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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents findings from a small-scale qualitative study offering an alternative 
framing of children’s humour and laughter in an early childhood education setting. The study 
employs a Bakhtinian carnivalesque lens to explore the nature of children’s humour in an 
urban nursery and investigate the framing of children’s humour and laughter outside the 
popular paradigm of developmental psychology. In addition, it addresses the challenge that 
children’s humour can present for early childhood practitioners, turning to Bakhtin’s analysis 
of carnival to frame children’s humour as carnivalesque. This conception is then offered as a 
part of a potential explanation for practitioners not having an opportunity to understand 
children’s humour, proposing that dominating, authoritative discourses within early 
childhood education play a significant role in this. The thesis draws on several theorists, 
including Bakhtin more widely, via a Dialogic methodology, to address reasons why humour 
is not valued, pedagogically, within the English early childhood field. Finally, the suggestion 
that it is profitable to view young children’s humour in the context of Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque is offered, and a case for reframing young children’s humour in an ECEC 
context as ‘carnivality’ is made. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
‘If you laugh at something, you’ve won already’ 
Joan Rivers 
 
 
Humour has been a subject of interest for thousands of years and has been debated ardently 
by prodigious thinkers, from Aristotle and Plato to Bergson and Freud (Raskin, 2008). 
Accordingly, it has been studied via a breadth of paradigmatic and philosophical angles. My 
profound interest in humour stems from childhood experiences of being surrounded by 
laughter and silliness; when humour began to have a principal role in my relationships with 
family and friends; the types of books, TV programmes and films I enjoyed; and, on 
reflection, in shaping my ability to cope with negative life experiences. My interest in 
children’s humour developed prominence when I trained as an early childhood practitioner in 
the 1990s and began working with young children. I could not help but notice how very 
young children of 2 and 3 years old would laugh, wholeheartedly, at something that seemed 
to touch their ‘sense of humour’. Prior to this, it had not crossed my mind to wonder, in any 
depth, about the nature of young children’s humour and its likeness, or not, to that of adults. 
Working with very young babies pressed my interest further and raised questions about the 
provocations for their laughter, and whether laughter was always a genuine response to 
humour or, when I found an 18-month-old child climbing upon a table and they burst into fits 
of manic, almost desperate, giggles, whether those chuckles were prompted by something 
other than humour. At that time, I began to consider my own experiences of humour as a 
child and an adult and to question how important humour was in my life, and life generally, 
but particularly - as my academic interest most certainly focused around young children - 
how important, significant and prominent humour is in children’s lives. 
 
I began to search for literature that would help me answer the questions I had about 
children’s humour and discovered a veritable dearth of literature on the subject.  However, 
whilst on this search, I stumbled across Brodzinsky and Rightmeyer’s suggestion that, ‘…the 
 11 
study of humour, and the individual difference factors affecting this phenomenon, helps to fill 
a glaring gap in the current research on human behavioural development’ (Brodzinsky and 
Rightmeyer, in McGhee 1980). At the time, I harboured an interest in child psychology and 
was fascinated by theories of cognitive development, which existed in abundance. Armed 
with a wealth of literature focused on developmental psychology, I embarked on my Master’s 
degree and considered focusing the study upon the development of humour and affecting 
factors. As this would have meant following a path underpinned predominantly by 
developmental psychology (McGhee, 1989) I reasoned that, although children’s humour 
should be the focus, a different approach was required given my background is not a purely 
psychological one. Consequently, I decided to explore the idea of the importance of humour 
and whether it warranted more attention within early years’ practice. The topic experienced a 
period in the research spotlight, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s but, until recently, there 
has been a significant absence of new research. The need to conduct a small-scale exploratory 
study in this area, therefore, was palpable. It prompted me to begin the project, undertaken in 
the hope it could form even a small part of a resurgence of interest.  
 
1.1 Why focus on children’s humour in the context ECEC? 
Of interest to me are the social implications of children’s humour. Here, in the west, humour 
seems to hold a special place in people’s collective heart and it has been conceptualised by 
sociologists as ‘a form of spontaneous behaviour and expression of sub-cultural norms’ 
which prompts, ‘…shared resistance to the social pressures and tensions created by the 
formal organisation of the wider environment (Linstead and Holdaway: 1999, xvii). This 
resonates with the social environment of English ECEC settings and is an idea that this study 
will probe and explore alongside the suggestion that the current picture of children’s humour 
in early years’ settings (EYS’s) is, potentially, unhelpful: an idea stemming from my own 
experiences and from master’s research. The inaccurate picture of children’s humour may 
have been influenced by dominant social constructions of children and childhood, created 
because of early childhood practitioners’ life experiences, and societal influences prevalent 
within ECEC. Social constructions of childhood are influential within early childhood 
training and introduced to students via the content of many courses (Nutbrown, 2013). 
Personal experience of being a student and lecturer says that the conceptions of the naturally 
developing child (Jenks and Prout, 1998) and of children as a ‘tabula rasa’, or blank slates 
(Jenks and Prout, 1998) are introduced on nationally accredited ECEC courses (Nutbrown, 
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2013). The notion of the naturally developing child emanates from the wealth of content 
within professional early childhood courses that focuses, in some way, on the theories of 
Piaget (Athey, 1976). The view of children as blank slates is introduced to students of early 
childhood as part of an historical overview of social constructions of childhood (James, Jenks 
and Prout, 1998) and, although this idea is generally not championed by teachers/lecturers, it 
is likely to resonate with many students’ lived experiences and ideas about childhood formed 
as a result of a likely susceptibility to societal influences (1998). That this resonance occurs 
for students seems to make it more likely that ideas about children will be consolidated for 
them during their influential experiences of training to become ECEC professionals 
(Nutbrown, 2012) and therefore, more likely that the ideas will underpin students’ beliefs 
about what constitutes desirable practice. This has ramifications for the plight of children’s 
humour as a pedagogically significant and important consideration within the ECEC field. 
 
 
1.2 A conflict within English ECEC between the notions of ‘child as competent’ and 
‘child as naturally developing’? 
 
An apparent anomaly exists between the idea of the naturally developing child and child as 
blank slate and the championing of framing children as competent and as ‘protagonists’ 
(Edwards and Gandini, 2011) within ECEC professional courses (Nutbrown, 2013). It could 
be argued that the idea of children as competent and capable is unlikely to become a 
meaningful part of an ECEC practitioner’s personal philosophy because it conflicts too 
strongly with notions of the naturally developing child and child as a blank slate so visible 
and influential within the ECEC professional training (Nutbrown, 2013).  
 
1.3 The influence of a predominantly female workforce on early years’ practice 
 
The early years’ workforce is predominantly female (Rodd, 2013). Gender and its influence 
upon practitioner perceptions of themselves and of children may be relevant, therefore, 
particularly if we accept Luke’s supposition that children and women are grouped together 
because, in a paternalistic society, they are ‘not men’. This reflects Nussbaum’s arguments 
that ‘unequal social and political circumstances give women unequal human capabilities’ 
(2000:1). This prompts us to ask how these ideas may impact upon female ECEC 
practitioners’ perception of their role and relationship with children. Moreover, this raises 
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questions over the potential effects of this on practitioners’ perceptions of children’s humour. 
For example, if practitioners are in the same ‘group’ as children they may have been afforded 
the impression that they have an affinity with them, and experience subsequent 
disequilibrium when children engage in humorous behaviours that they do not understand or 
cannot empathise with. Arguably this is a theme worth pursuing and therefore is addressed by 
this research. 
 
1.4 Perceptions of children’s humour within ECE  
Following the line of thought put forward in this chapter, it can be argued that if children’s 
humour-related behaviours fit within the realm of ‘acceptable humour’ and converge with the 
social constructions of children and childhood (as argued earlier in the chapter) then 
practitioners’ expectations of  children will not be challenged. This may result in practitioners 
experiencing a sense of equilibrium. Humour-related behaviours that sit within the realm of 
what may be perceived as ‘challenging humour’, however, potentially conflict with the social 
constructions of childhood illustrated earlier. If this were the case, these potential challenges 
to ECEC practitioner’s view of ‘a child’ may create discord with practitioner’s expectations 
of children, resulting in unmediated responses from practitioners towards children and, 
therefore, children receiving unsatisfactory support, or no support with this. 
 
This study explores young children’s humour by adopting an alternative approach to those 
that arguably dominate, currently: namely the Bakhtinian carnivalesque. Chapter two 
provides a discussion of the existing literature on children’s humour and that addresses the 
issues raised, here. Chapter three explains the inextricably linked theoretical and 
methodological application of Bakhtinian theories, and discusses the ways in which they 
underpin this research. Chapter four presents the methodological approach and describes the 
research methods that are adopted within the study. Chapter five is an in-depth analysis of the 
data generated within this project; and chapter six engages the reader in a discussion of the 
findings and argues the implications they have for ECEC practice and future research. The 
next chapter begins with a review of the literature that stands before this research and finishes 
by introducing the study’s guiding research questions. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
At the heart of this research project lies the idea that all human beings possess a sense of 
humour. A wealth of literature exists spanning many centuries, outlining theories that claim 
to explain where our sense of humour originates and offering descriptions of its nature and 
role. The following chapter details salient aspects of this literature. It is important to note that 
this thesis is not concerned with identifying a new theory of humour; instead, it is concerned 
with attempting to understand the nature and role of children’s humour, as well as 
perceptions of children’s humour, within the context of an early childhood setting. 
Consequently, a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all relevant literature is beyond this 
study’s scope. However, an overview of pertinent literature and ideas is offered to provide a 
sound base from which to conduct a more in-depth exploration of children’s humour 
research.  
 
Humour has been a topic of interest for scholars dating back to Aristotelian times. The 
following section briefly follows the course of humour studies, thematically not 
chronologically, to establish prominent discourses in humour research that relate to this 
study. From here, the chapter moves away from general humour research towards research 
focusing on the topic at the core of this study: young children’s humour (with a focus on 3-5-
year-olds). The notion of whether young children’s humour research mirrors the course of 
general humour research with regards to underpinning theory is explored. Finally, the strong 
connection between humour and play is argued, leading into a proposal that adopting a 
Bakhtinian approach to children’s humour could be advantageous for young children and the 
field of early childhood education. 
 
2.2 Definitions of humour  
The polysemic nature of humour (McGhee, 1989) may endure because ‘...humour differs 
from serious discourse in requiring at least a duality of meaning and often a multiplicity of 
opposing meanings' (Mulkay, 1988: 30). As a concept, humour has experienced a series of 
definition changes over time, evolving from a corporeal to a psychological, sociological, 
philosophical and anthropological phenomenon. One of the most primitive understandings of 
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humour (humores) was as bodily fluids. Hippocrates (400 BC) wrote that blood, mucus, and 
yellow and dark bile were integral for health and wellbeing (Schubert and Leschhorn, 2006). 
Later, in Medieval times the meaning of humour began to develop, and, possibly due to the 
common belief that the relative proportions of these ‘humores’ were inextricably linked with 
temperament, was a peculiar personality trait. The move toward a dynamic term, when a 
connection with the ability to connect with and delineate the comic became associated with 
humour, was instigated by Corbyn Morris in 1744. Morris offered a definition of humour as 
‘any remarkable Oddity or Foible belonging to a Person in real life’ acknowledging that ‘it 
gives more delight and pleasure than wit’ (Morris, 1744). 
Much of the current humour theory aligns with Mulkay’s comments and affirms that a 
definitive meaning of the word is difficult to identify (McGhee, 1989; Monro, 1988). 
Moreover, most research into the development of humour focuses upon a broad definition of 
the word (McGhee, 1989; Monro, 1988). McGhee claims that at least since the era of 
Aristotle, if not before, philosophers have debated the ‘nature and significance of humour’ 
(McGhee, 1989: 1); and its ambiguous or ambivalent nature may have guided much of their 
discussion. McGhee also proffers that, although humour has been a source of conjecture and 
discussion for many years, it has not enjoyed popularity as a research topic and, even 
considering the increase of research interest in humour in the 1970s and 1980s, until the 
2000s there were still relatively few studies on the nature and significance of children’s 
humour (McGhee, 1989; Tallant, 2015).  
2.3 Perspectives on and theories of humour  
2.3.1 The influential presence of the psychology of humour within humour research 
According to Loizou (2006), within the psychological discipline there are two key theoretical 
perspectives on humour: the ‘psychoanalytic’ and ‘cognitive’ (Loizou, 2006: 425). A 
particularly influential figure associated with the psychoanalytic theory is Freud (1928) and 
supporters of the perspective include Winnicott (1970); Levine (1980). Freud argues that 
jokes occur when the conscious permits thoughts stifled by society. He suggests the superego 
permits the ego to produce humour. A munificent superego sanctions a reassuring type of 
humour while an unsympathetic superego generates a scathing and sardonic type of humour. 
Freud stipulates that it is possible for the superego to banish humour all together (Freud, 
1928) and, in later life, focused more on the notion that some people are not ever able to 
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appreciate or produce humour (McGhee, 1989; Bergen, 2002, 2016). As this study does not 
adopt a psychoanalytical stance it would seem prudent to refer to Freud’s theory – a well-
established and scrutinised theory of humour – to offer its essence without going into great 
detail. However, it would be remiss not to discuss some of the main elements of Freud’s 
theory as they are supported by many theorists interested in children’s humour including 
Wolfenstein (1954), Kris (1940) and even by McGhee (1979), despite his primary focus on 
developmental psychology. For McGhee, the elements of Freud’s theory which suggest that 
humour can act as a coping mechanism, allowing us to deal with stress and anxiety more 
effectively, were of interest. Wolfenstein’s (1954) theory stipulates that humour is a 
procedure that turns a negative experience (for example frustration or guilt when faced with 
all-powerful adults and the constraints they impose) into a positive one. The contents of 
humour over the course of childhood reflect the concerns which mark the successive steps of 
emotional development and which were at one time associated with worry or anxiety 
(Wolfenstein, 1954). Like Wolfenstein, Kris focuses on the links between humour and 
anxiety and argues that children get pleasure from ‘the memory of an averted superfluous 
anxiety’ (Kris, 1940: 209) and subsequently can produce humour from the sense of relief. 
Although, as previously mentioned, McGhee has been found to support aspects of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory (1989), he has been one of the main proponents of the cognitive 
perspectives, supporters of which hold that, ‘humour occurs when there is a restructuring of a 
pattern of elements’ (Kuchner in Loizou, 2006: 425). Particularly, McGhee argues that 
humour occurs because of the appreciation of incongruity, and this work will be discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter. Attardo (1994) adds a third perspective or ‘family’ to 
Loizou’s two: the ‘social’, as he suggests there are psychological theories of humour which 
do not sit happily under the cognitive or psychoanalytic umbrellas. He argues that the most 
well-known theories of humour fall into each of these three families, as seen in Fig i.  
Cognitive Social Psychoanalytic 
Incongruity Hostility Release 
Contrast Aggression Sublimation 
 Superiority Liberation 
 Triumph Economy 
 Derision  
 Disparagement  
Fig. 1 
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In the domain of psychology, and across a range of academic disciplines (Morreall, 2009) 
there are three groups of humour theories in sync with the cognitive, social and 
psychoanalytic perspectives and much of the literature reports these groups are the three main 
humour theories (Raskin, 2008). They are commonly known as the Incongruity Theories 
(with foundations in the Cognitive family); the Superiority Theories (with foundations in the 
Social family) and the Relief Theories (with foundations in the Psychoanalytic family) 
(Monro, 1988).  
The ‘Superiority Theories’ have biblical origins and can be said to have begun with Plato, 
going on to dominate Western views of laughter for over 200 years (Morreall, 2009). They 
contend that we laugh at others because they have some failing or defect, or because they 
find themselves at a disadvantage in some way or suffer some small misfortune, and this 
allows us to feel superior: a response we find humour in. The theory is underpinned by the 
view that all humour is derisive. A more contemporary perspective of this theory is offered 
by Scruton (in Morreall, 2009b). He suggests that if someone is unhappy about being laughed 
at it is because of a perception that laughter communicates a devaluing of its object. Several 
humour researchers have, however, refused to accept the view that humorous incongruity 
involves degradation of something by linking it to something trivial or disreputable (Monro, 
1988). This group of thinkers not only hold that incongruity is quite distinct from 
degradation, but insist that incongruity, not degradation, is the most essential feature of all 
humour: they subscribe to the ‘Incongruity Theories’. McGhee proffers that ‘[t]here is almost 
total consensus among researchers that humour is related to comprehending (humour 
reaction) or producing (humour creation) an “incongruity” (McGhee, 1989:17).  As 
previously identified, this does not lead to all researchers supporting the ‘Incongruity 
Theories’. Some prefer to hold onto the premises of the two other prominent models (Raskin, 
2008). Since humour often calls social conventions into question a third set of theories to 
arise, contesting the superiority theories (Morreall, 2009) and commonly known as the 
‘Relief Theories’, maintains that humour affords us relief from the restraint of conforming to 
those requirements (Monro, 1988); Freud’s psychoanalytic offerings being the main 
contribution to this set of theories. Morreall provides a helpful analogy offering strong 
imagery of the theories as ‘an hydraulic explanation in which laughter does in the nervous 
system what a pressure-relief valve does in a steam boiler’. Freud’s approach involved the 
analysis of three contexts for laughter: der Witz or ‘joking’; the comic; and humour. Morreall 
explains that each of these situations involves laughter releasing nervous energy that built up 
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in anticipation of being needed for a psychological exercise but became surplus once when 
the exercise was discarded (Morreall, 2009). Relating to the three main theories outlined 
here, a close reading of the available literature suggests that studies of children’s humour - 
adopting data-collection methods including observations, child consultations and case-studies 
- appear, for the most-part, to subscribe to the Incongruity Theories (Mcghee, 1989; Hobday-
Kusch and McVittie, 2002; Loizou, 2005, 2006). This approach seems to fit effectively with 
the majority of empirical evidence regarding children’s appreciation and expression of 
humour. 
 
Clarke’s (2008) evolutional psychology theory stems from one of the most recent studies into 
the significance of humour: the ‘Pattern Recognition Theory’. His theory claims to provide a 
definitive explanation of humour. Clarke attempts to clarify how and why we find things 
funny. In addition, he claims to identify that the reason humour is common to all human 
societies is its fundamental role in the evolution of homo sapiens and its continuing 
importance in the development of infants. Clarke argues that underlying all forms of humour 
is a pattern, and it is the recognition of this pattern, which evokes a humorous response in us. 
He says that the content of humour is necessary, initially, but once that content has been 
accounted for, it is the recognition of the pattern that we turn to and which makes the humour 
meaningful (Clarke, 2008). Clarke recognises the significant link between cognitive and brain 
development and humour and suggests that humour ‘is a process by which the child is being 
encouraged to repeat or hone specific neuronal activity’ (Clarke, 2008: 61). Further, he 
argues that this process and the child’s developing ability to recognise patterns, and therefore 
humour is to an extent essentially innate, although likely to be influenced through social 
interaction (2008). Significantly, in relation to the present study’s focus on Bakhtinian 
subjectivity, Clarke stresses that ‘[p]attern recognition remains a subjective matter, just like 
any other perception’ (Clarke, 2009, online). The idea of humour being subjective, generally, 
is one that bears careful consideration when analysing young children’s humour expression 
as it may influence the way individual children engage with humour, as well as adult 
perceptions of this engagement. 
 
Clarke’s emphasis on the social aspects of humour supports Attardo’s (1994) suggestion of a 
third ‘family’ of theories that supplements the psychoanalytic and cognitive families and 
promotes an aspect of humour that bridges the potential gap between mind/brain-based 
theories, and those that sit within alternative paradigms such as philosophy, sociology and 
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anthropology (Raskin, 2008). Moreover, this line of thinking leads us to consider the need to 
address the prolonged gap within children’s humour literature that exists between 
psychological and alternative approaches to it. 
 
2.3.2 The sociology of humour and its relevance to the ECEC context 
 
Koller (1988) posits that there are five functions associated with humour. The first function, 
he argues, is social bonding. In this scenario children share their humour with other people 
and form bonds, a sense of worth and develop an identity as part of a group, enhancing their 
aptitude to communicate. Second to this, Koller suggests another function is as relief from 
stress and strain. He proffers that children require liberation from real and perceived 
constraints and adult expectations that can instigate anxiety and tension. The third social 
function of humour in Koller’s typology is as a celebration of life. He proposes that humour 
has an important role in children’s development of positive dispositions. The penultimate 
function, Koller suggests, focuses on the enjoyment children experience on discovering 
adults are fallible: a revelation that children’s find empowering. The final function is of 
provoking thought.  This theory suggests humour can rouse children’s inquisitiveness, 
motivate them to embrace challenging tasks, and motivate them to engage in divergent 
thinking (ibid). Further, and significantly in the context of the present study, Lockyer argues 
that in analysing humour, seriously, we are not being ‘anti-humour’ or advocating that people 
should stop laughing. On the contrary, it is to argue that ‘in its various communicative acts, 
humour forms a distinct modality of human interaction, universal in occurrence yet highly 
particular in how it operates and how it is sanctioned within different societies and different 
historical periods’ (Lockyer, 2008: 809). This is an idea I will return to later in the thesis, due 
to its potential relevance to perceptions of humour and children’s humour in an ECEC 
context, and how these relate to children’s expression of and responses to humour. 
 
 
2.4 Humour and laughter  
 
In any thorough and rigorous study of children’s humour it is essential to explore the links 
between humour and laughter: laughter being arguably the most familiar indication of 
humour appreciation (Provine, 1996). Smiling and laughter are often considered a direct 
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response to the appreciation of humour or finding something ‘funny’. The synonymy of 
humour and laughter is well documented, and research highlights a strong link between the 
two (McGhee, 1989). However, also highlighted is the idea that they are not inextricably 
linked, and one can occur without the other (Chapman and Foot, 1980). Giles and Oxford’s 
1970s research maintains there are six types of laughter aside from humorous laughter: 
social, ignorance, anxiety, derision, apologetic and the phenomenon of tickling (Giles and 
Oxford, 1970 in Chapman and Foot, 1980). The suggestion that laughter is not always evoked 
by humour is an important factor to note when exploring children’s production and 
appreciation of humour as it could be easy to misinterpret children’s laughter. For researchers 
of children’s humour, this insight is crucial. Giles and Oxford’s study is not the only one 
worthy of note, here.  More recently, Pinheiro et al.’s research into laughter involved looking 
at the attention gaining qualities of sudden and ‘emotionally salient’ vocalisations and 
concluded that ‘vocal emotions may be differently processed based on task relevance and 
valence…[and]…[i]ncreased anticipation and attention to positive vocal cues (laughter) may 
reflect their high social relevance’ (Pinheiro et al., 2017: 11). This adds weight to the notion 
that laughter has a largely social function (Attardo, 1994). Giles et al (1970) concede that 
these examples of laughter stimuli are not necessarily discrete, and that humorous laughter 
may be accompanied by some of the criteria identified above but most particularly, by social 
factors. This is supported by McGhee’s (1979) suggestion that humour researchers, ‘…can 
only make an educated guess regarding humour perceptions on the basis of behavioural cues’ 
(McGhee, 1979: 68).   
 
2.5 Humour and child development: the origins of children’s humour research  
To date, several academics have focused on children’s humour and how its development 
pattern tallies with other aspects of children’s development (Raskin, 2008). These studies 
have predominantly excluded young children. The most significant scholar in the area of 
children’s humour (with a focus on children from birth to 8 years old) is Paul McGhee (1979; 
1980; 1989). With his roots in psychology, McGhee tenders that although we had learned 
much about the humour of adolescents in the years preceding 1988, in developmental terms 
we had learned very little as pre-school aged children were rarely, if ever, the subjects of 
humour research (McGhee, 1989). McGhee proceeded to conduct psychological 
investigations into the development of humour and its clear relationship with the path of 
many other areas of child development (McGhee, 1989).  McGhee notes general agreements 
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amongst work with children that suggest, ‘there is an important link between children’s play 
and humour’ (McGhee, 1989: 8) an idea strengthened through his study of children aged 3-5 
years old. Shultz (in McGhee and Chapman, 1980) goes further, suggesting that imaginative 
play is particularly significant given that the development of humour relies upon children’s 
ability to appreciate the symbolic but does not believe that children acquire this capability 
until around 7 years old. McGhee (1989) concurs with Shultz regarding the link between 
imagination and humour but adds that the presence of theory of mind is required (McGhee, 
1980) for children to appreciate an incongruity, and most psychology scholars agree children 
acquire theory of mind at around 18 months old (Leslie, 1987). Pre-1980s, and the 
understanding that children as young as 18 months old are able to distinguish between 
pretense and reality, researchers assumed that children did not develop theory of mind and, 
therefore, a ‘sense of humour’ until much older (McGhee, 1980). This idea may have 
contributed to the lack of focus on young children within past humour research as scholars 
laboured under this potentially false belief.  
As an outcome of his work with children, McGhee (1979) developed a theory centred within 
the Cognitive perspective and Incongruity Theories that mapped the development and 
appreciation of humour in children through four stages. Each of the four stages is based upon 
the development of cognitive abilities which enable the child to recognize and demonstrate 
cognitive incongruities. The four stages are as follows: Stage One: Incongruous Actions 
Towards Objects; Stage Two: Incongruous Labelling of Objects and Events; Stage Three: 
Conceptual Incongruity; Stage Four: Humour in Multiple Meanings – or the First Step toward 
Adult Humour (McGhee, 1979). McGhee’s humour stages bear correlation with Piaget’s 
(2007) stage model of child development in assuming that until children reach a certain point 
in their development, they are unable to appreciate or produce humour of particular forms. 
Pober (2008: 80) supports this, arguing that ‘the typical sequence of humour and play 
development show a close relationship to the stages of cognitive development’. I argue that 
the dominance of Piagetian thinking in English ECEC (Canella, 1997; Dahlberg, Moss and 
Pence, 1999; MacNaughton, 2005; Grieshaber and McArdle, 2010; Rogers, 2011; Tallant 
2015) and the link between Piaget’s and McGhee’s theories may have bearing on the Early 
Years Foundation Stage (DfE, 2012) Curriculum’s only interest in humour being the 
development of understanding in relation to jokes, in children between 30 and 60 months old 
(Tallant, 2015).  
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The first of McGhee’s stages begins at 18 months with the development of symbolic thought 
and therefore symbolic play. Further, amongst humour researchers, McGhee’s developmental 
spectrum did not stand uncontested. As previously mentioned, unlike McGhee (1979), who 
argues that as soon as young children can perceive an incongruity in fantasy play (around 
eighteen months old) she finds humour in it, Shultz (1980) argues that the appreciation of 
incongruity humour relies upon a child’s capability to discover an incongruity, understand it, 
and appreciate its resolution. He suggests that young children, although often able to 
comprehend the resolution of incongruity (or, are able find meaning in it), this does not 
contribute to their appreciation of humour until they are around seven or eight years old. He 
suggests that an incongruity is humorous to a young child because it does not make sense, not 
because it does not make sense in an unexpected way (McGhee on Shultz, 1979). Pien and 
Rothbart (1980) challenge both McGhee and Shultz and argue that humour may occur earlier 
than eighteen months old and suggest that ‘the development of symbolic play capacities and 
fantasy assimilation are not necessary for the appreciation of incongruity humour’ (Pien and 
Rothbart, 1980: 3). Instead, they suggest that children only need perceive an incongruity and 
interpret it playfully and that this can occur roughly at four months old (1980). The second of 
McGhee’s stages states that ‘incongruous labels for incongruous events may be combined 
with incongruous actions directed towards objects, or the child may create purely verbal 
incongruities’. This stage is epitomised by, ‘the absence of action toward objects’ and 
McGhee argues that within this stage, ‘physical activity may occur, but it is not central... [and 
it is] [t]he verbal statement alone [that] creates incongruity and leads to laughter’ (McGhee, 
1979: 69). Further, he argues that it is in this stage that children develop their capability for 
abstract thought and that this is a definitive characteristic of the second stage.  
McGhee’s third stage involves the emergence of conceptual thought when children reach 
about 3 years old. They begin to understand that a word does not refer to a single object, but 
rather to a category of objects sharing common distinctive features that differentiate them 
from other objects. In this third stage, the child’s mode of thought is based exclusively on the 
perceptual characteristics of objects or events, and this is in striking contrast to the fourth 
stage, which will be highlighted in a moment. Humour at this third stage is centred on 
incongruities related to appearance. In its verbal expression, it consists of the invention of 
nonsense words, enjoyment of rhymed sequences, and laughter when hearing words with 
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unexpected pronunciations, as though what was most important was the distortion of the 
‘physical’ aspect of the word (i.e. its sound, and not its meaning). This aspect of stage three 
reflects the work of Chukovsky who writes of the pleasure children find in distorting reality 
through creating what he terms ‘topsy-turvies’ (Chukovsky, 1968). McGhee argues that it is 
not until Stage 4, at around 6 years old, that children’ humour begins to be recognisable as 
adult humour. He argues that this stage is characterised by understanding of linguistic 
ambiguities. Although McGhee has his critics, these stages remain an accepted model for 
researching children’s humour (Loizou, 2006).  
 
2.6 Humour and early childhood education and care (ECEC)  
The body of children’s humour research appears to harbour a sizeable chronological gap 
between the activity of McGhee, Chapman and Foot, Shultz and others in the 1980s and the 
2000s when the field became active again. During this hiatus, a relatively small number of 
journal articles and research projects, predominantly reiterating findings from earlier 
research, were reported but it was not until the new millennium that the field regained 
momentum. A number of themes frame the seminal studies and papers about the topics 
relevant to this study. The following section discusses them under the following ideas: 
developmental framings of children’s humour in early childhood education and care; 
alternative framings of children’s humour in early childhood education and care; Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque; pedagogical values in early childhood education and care: practitioner and 
curricular perspectives. 
 
2.6.1 Recent developmental studies of humour within Early Childhood Education and Care 
(ECEC) 
Cohen (2011) suggests that since at least 1997 a significant range of academics have 
expressed concern over the dominance of developmental discourses in early childhood 
education (Canella, 1997; Dahlberg, Moss and Pence, 1999; MacNaughton, 2005; Grieshaber 
and McArdle, 2010; Rogers, 2011; Tallant 2015): a significant reason for the present study 
adopting a focus outside this domain. It seems clear that this developmental theme, so 
dominant across the field, is reflected within the body of children’s humour research: a good 
reason to adopt an alternative framing that explores children’s humour from a fresh 
perspective. The following section offers an introduction to the more recent, key research in 
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the field of children’ humour some of which follows the focus on developmental approaches 
and some within which the disciplinary boundaries are less defined. 
Eleni Loizou (2004) conducted a study that explored ways that the environment in an ECEC 
setting can impact upon young children’ experiences of humour and, subsequently, their 
development and learning. A range of qualitative data collection methods were employed 
including observations, interviews, research journals, video, and document review. The study 
focused on the capacity of the environment to contribute or detract from children’s 
experiences of humour. Two prime themes emerged relating to the larger notion of 
environment. The first focused on curriculum and was manifest in: the underpinning 
philosophy of the baby room; interactions; activities, their makeup and situation; and 
materials and their purpose. Secondly, five behaviours in response to children’s humorous 
actions were discovered within the caregiver role: directing, observing and making 
suggestions, active participation, initiation and verbal facilitation. Loizou reported that an 
adaptable, child-centred, play-based environment where playful practitioners can enrich 
children’s experiences of humour are factors that can have a positive impact on young 
children’ overall development and learning (2004). 
 
Building upon the connection between humour and play, Loizou’s (2005) next study explored 
the idea of young children’s humour as a form of play. The study considered the impact of 
this conception on young children’s learning and, in particular, their cognitive development. 
The study context was a university ECEC setting and a variety of qualitative data collection 
methods were utilised. The findings suggested that the occurrences of humour recorded 
happened when the children were involved in play scenarios. For example, some children 
were involved in playing with materials; others in playing with language; some children were 
engaged with imaginative play; and finally, a number of children were enjoying physical 
play. Loizou suggests these forms of play can be transformed into examples of humour 
because of the creativity demonstrated by the children during these activities. In addition, 
there was evidence of children transforming routine events into playful humour.  Loizou 
(2005) argues that a range of socio-cognitive characteristics; for example, social interaction, 
creative thinking and metacognitive experience need to be considered when exploring the 
relationship between play, creativity and humour. A second study conducted in 2005 focused 
on how six infants in a group child care setting produced and appreciated humour. With the 
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use of multiple qualitative methods - participant and non‐participant observations; journal 
writing; video; interviewing; and document review - this study looked at children’s humour 
as indicated through their smiles and laughter. Findings suggest that there are two theories 
that best describe young children’s humorous behaviour: The Theory of the Absurd and the 
Empowerment Theory. The Theory of the Absurd includes events that are out of the ordinary 
and violate children’s existing schemata. It emphasizes the incongruity of an event through 
funny gestures or positions, the incongruous use of materials and actions. Empowerment 
Theory describes young children’s ability to violate the expectations of their caregivers and 
use humour to empower themselves. It highlights a different form of incongruity which has to 
do with the violation of expectations, intentionally or otherwise. 
 
Two years later, Loizou (2007) investigated the humorous activity of two infants, 18 and 21 
months old, in their infant group childcare setting. This was a qualitative study that followed 
two infants for four months. Through participant and non‐participant observations, journal 
writing and interviews, data were collected on children’s involvement in humorous activity. 
The findings suggest that the two infants were involved in producing and appreciating 
incongruities as well as empowering themselves by violating the rules within their childcare 
setting. Simultaneously, there were distinct differences in the way they were involved in 
humorous events and personal and social knowledge. Reactions from caregivers also 
impacted their humorous behaviours. An individual profile was constructed for each child 
that highlighted their uniqueness and own way of regulating their social selves through the 
production and appreciation of humour. 
 
Loizou’s most recent qualitative study (2011) had two phases and explored the humorous 
aspects of humorous photographs young children took at school and home. The images were 
viewed through the lens of Loizou’s ‘theory of the absurd’ and ‘empowerment theory’. The 
study involved three boys and three girls between four and six years old. Phase one involved 
the children being offered a disposable camera and asked to photograph anything they 
considered humorous and made them laugh in their school and at home. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in which the children described their photographs and offered 
thoughts about why they were funny. Phase two took place six months later. During this 
phase the children returned to their humorous photographs and discussed them. Findings 
suggested that nursery children’ own definitions of humour as seen in the photographs they 
 26 
took can be framed by a framework comprising the two theories. Loizou reports that the 
children referred to incongruity, ‘something out of the ordinary’ which she describes as ‘a 
cognitive process’. Further, the children demonstrated social agency via using relationships in 
their social circle to produce and appreciate humour. A final finding suggested that the use of 
a camera can usefully be thought of as a ‘creative and empowering tool’ that engages 
children in the research process more meaningfully. 
 
Arguably Eleni Loizou has engaged in the most in-depth study of the field since the time 
McGhee was in full swing. However, she is not the only current children’s humour researcher 
of note. Elena Hoicka has engaged in research that resonates with Loizou’s but also offers 
new and different insights. Hoicka et al. (2008) investigated humour as a context for learning 
about conceptions of abstraction and disbelief. Parents were monitored whilst reading 
humorous and non-humorous books to their children. The study’s findings suggest that 
humour dominates as a form of wrongness in books written for 1- to 2-year-olds and that it 
seems to invite the use of abstract words and imagery. Moreover, they found that parents 
offered more extra textual references whilst sharing humorous books with toddlers, and that 
this increased their exposure to ‘high abstraction and belief-based language’, arguably 
encouraging children towards the development of divergent thinking (Donaldson, 1978). 
  
Following on from this work, Hoicka and Achtar (2011) investigated 30 and 36-month-old 
English speakers’ capacity to construct jokes, comprehend there is a difference between 
humorous and sincere intentions, and distinguish between English- and foreign-language 
speakers. This was investigated via the children’s engagement in two tasks. The first, the 
Giving Task, involved a researcher requesting one of two familiar objects and a partner 
always giving the wrong object. In the Naming task, the partner misnamed familiar objects. 
Under the English-speaking conditions, after doing something wrongly, the partner laughed 
(labelled as English-Humour) or said, ‘There!’ (labelled as English-Sincere). Under the 
Foreign conditions, the French- or Italian-speaking partner laughed (labelled as Foreign-
Humour) or said, ‘D’accord!’ or ‘Va bene!’ (labelled as Foreign-Sincere). The children were 
then asked to pass and label the same objects to the researchers, followed by a new collection 
of familiar objects. The findings showed the children were significantly more likely to 
emulate ‘doing the wrong thing’ in the Humour versus Sincere conditions, and in the English 
versus Foreign conditions. This showed that children were more likely joke with those who 
offered humour, but this was particularly the case when the partner was English speaking.  
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The following year, Hoicka (2012) conducted another series of studies exploring young 
children’s humour as ‘a complex socio-cognitive phenomenon’ by investigating 2 and 3-year-
olds’ humour production with their parents. She examined whether children produced 
original humour, whether they signalled their humour, and the types of humour engaged in. 
Forty-seven parents were interviewed, and filmed joking with their children. Other parents 
were asked to complete a survey. According to the parents’ reports, the children copied jokes 
between 0-1 years and produce original jokes from 2 years. Three-year-olds produced 
predominantly original humour; 2-year-olds produced original and mimicked humour equally 
regularly. Also reported by parents was that children laugh, smile, and seek a reaction when 
they joke. During play, 2- and 3-year-olds engaged in these behaviours more when creating 
humorous versus non-humorous actions. In both the reports and play sessions, the children 
created original object-based (e.g., socks on hands) and conceptual humour (e.g., ‘dog says 
miaow) and used incorrect labels for humorous effect (e.g., calling a cow a sheep). Hoicka 
concluded that both the reports from parents and the children’s behaviour confirmed that 
young children create original humour and demonstrate the sharing of their own humour 
through smiles, laughs, and seeking a reaction. 
 
As seen in the theory illustrated throughout this chapter, a large percentage of the research 
into young children’s humour focuses on children over the age of 1 year. Vasuvedi Reddy’s 
(2001) research focused on how the development of humour has largely neglected children 
aged 0-1 year and, specifically, humour production by these very young children. She carried 
out two longitudinal studies with parents of children aged between 7 and 11 months. The 
findings indicated, via interviews with the parents, that the children were said to make others 
laugh by repeating actions on purpose, so as to re-create the laughter that accompanied their 
actions the first time. The children’s actions are likened to the activities of clowns, that 
showed numerous commonalities and ‘developmental continuities’. Significantly, these 
findings suggest that the origins of humour may lie earlier in childhood than has been 
accepted up to now. Humour production, Reddy argues, can be seen in these types of 
engagements and can be seen therefore as part of an interactional as opposed to individual 
process. In addition, Reddy suggests that these findings indicate humour is an emotional 
process, as well as cognitive. 
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2.6.2 Alternative framings of humour in early childhood education and care (ECEC) 
 
Cohen (2011) suggests a need for early childhood education to look beyond developmental 
discourses for theoretical frames that may help us to reimagine what we think we know about 
early childhood education. Aside from a relatively wide range of studies within the 
developmental domain, there exist a number of studies that adopt alternative approaches. As 
this study follows Cohen’s advice in embracing an alternative approach, these studies are of 
particular relevance and are consequently discussed here.  
 
Sutton-Smith and Abrams’ (1978) research findings suggested that young children use names 
of sexual organs or bodily functions because they elicit humour for them; for example ‘wee’, 
‘poo’, ‘bum’. They found that this transformed somewhat once children reached aged 8 and 
over, at which time they preferred language and imagery that adults made clear they thought 
of as taboo, for example “cunts”, “tits”, and “eating shit”. The use of profanities and 
scatological language is also documented elsewhere; for example, Katch (2007) whose data 
emphasises children’s engagement with this language. She suggests that an explanation for 
young children’s engagement with such language could be credited to the common 
appearance of such words and phrases; for example, in a variety of popular books and 
television programmes that children may encounter in their everyday lives. Cohen’s (2011) 
research supports the presence of profanity in young children’s communications, similar to 
those in Katch’s study. She reports that some four-year-old children in her research used what 
they might perceive as socially offensive, scatological language in a mood of illicit festivity. 
Sutton Smith suggests that children’s engagement with this type of language might be 
because they enjoy the experience of it creeping into the ECEC setting to trouble the status 
quo (Sutton Smith, 1998). Building on children’s enjoyment and positive perception of 
potentially illicit behaviours as festive, Cohen argues that children and ECEC practitioners 
could benefit from the adults adopting a child’s perspective; thereby viewing play as 
carnivalesque instead of succumbing to the strong inclination to frame play using more 
traditional lenses (Cohen, 2011). Adopting a ‘child perspective’ differs from what Sommer et 
al. call ‘children’s perspectives’. They argue that the latter ‘represent children’s experiences, 
perceptions and understanding in their life world’ (2010: 23), as opposed to a ‘child 
perspective’ that represents the more abstract concept of how adults ‘think’ children perceive 
the world (Sommer et al. 2010). This distinction between ‘child’ and ‘children’’ perspectives 
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is significant and will require attention when analysing children’s experiences of humour and 
practitioner responses. 
 
Studies of the types of books that young children  read by choice have found that a primary 
factor is humour, particularly scatological humour. McKenzie suggests that children’s 
habitation within an ‘underground culture’ where they can enjoy ‘bawdy’ humour has been a 
familiar idea for some time thanks to a substantial volume of popular folklore literature, and 
verbal rhymes and stories (McKenzie, 2005). The corporeality attached to the image of 
‘bawdy’ humour, Klor argues, links to children’s interest in the human body and that related 
humour manifests in the broadest, silliest ways involving silly words and sounds, 
incongruous actions and spoofs and that these are most likely to make young children laugh. 
This may be because these are situations that young children feel an affinity with and 
therefore expert in. This sits well with Klor’s suggestion, that children enjoy situations where 
they feel they know more than adults because they are afforded so little control in their lives 
that any opportunity to correct an adult’s mistake or tell them what to do is very welcome 
(Klor, 1991: 10). Further, the notion that young children’s desire for peer recognition and 
social status, arguably as they facilitate opportunities to engage in performances with and for 
each other, might explain why these traditional themed collections have remained popular 
(Klor, 1991).  
 
Building on McKenzie’s idea that children have a fervent interest in scatological humour, 
Lambirth (2003) suggests that the pleasure children experience when engaging with this form 
of humour may, for some adults, evoke fear of the potential ramifications of children’s 
interaction with themes of this nature. This has strong links with Sutton Smith’s (1998) line 
of thinking, cited earlier in the chapter, that highlights children’s interest in what they deem 
as illicit ‘festive play’, and resonates strongly with Bakhtinian carnivalesque imagery of 
carnival spaces as separate from officialdom: existing as a resistance to all that is official and 
consecrated (RHW). Captured here is support from the literature of the potential benefit to 
framing young children’s humour as carnivalesque. This and the associated themes of 
subversion, resistance and separate spaces for children and adults should be noted and nestled 
behind the data collection and analysis processes selected when looking for evidence of a 
connection between children’s humour and Bakhtinian carnivalesque. 
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2.6.3 A carnivalesque turn 
 
Further to the earlier discussion of children’s interest in ‘bawdy’, scatological humour, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that many adults are often baffled by young children’s 
fascination with toilet humour. If we take children’s interest at face-value, this bafflement 
may seem to make sense. However, McKenzie suggests that children’s interest runs deeper 
than a surface enjoyment of scatological imagery, arguing that ‘scatological humour inverts 
and subverts social order’ and in this, ‘the carnivalesque is at play’ (McKenzie, 2005: 85). 
McKenzie describes how, in picture books that are classified as carnivalesque, paradoxical 
play is ‘dialogic or double-voiced’ because ‘there is an interplay between the serious and the 
playful, the authoritative voice and the subversive voice’ (McKenzie, 2005: 87). During 
carnival, children have permission to play with paradoxes that are perceived by some as 
constructing human experience: ‘order/chaos; soul/body; serious/playful; good/evil; 
clean/unclean; control/freedom; adult/child’ (McKenzie, 2005: 85). As McKenzie suggests, 
children’s enjoyment of carnivalesque themes catechises the dominance of Piagetian 
developmentalism that drives ECEC policy (DfE, 2013) and, to an extent, pedagogy and 
practice in England (Dahlberg et al, 2006): a conception of children that limits adults and 
pushes them towards privileging young children’s ‘preoperational, transductive, egocentric 
reasoning’. Instead, carnivalesque ideas encourage children towards an involved ability to 
identify reversed and subverted spaces and ‘all the imaginative possibilities that ‘what if?’ 
allows’ (McKenzie, 2005: 85). Moreover, McKenzie tenders that ‘the carnivalesque 
challenges children to think about the social order through the reversal of roles, and in the 
closure brought about by the ending of the carnival, an increased awareness of the social 
nature of being-in-the-world’ (McKenzie, 2005: 91). This gives rise to the idea that children 
may inhabit two different ‘settings’ of life – one where they abide by the ‘rules’ and the other 
where they challenge and play with them. In this vein, as Lensmire suggests, imagining 
educational institutions, such as an early years’ setting, as spaces that embody what Bakhtin 
terms ‘the people’s second life (RHW) may not be unreasonable, given they are often spaces 
in which children spend a large amount of time. However, he suggests that ‘this stands in 
stark contrast…to the dominant conception’ of educational institutions, like schools, in which 
they are ‘imagined as preparing children…for the labor market’ (Lensmire, 2011: 121). 
Moreover, schools and, by extension, early childhood settings, can be argued as being ‘too 
serious – where serious points to that false and heavy sort of seriousness that Bakhtin was 
worried about, a seriousness that keeps us locked into dominant modes of thought and 
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feeling, trapped in damaging relations with each other and the world (Michelson, 1999). 
Following this, Lensmire (2011) provides a compelling argument as to why we should see 
carnival as having an intrinsic role in learning. He suggests, via a Dewian prespective, that 
‘in order to criticize and remake the world, children and youth and teachers will need to play 
(with ideas, with each other) in order to experience and imagine something better’ (2011: 
125). This call for practitioners to ‘lighten up’ is reinforced by McEvilly et al. (2017) who 
argue ‘that preschool practitioners, as well as policy-makers and researchers, should critically 
reflect on the effects of taken-for-granted developmental discourses and move beyond 
thinking in terms of binaries such as […] ‘education versus play’ or ‘structure versus 
freedom’ (2017: 943).  
 
Although not focusing directly on humour, Cohen (2011) drew on a Bakhtinian carnivalesque 
frame to conduct research in to the carnivalesque nature of children’s role play. Some of her 
findings include references to young children’s humour and suggested that ‘children can 
resist unwanted structure and rules through pretending’ (Cohen, 2011: 180). Likewise, it can 
be argued that children can achieve the same goal through engaging with carnivalesque 
laughter and humour that turns the world on its head and enables them to challenge social 
structures and hierarchies. In addition, she suggests that children explore and negotiate their 
standing in the social world through use of double-voiced speech, which Bakhtin argues is 
inherently carnivalesque, as two separate voices, offering different - sometimes conflicting – 
sentiments exit in one utterance (RHW). It is important to note the findings of Cohen’s 
studies and consider them in relation to the findings this study produces. As Cohen (2011) 
suggests, there is a dearth of research that focuses on laughter in a play context and this is a 
situation the present study aims to remedy.  
 
The work that comes closest to the focus of this research is that of Jayne White. Her PhD, a 
Bakhtinian analysis of assessment in a New Zealand ECEC setting and the subsequent role of 
toddler metaphorocity led her to make some interesting links between Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque and the humour displayed by one of the children in her study. She argues that a 
similar phenomenon to Bakhtinian carnivalesque exists in modern education settings and 
suggests that very young children are extremely capable of choosing to act within this 
context. Her doctoral study prompted her proposal that the role of the early childhood teacher 
in this ‘underground culture’ is to be a dialogic partner who recognizes their dual horizontal 
and vertical roles as both insider and outsider: appreciating humour with children but 
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expecting (and celebrating) the child’s position within a distinct culture that necessarily 
resides outside officialdom. She suggests that in doing so, teachers will acquire a more 
profound appreciation of the important role of humour for children to play with hierarchical 
roles in contexts in which they are often afforded very little power. Furthermore, she argues 
that the teacher can appreciate the capacity of humour to be a form of social mobility and 
agency on the part of the child. These findings and suggestions segway into this research 
project and support the value of further research in the area. I argue that of particular value to 
children and ECEC practitioners, is research that continues the themes raised by White but 
goes deeper into the perspectives of children and practitioners, whilst also considering the 
place and influence of policy and authoritative discourses. 
 
Other researchers, although not having carried out full-scale studies into children’s humour, 
have commented on ideas relating to the nature of children’s humour as sub-findings in their 
research. For example, Bariaud (1989) asserts that humour in early childhood settings 
inspires behaviour and dialogue that involves clowning, foolery, pulling faces, and ‘eliciting 
paralinguistic imitation’ (in Cohen, 2011: 192). Further, Duncan and Tarulli (2003:341) 
highlight the Bakhtinian notion of ‘ideological becoming of a human being’ and, as Cohen 
suggests, children can experience this through imaginative play. It seems fair to suggest that 
they might also experience it through carnivalesque humour. The final study to be explored in 
this section was conducted by DaSilver Iddings and McCafferty (2007). This work offers a 
positive carnivalesque analysis of children’s ‘off-task’ behaviours in a language classroom. 
The study’s findings suggested that the context provided children with an opportunity to 
transform activities, presenting opportunities for growth. DeSilver et al. suggest that ‘carnival 
is not simply the spontaneous world of child's play. It is rather fundamentally a form of 
rejuvenation achieved through the playful mocking of the hierarchical order by individuals 
who find themselves oppressed by it’ (2007: 31) and that ‘it…needs to be recognised that, in 
general, children have a natural affinity for carnival, in the case of resisting unwanted 
impositions through playful means’ (2007:32). DaSilver Iddings and McCafferty (2007) 
argue that carnivalesque rebellion is not predominantly fuelled by anger, for Bakhtin but 
‘most saliently, one of satire, critique, and ultimately, play’ (2007:33). The notion of 
‘critique’ characterising the rebellion of carnival fits with the idea that children are 
attempting to make sense of the world around them and, as part of that, critique is necessary. 
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The range of ideas expressed here concerning researchers’ forays into alternative 
understandings of children’s appreciation and production of humour, highlight a potential gap 
in the literature. Much is offered in relation to young children’s experiences, perceptions and 
perspectives within these studies, but less attention is paid to the perspectives of 
adults/practitioners. Gaining practitioner insights on children’s humour and humour, 
generally, could be a useful way of exploring potential reasons why young children’s humour 
does not enjoy high pedagogical status within ECEC practice and policy in England. This, 
despite the evidence to suggest its significance and importance in their lives. Another 
possible area for exploration in relation to this are the values held by early childhood 
practitioners that drive, influence and inspire their practice. This study looks to gain 
practitioner perspectives and underpinning values and, consequently, the next section offers 
an overview of existing research in this area. 
 
2.7 Values in English ECEC policy and practice: a setting for humour? 
 
It can be argued that early childhood curricula are underpinned, primarily, by a set of shared 
values (Faulkner and Coates, 2013). Further, the pedagogies adhered to by ECEC 
professionals are predominantly determined by firstly, the values of the curriculum; and 
secondly, professional perspectives on what is important for young children. We cannot take 
for granted that the two will reflect or complement one another so, when considering the 
place of children’s humour in the field, it is important to note that both policy and practice 
will be of influence.  
 
ECEC in England is driven by a number of curricular values that give the Early Years 
Foundation Stage (EYFS) its structure. It has four over-arching principles: a unique child, 
positive relationships, enabling environments and learning and development; and within 
those are sub themes known as prime and specific areas of learning and development (DfE, 
2013). Significant to this study is that some sections of the EYFS focus on areas that link 
closely to humour but, for the most part, do not refer to it explicitly. Further, out of the 28 
OECD countries, of which 18 have national guidance for early childhood education, only 3 
refer to humour: England, Norway and Ireland (Tallant, 2015). While humour is mentioned 
by these three countries, none of the references to it go into detail.  Within the English non-
statutory EYFS statutory guidance and Foundation Stage Profile documentation (2017) there 
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is no mention of humour. The sole mention of humour in the EYFS curriculum is advice 
provided in the ‘Communication and Language: Understanding’ section. It states that 
between 40-60 months a child ‘[r]esponds to instructions involving a two-part 
sequence…[and]…[u]nderstands humour, e.g. nonsense rhymes, jokes’ (DfE, 2017). The 
Norwegian ‘Barnehage’ guidelines (2017) offer the broadest consideration of humour, 
including it in a section relating to play, creativity and environment. It states that 
‘[k]indergartens shall offer children an environment that is characterised by joy, humour, 
creativity and consideration for the group’ (2017: 27) pointing out that ‘[p]lay, aesthetic 
activities, humour and creativity are phenomena that are linked to one another’ (2017: 28). 
The guidance stipulates that ‘for the youngest children, humour is primarily based on the 
body, and is developed through interaction between the children, finally stressing that ‘[j]oy, 
humour and aesthetic experiences must be important parts of children’s existence at 
kindergartens’ (2017: 30). In a similar vein, Ireland’s ‘Aistear’ curriculum states in its 
‘Guidelines for Good Practice’ that humour is part of the ‘enjoyable’ characteristic of play, 
suggesting that play ‘is fun and exciting, and involves a sense of humour’ (2017: 53).  
 
Continuing the discussion of the relationship of the EYFS’s (2013) underpinning values with 
the place of children’s humour in English ECEC, Belsky et al. (2007) and Schweinhart et al. 
(2005) suggest that investing in sufficiently qualified staff to look after and meet the learning 
needs of young children is becoming fundamental in this country: an idea also reflected 
within the longitudinal Effective Provision of Preschool Education (EPPE) study (Sylva et al. 
2010) and further supported by Nutbrown, post Nutbrown Review (2013). These findings 
support the argument that well-qualified staff may be more confident about how to meet the 
EYFS requirements and, therefore, better equipped to think ‘outside of the box’ presented by 
the curriculum. Moreover, a capacity to ‘think outside of the box’ could suggest a capacity to 
consider children’s potential needs, such as an engagement with and nurturing of humour, 
that do not necessarily fall within the EYFS guidance. Consequently, it will be important to 
consider qualifications when working with the PRs in this study and to gain their perspectives 
on this. 
 
Once early years settings are satisfied with the qualification levels of their staff, Faulkner and 
Coates (2013) suggest that another widespread value – developmentally appropriate practice - 
may become a focus. This has potential bearing on practitioner perceptions of what is 
developmentally appropriate for young children. Given the earlier discussion of the potential 
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jarring between adults’ held discourses of young children as innocent and naturally 
developing (Taylor, 2015), and children’s enjoyment of carnivalesque humour that involves 
scatology and subversion, I argue that how practitioners frame ‘developmentally appropriate’ 
is significant when considering their contentment (or not) of children’s engagement with 
particular forms of humour.  
 
The OECD state that involving parents and communities in ECEC and providing high quality 
experiences for young children have become increasingly important within the English ECEC 
field, as laid down in the report ‘Supporting Families in the Foundation Years’ (OECD, 
2017). In addition, Wood (2010) suggests a debate existed (and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that arguably one still does) surrounding the meaning and value of play for young children 
and the relationship between play and learning; whilst the notion that children’s physical, 
intellectual, social and emotional wellbeing benefit from children’s experiences of play, are 
no longer questioned. With play seemingly having been a driving factor in the English ECEC 
system for some years, Faulkner and Coates (2013) argue that the field has ‘fought to sustain 
a view of the individual child which positively values any knowledge, skills and attributes 
which can be identified through observation, rather than itemising, negatively, those skills 
and areas of knowledge which a child has not yet achieved’. I argue that the idea that these 
values and the shift away from deficit models they represent is an area that can be explored in 
this study as relevant to the role and value of humour within ECEC. This is particularly 
important with regards to perceptions of humour as trivial and as in opposition to seriousness, 
that have been referred to throughout this chapter and threaten to affect whether children’s 
humour is valued in early childhood pedagogy. 
 
A practitioner voice enters Faulkner and Coates (2013) paper, providing an opportunity to 
reflect upon a practitioner perspective on the values that underpin ECEC in England, before 
gaining the views of the PRs in this study. In Faulkner and Coates’ research, a focus group of 
ECEC practitioners agreed that the values and principles of the EYFS are akin to ‘common 
sense’ which suggests that those practitioners share many, if not all, of those values.  Further, 
the concept of assessment made an appearance in the interviews with the practitioners, 
leading to the authors’ supposition that ‘[m]ost pre-school practitioners value assessment 
activities as an integral part of their daily support for learning’ (ibid). This insinuation has 
potential relevance to the present study in that, if accurate, it has ramifications for humour’s 
place within ECEC pedagogy: humour being non-quantifiable or measurable in a similar way 
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to play. Encouragingly, play, over recent years, has undergone a metamorphosis in terms of 
its significance and status in early childhood pedagogy (Wood, 2007) which bodes well for 
the prospects of humour in this context. Lastly, another of Faulkner and Coates’ findings 
arguably worthy of note, was that practitioners with more experience confessed to needing to 
try and reconcile what they viewed as the ‘current statutory requirements’ with their own 
core beliefs and values as, at times, they were somewhat dichotomous; hinting at the potential 
for the practitioners in this study to harbour similar concerns. 
 
This study is looking to highlight the struggle for humour to be seen as a legitimate and 
valuable aspect of children’s experiences in ECEC settings. Consequently, it is useful to note 
that an examination of early education policies by Heckman and Kautz (2012) revealed that 
‘soft skills’ involving character traits such as openness, conscientiousness and diligence are 
frequently neglected, despite being valued within education settings. In line with an argument 
made in the previous paragraph, they suggest this might be due to the curricula valuing 
standardised testing so highly and that ‘soft’ skills are unquantifiable. Further, they argue that 
this is potentially negative for young children, given the important place of soft skills within 
learning and development. They advocate that programmes overtly attending to soft skills 
should have a significant role in the creation of policy in the sector (Heckman and Kautz, 
2012). Significantly for this study, I argue that humour may not even fall under the category 
of ‘soft skills’ in a policy context, as it is positioned more as a personality quality than a skill 
(soft or not). Subsequently, the idea that soft skills are not considered within EY curricula in 
any profound sense, coupled with the notion that humour may not even enjoy ‘skill’ status, is 
a potential explanation for the lack of attention to humour within a wide range of early years’ 
curricula globally (Tallant, 2015).  
 
2.8 A new contribution to the field of children’s humour research in the context of 
ECEC settings. 
 
We have seen throughout this chapter that a developmental paradigm dominates the field of 
humour research (White 2009; Tallant 2015). This suggests a gap in the current academic 
literature of research that frames young children’s humour outside developmental discourses 
and seeks to address its position within ECEC policy and practice. I argue that it is important 
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for this gap in the research to be addressed if the significance of young children’s humour is 
to become a focus in our field.  
 
Reflecting on several years of working with young children, the collection of memories I 
have of their humour is not explained adequately by current theories. Each theory appears to 
have elements that resonate, but none seem to encapsulate the breadth of children’s humour 
production and appreciation. The principal theories highlight children’s appreciation of 
incongruity (McGhee, 1980) as well as absurdity and empowerment (Loizou, 2005). These 
concepts undoubtedly reflect young children’s engagement with humour, yet the humour of 
children seems to be much more complex and nuanced, going beyond an enjoyment of 
playing with ideas that are nonsensical or absurd or that afford them a sense of mastery or 
empowerment. This study sought to address this dimension of complexity and nuance using a 
conceptualisation of medieval folk-humour: Bakhtinian carnivalesque.  
 
While less well-known in early childhood research, further support for use of carnivalesque 
theory to frame young children’s humour comes from anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
practitioners in ECEC find children’s enjoyment of scatological humour, amongst other 
aspects of their humour, challenging, baffling or, at best, something they tolerate and attempt 
to avoid encouraging. Perhaps this is due to tensions between children’s perplexing interest in 
socially-distasteful or nonsensical imagery, and dominant constructions of childhood that 
inhabit early childhood settings: Piaget’s ‘naturally developing’ child, and Rousseau’s 
‘innocent child’ (Taylor, 2015). The strong developmental undercurrent of Western ECEC 
(Dahlberg et al, 2006; McNaughton, 2005) is influenced by the Piagetian notion of children 
developing in stages and, although new research (Taylor, 2015) has quashed the suggestion 
that the stages are distinct and unmovable, the powerful image of children’s development 
moving up through set stages continues to cast a long shadow. As ECEC professionals, we 
may articulate the Reggio Emilia values of viewing children as strong, rich and capable 
(Edwards and Gandini, 2011) but the image of the child as vulnerable, innocent (Taylor, 
2015), human becomings (Qvortrup, 2009) is powerful and has proven difficult to move 
away from. Consequently, if these constructions of the child do influence our thinking 
(knowingly or not) within the ECEC field, any behaviour that children engage in (humorous 
or not) that clashes with the image of innocence or natural development may be viewed as 
problematic. In turn, this may cause practitioners to position children’s behaviour along a 
continuum, with Apollonian ‘angelic’ behaviour at one end and Dionysian ‘devil-like’ 
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behaviour at the other. The diagram, below, (Fig 2) outlines this continuum along with the 
underpinning theoretical approaches.  
 
 
Fig 2 
 
Founded on experiences of working in early years settings, relevant literature and original 
data (Tallant, 2015), I argue that early years practice consists of two separate realms: the 
routine realm and the challenging realm (see Fig 3). Further, the data suggests that children’s 
utterances and actions that fit with early childhood practitioners’ dominant constructions of 
childhood, sit within the routine realm. Such constructions are visible as Rousseauian and 
Froebelian conceptions of innocence (Taylor, 2015) and Piaget’s emphasis on natural 
development (ibid). As long as children’s behaviour is harmonized with these images of 
innocence and order, practitioners’ equilibrium is maintained.  
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Fig 3 
In contrast, anything children say or do that jars with practitioners’ held constructions 
instigates dissonance between their view of the innocent and naturally developing child, and 
the behaviour they see children engaging in that cannot easily be categorized as innocent and 
does not necessarily reflect predicted stages of development (Tallant, 2015). These 
behaviours appear, for the most part, to fall into the challenging realm. It is possible that 
although numerous aspects of children’s carnivalesque humour fall into the challenging 
realm, it may not be exclusive. In the nuanced social world that we inhabit it seems 
reasonable to suggest that some examples of children’s humour may be perceived as only 
partially subversive or challenging, or even not at all. Consequently, this study aims to 
explore expressions of carnivalesque humour that fall into either category (routine or 
challenging) to frame and explore young children’s humour as Bakhtinian carnivalesque. In 
doing so, the following research questions will be addressed: 
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1. What are young children’s manifestations and perceptions of and reactions to humour 
within an early years setting, from a child, practitioner and Bakhtinian perspective?  
 
2. What is a Bakhtinian interpretation of adults’ experiences and perceptions of humour 
inside and outside of an early years setting, and how do these relate to those of young 
children’s?  
 
3. How do these experiences and perceptions, interpreted in this way, relate to the 
pedagogical significance of humour within an early years setting?  
 
4. What are the implications of interpreting young children’s humour and perceptions of 
young children’s humour through a Bakhtinian lens, for early childhood education? 
 
These questions take up and extend White’s argument that there is a gap in educational 
research that has endeavoured to introduce Bakhtin’s theory of carnivalesque as a ‘genre of 
resistance’ (2009: 61). She emphasizes that this theme is often highlighted by Bakhtinian 
scholars, suggesting it is an area worthy of research in the field of ECEC. Since 2009 a 
limited number of studies (including White’s doctorate) have explored this concept (see 
Cohen, 2011; Oksnes, 2008; Da Silva Iddings and McAfferty, 2007). By highlighting and 
focusing on the paradigmatic quality of carnivalesque in ECEC, this study aims to contribute 
to the field, in part, by addressing the capacity of carnivalesque to involve generic resistance. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical and methodological foundations: Bakhtinian dialogism and carnivalesque 
 
3.1 Humour, laughter and Bakhtinian carnivalesque: drivers of a theoretical 
framework 
 
Throughout history there have been many attempts to create a universal theory of humour: 
one that explains categorically the existence and nature of the phenomenon. As yet, this feat 
has been elusive and instead there exists a body of ideas each of which seems to fit into one 
of three dominant groups: the incongruity theories; the superiority theories and the relief 
theories. One theory, which is noteworthy within the field yet defies categorisation in this 
way, is Bakhtin’s theory of the Carnivalesque, based upon his analysis of the works of 17th 
century author, Rabelais. Bakhtin’s theory places humour in an historical and literary context 
and draws upon the prominence of carnivals and carnival imagery within Rabelais’ writing, 
transforming the carnival from a single event into a semiotic cultural code. Bakhtin believed 
that the popular tradition of carnival carried a specific wisdom that can be traced to the 
ancient world. For Bakhtin, carnival and carnivalesque create an ‘alternative social space’, 
comprising freedom, equality and abundance. Hirschkop assists our understanding of 
Bakhtin’s perspective arguing that ‘Carnivalesque works, in Bakhtin’s parlance, use motifs, 
themes and generic forms drawn from a tradition of subversive medieval popular culture, a 
tradition linked to a very specific festive practice and to the significance of the body in 
medieval and Renaissance culture’ (Hirschkop, 1989: 3). Linked closely to the subversion 
Hirschkop refers to, humour is the language of the carnival through which many 
carnivalesque features are expressed (RHW). 
 
 
On discovering Bakhtinian Carnivalesque’s potential to reframe young children’s humour, 
the need not to discount his philosophical beginnings became clear, and that the significant 
influence of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology on his later works 
(Eskin, 2000) needed to be noted. In addition, philologist David Shepherd (in Matusov, 2007: 
216) stresses that his issue with Education scholars appropriating Bakhtin’s work is not, 
 
 42 
‘…that Bakhtinian concepts cannot or should not be ‘‘applied’’ to real-life 
problems…’ He warns, however, that ‘…unless we try to understand how Bakhtin 
came to assemble his potent analytical instruments, we cannot achieve more than an 
approximate calibration of their true usefulness, and their application may become 
somewhat mechanical and unsubtle’. 
 
With this in mind, there is a need for a thorough, comprehensive application of Bakhtin’s 
ideas if they are not to be misappropriated. Consequently, I argue that the apposite 
methodological approach for this project is dialogic; utilising Bakhtinian theory throughout 
the thesis to underpin the conceptual, theoretical and analytical framework. Consequently, 
from this point on, this chapter focuses on the ways in which Bakhtinian dialogism lies at the 
heart of this thesis: from its carnivalesque-focused theoretical framework to the guiding 
dialogic methodology.  
 
3.1.1 The origins of Bakhtinian carnivalesque  
In ‘Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics’ Bakhtin coins the term ‘carnivalistic literature’, 
meaning any genre of literature that involves a carnival sense of the world. He goes on to 
suggest that we might consider (albeit crudely) carnivalistic literature to be one of three roots 
of the novelistic genre; the other two being the epic and the rhetorical. This suggestion seems 
to provoke Bakhtin into a more thorough investigation of the notion of carnival and 
carnivalesque, as found in Dostoyevsky’s work, and its varieties, the roots of which he 
suggests are to be found in ancient and classical antiquarian literature.  
 
3.1.2 Carnival, the Socratic Dialogue and Menippean satire 
The Socratic dialogues were authored by numerous ancient philosophers; however, only 
those of Plato and Xenophon have survived intact. The genre began as an oral tradition that, 
over time, developed into a literary genre comprising accounts of real conversations that 
Socrates had engaged in, and records of recollected conversations, both framed within a 
story. As the literary genre developed it acquired a freedom from historical accuracy or even 
from accounts of Socrates own words or ideas, retaining only his method of discovering truth 
via dialogue, encapsulated within story-form and burgeoning into a tremendously creative 
genre. The Socratic dialogue, a non-rhetorical genre, was pervasive at the time of its creation, 
forming part of Bakhtin’s genre of ‘carnivalistic literature’, in the sense that it grew out of a 
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‘folk-carnivalistic base’ (Elliot, 1999) and was ‘thoroughly saturated with a carnival sense of 
the world’. This ‘sense’, Bakhtin informs us, was brought to life through the two ‘basic 
devices’ of the Socratic dialogue: syncrisis and anacrisis. Syncrisis meaning the 
‘juxtaposition of various points of view on a specific object’ and anacrisis, as a, ‘means for 
eliciting and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor, forcing him to express his opinion 
and express it thoroughly’ (PDP:110). Both syncrisis and anacrisis have a, ‘narrow, abstractly 
rhetorical character’ but, for Bakhtin, this is tempered when they appear in the carnivalised 
genre of the Socratic Dialogue: giving a hint of the power that Bakhtin argues carnivalistic 
genres have. As the Socratic dialogue genre moved on, primarily through the writings of 
Plato, Bakhtin argued it began to lose its carnival sense of the world as it was transformed 
from a dialogic means of discovering truth into a monologic rhetoric espousing ready-made 
truths for the purpose of ‘teaching’ novices, rendering it void of possibility and openness. 
This monologization (Morson and Emerson, 1990) of the Socratic dialogue had the effect of 
turning ‘dialogue into an empty form and a lifeless interaction’ (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 
57) which could be regarded as the antithesis of carnivalesque. Arguably, it was this 
paradigm shift in the genre that ignited Bakhtin’s interest in and novel approach to the theory 
of carnivalesque and its driving force: humour. 
 
3.1.3 A Dostoevskian spark 
A catalyst for Bakhtin’s fervent interest in carnival and the carnivalesque was the novelist, 
Fyodor Dostoevsky as Bakhtin sees a number of Dostoevsky’s novels as embodying the spirit 
of carnivalesque. That Dostoevsky really does embody the carnivalesque in this way is 
questioned, however. Wellek, for example, suggests, ‘Bakhtin himself says that "Carnival 
belongs to the whole people; it liberates from fear, brings the world close to man and man to 
his fellow man" (214)’ yet ‘[a]lmost nothing in Dostoevsky implies a collective rapture or 
resembles the "joyous relativity" (166) Bakhtin finds in the "carnivalesque." (Wellek, 1980: 
37). Wellek continues to describe how Bakhtin, ‘…ignores the deep seriousness, the sombre 
colors of a Dostoevsky novel, even if we grant that there is a bright Utopian hope at the end 
of the rainbow’. The affirmation, for Wellek, of Bakhtin’s misunderstanding of Dostoevsky’s 
relationship with the carnivalesque is that, ‘…there is nothing in Dostoevsky of Rabelais' 
corporality, of the lust for life in the ancient saturnalia or the commedia dell'arte. In every 
way Dostoevsky seems to me to represent the opposite of the carnivalesque spirit” (Wellek, 
1980: 37). Whether or not Bakhtin’s alignment of Dostevsky with the carnivalesque is 
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accurate, there appears to exist for him an inextricable connection between Dostoevsky and 
his broader theory of dialogism – another reason for bringing together Bakhtin’s ideas and 
discussing them here, collectively. Dialogism refers to Bakhtin’s comprehensive 
epistemological and ontological theory at the heart of which is his understanding of dialogue 
and intersubjectivity being at the root of meaning (DI). The details of this theory are 
discussed further later in this chapter with connections made between the dialogic concepts 
that merge under Bakhtin’s umbrella of dialogism and the methodological approach adopted 
within this study. 
 
3.1.4 Mikhail Bakhtin’s underworld 
Mikhail Bakhtin was, arguably, one of the most significant scholars of discourse in the 1900s 
(Holquist, 2002). A central Soviet thinker in the social sciences, his work has considerable 
importance regarding ideas of political resistance (Robinson, 2011). Working under the 
restrictive Stalinist regime (1922-1953), Bakhtin was a controversial character whose life in 
many ways reflected the subversive and resistant themes of his theory of carnivalesque: 
themes that will be returned to and explored in more detail throughout the chapter. His 
controversialist status can be seen in many aspects of his life story and academic works but, 
also, in his lack of certainty over the scholarly labels used to define him and his writing. 
Clark and Holquist (1984) claim that he felt most comfortable being described as a 
‘philosophical anthropologist’ and these disciplines can be seen across his body of work but, 
arguably, most clearly within his study of Rabelais and carnivalesque humour. His academic 
career began studying at Petrograd University where he encountered a man who had one of 
the biggest influences on his thinking: Faddei Zelinsky, a Professor of classical philology. 
Zelinski’s influence on the genesis of Bakhtin’s theory of carnivalesque is significant to this 
study because both harboured views that resonate with what were to become central themes 
in Bakhtin’s carnivalesque theory. Drawn from his study of Renaissance author, Rabelais, 
these themes were the ‘potential of the folk for undermining the heaviness and dogmatism of 
high culture…[a]nd Zelinsky’s proclamation of the revivifying role of humor in the satyr 
play’ (Clarke and Holquist, 1984: 31). ‘Satyr’ (or, satire) was an interest of Bakhtin’s and 
Zelinsky’s emphasis on humour’s role within it probably acted as a catalyst for the 
inauguration of Bakhtinian carnivalesque (Clarke and Holquist, 1984).   
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Denied his doctorate due to the contentious nature of his study on Rabelais, Bakhtin was 
condemned to ‘internal exile' in Kazakhstan amidst Stalin’s ‘purges’ (Robinson, 2011): 
‘official’ reasons citing his clandestine Russian Orthodox beliefs, but it is thought more likely 
that his scholarly publications were seen as a threat to the establishment (Emerson, 2000). 
This is supported by the fact that Bakhtin and a select group of Russian thinkers including 
Valentin Voloshinov and, later, Pavel Medvedev formed a group, now known as ‘The 
Bakhtin Circle’. They met in secret, often in members’ homes, and addressed cultural and 
social issues surrounding Stalin’s regime and the Russian Revolution. The Circle ‘developed 
a body of work which purported to describe an already democratised language, one which 
was, ‘dialogical’, ‘heteroglottic’, [and] at its better moments even ‘carnivalesque’; 
(Hirschkop, 1989: 2). They focused on an examination of the clashes between social groups 
conveyed by language (Brandist, no date) and outward facing agendas coupled with hidden 
messages: ideas that had a significant influence on the Bakhtin and, subsequently, is a theme 
threaded through much of his work and, arguably, a significant indication of Bakhtin’s 
preoccupation with types of power; such as those wielded by the Stalinists (Emerson, 2000). 
Additionally, and significantly given the focus on corporeality throughout his work, Bakhtin 
had a disability for much of his life.  His right leg was amputated in 1938 after he had 
suffered for years with the bone disease, osteomyelitis. He does not write specifically about 
disability issues; however, his concern with embodiment is apparent, particularly in his 
theory of carnivalesque (Robinson, 2011). This theme of embodiment, I argue, fits well with 
the physicality of young children’s humour (McGhee, 1989) and informed the adoption of 
Bakhtinian carnivalesque as a lens through which to investigate young children’s humour in 
the context of ECEC.  This is discussed in more detail throughout this chapter, starting with 
an exploration of the roots, evolution of, and main themes within Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnivalesque, followed by a foray into his broader epistemological and ontological theory of 
dialogism and a discussion of how it guides the methodology of this research. 
 
3.1.5 Bakhtin’s own carnival 
It has been suggested the way Bakhtin writes ‘reflects the spirit of carnival’…in that ‘it defies 
systematic explanation’ (Elliot, 1999: 129). Consequently, for clarity of understanding it is 
useful to secure any ‘mobile terms enough to indicate the main elements of carnival and their 
relationship to discourse’ (Elliot, 1999: 130).  Elliot argues that by presenting his 
investigations in ‘laughter, ambivalence and becoming, Bakhtin emphasises the dynamic 
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movement underlying ‘unofficial language’ (Elliot 1999: 130). This sense of movement can 
also be found in manifestations of Bakhtinian carnival imagery that subvert, highlight human 
relationships and are ambivalent (Elliot 1999): all key carnivalesque themes that reflect the 
unconventionality of the theory.  In addition to Elliot’s work, much attention is paid to 
Bakhtinian thinking within the wider field of Folklore. Researchers in this field have found it 
useful to explore aspects of carnivalesque theory in significant detail, refining Bakhtin’s 
theories to highlight their clear links to performance contexts. This has enabled them to 
develop Bakhtin’s theories and discuss in detail aspects of key carnivalesque terms, such as 
reversal and ambivalence, in a way that Bakhtin did not. I argue that this may be a necessary 
undertaking if working within the discipline of folklore; however, I argue that the detail 
Bakhtin provides and the context within which he provides it more than suffices for the 
purposes of my research. Thus, this study adopts a purist Bakhtinian conception of carnival 
and carnivalesque. 
 
3.1.6 Bakhtinian carnivalesque 
In ‘Rabelais and his World’ Bakhtin presents the most detailed account of his theory of the 
carnivalesque via his analysis of Rabelais’ allusions to the significance of the carnival in the 
Middle Ages. He leads up to this through an account of how the significance of laughter and 
humour changed over time. He suggests that there was once a ‘synergy’ (Taylor, 1995) 
between the comic and the serious, during the period when class and politics did not exist, 
and this resulted in ‘the serious and the comic aspects of the world and of the 
deity…[being]… equally sacred, equally “official” (RHW: 6). As class became more 
prevalent, however, due to the emergence of class-structured societies, the ruling classes 
sought to demonstrate and assert their power by inflicting a sense of fear and awe upon the 
lower classes and this was incompatible with any sense of the comic or of humour. 
Consequently, a divide between the comic and the serious surfaced which had the effect of 
driving the comic underground and creating a void between official and folk culture. It is at 
this stage in history, the medieval period, that Bakhtin suggests carnivals become a 
significant part of folk culture and when the comic evolves and takes on a significance, 
perhaps lacking before, that embodies a sense of liberation and celebration. A better sense of 
the ideas that Bakhtin writes about in relation to the actual Medieval carnivals that took place 
in the Middle Ages comes through in illustrations from Rabelais’ novel, Gargantua and 
Pantagruel. The next section presents a selection of these images to supplement the 
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descriptions of medieval carnival, throughout this chapter. 
 
3.1.7 Pictorial representations of Bakhtinian carnivalesque imagery  
The features of a carnivalesque outlook illustrated, here, allow us to see the place that 
carnival has within a carnivalistic awareness of the world. All of Bakhtin’s categories that go 
to make up a carnivalistic sense of the world stem from literary or pictorial carnivalistic 
imagery found primarily in the works of Rabelais (although it should be noted not 
exclusively as this imagery can also be seen in the works of Boccacio, Cervantes and 
Shakespeare - Taylor, 1995). The following illustrations represent scenes from Rabelais most 
notable story, Gargantua and Pantagruel. In Fig 4 we see the child-giant, Pantagruel, enjoying 
a feast and being fed. Bakhtin argues that giants presented an image of the body that was 
essentially grotesque and stresses that, for Rabelais, ‘…festive giants were the most 
important…and were saturated with the free atmosphere of the marketplace…[and]…closely 
connected with the popular [carnivalesque] conception of material-bodily wealth and 
abundance’ and this illustration arguably captures the essence of that imagery. 
 
Fig 4 Feasting, as reflected in an illustration from Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel 
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In Figs 4 and 5, we can see Bakhtin’s notion of the important role with real-world folk of 
popular festive-giants, reflected. Bakhtin highlights the festive protagonist role of giants 
within feasts, parades and processions: an image captured in this illustration. 
 
Fig 5 (above) Festivity, as reflected in an illustration from Rabelais’ Gargantua and 
Pantagruel 
 
In Fig 6 we see the giant, Gargantua, crying abundantly and ‘mooing’ like a cow after the 
birth of his son, Pantagruel killed his wife. In this scene, the grotesque body is depicted via 
images of simultaneous birth and death, hyperbole via a giant, crying exaggeratedly.  
 
Fig 6 Hyperbole and grotesque realism reflected in an illustration from 
Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel 
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In Fig 7, once again we see carnivalesque imagery of feasting, abundance, festivity and 
equality reigning between those who, outside of carnival, would normally be separated by 
class, but we can also see a depiction, here, of what Bakhtin says is the driving force of 
carnival: the people’s laughter (RHW). 
 
Fig 7 Laughter, as represented in an illustration from Rabelais’ Gargantua and 
Pantagruel 
 
 
During medieval times in France and, to an extent, England, carnivals were abundant, if 
heavily regulated by the ruling classes in terms of their frequency and timing throughout the 
year (RHW). The Medieval carnivals that Bakhtin refers to were held nationally, organised 
by cathedral sub-deacons, and commonly known as the ‘Festival’ or’ Feast of Fools’ (RHW). 
He argues that every common religious celebration had its carnival (RHW). Common events 
that exuded a carnivalistic sense of the world during these festive times were the harvesting 
of grapes, fun fairs and theatrical plays. Despite the element of control from the highness of 
the church and the strict management of their occurrence, Bakhtin contends that carnival, 
from a Rabelaisan perspective, was not an organised performance, spectacle or extension of 
the ‘real world’ as may be commonly misconceived (RHW) but a space within which 
equality between people and ideas reigned. Based on his exploration of Medieval Culture and 
both Rabelais and via other literary evidence, he proffers that people in the Middle Ages 
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lived what seemed to be dual lives, one being,  
 
‘the official life, monolithically serious and gloomy, subjugated to a strict hierarchical 
order, full of terror, dogmatism, reverence, and piety; the other [being] the life of the 
carnival square, free and unrestricted, full of ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the 
profanation of everything sacred, full of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact 
with everyone and everything. Both these lives were legitimate, but separated by strict 
temporal boundaries’ (PDP: 129-130) 
 
As seen in the quotation above, during carnival time there is a sense of the world being 
turned on its head.  Bakhtin argues that the carnival was a space within which ‘ordinary’ 
people could be liberated from the confines, rules and expectations of their everyday lives, 
and become someone completely other than themselves. It could be argued that it is this 
sense of ubiquitous anarchy, within an environment that was separate from the every day, and 
yet in many ways fiercely controlled, that leads us to the notion of carnivals being a fitting 
domicile for humour; especially if we accept the argument that humour always appears to 
represent an altered version of reality (Clarke, 2008) and that carnivals are the ultimate anti-
reality. 
The humour associated with carnivalesque theory Bakhtin terms ‘folk humour’ (RHW), and 
is comprised of three concepts: carnival, laughter and the grotesque. These concepts are 
represented by Bakhtin as he describes the following characteristic features of a carnivalistic 
awareness of the world. The first feature is the idea of familiar and free interaction between 
people. Within the realm of the carnival equality reigns and there is universality of all people 
resulting in a coming together of and an unreserved communication between people who may 
not interact in the ‘real world’. Bakhtin argues that any distance between individuals or 
groups in the outside world is adjourned for the period of carnival (RHW).  The second 
feature of a carnivalistic sense of the world is ‘eccentricity’: behaviour deemed intolerable in 
‘normal’ life is appropriate and even sought after during the carnival. What might be 
considered as the under-belly of human life, encompassing repressed primal impulses, roams 
freely and abundantly in this festive environment (RHW). The third feature Bakhtin terms 
‘carnivalistic misalliances’. This encapsulates the view that carnival is a kind of ‘syncretic, 
ritualised pageantry’ that offers an alternative perspective to that of the everyday. It is a 
fleeting moment during which life escapes officialdom and embraces utopian liberty. In the 
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same moment, it is a reality and an idyll, both universal and all encompassing. Festivity is its 
defining feature of carnivalesque misalliances, encapsulated by Bakhtin as a ‘festive life 
(Bakhtin, RHW: 8). Although having one foot in the door of reality, the significance of 
misalliances in carnival visibly reflects its lack of concern for practicality: instead, it is 
sanctioned by desire to experience the epitome of human existence (RHW). Linked to the 
earlier notion of people usually separated in the everyday being brought together by the 
carnival, carnivalistic misalliances describe the way attitudes of the carnival connect all that 
is normally separated: the ‘sacred and the profane’, the new and the old, the ‘wise and the 
stupid’ and so on. Everything that in the outside world is separated is brought together and 
‘drawn into carnivalistic contacts and combinations’ (RHW: 160) during the carnival. The 
final carnivalistic category is concerned with the sacrilegious or ‘profanation’. For Bakhtin, 
the carnival is a space for parody of the sacred, for ungodliness, profanity and blasphemy. 
This idea links to the sense of the carnival being a place for rebellion and mockery: a time of 
liberation from the confines of everyday life and from prevailing truth and established order. 
Bakhtin’s carnival is a world in which people cease to inhabit their everyday roles and a 
space that seeks dynamic change (Bakhtin, 1984). In essence misalliances, freedom of 
communication, eccentricity and the sacrilegious all set the scene ‘…for working out, in a 
concretely sensuous, half-real and half play-acted form a new mode of inter-relationships 
between individuals, counter posed to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical discourse of non-
carnival life’ (Bakhtin, 1984b:123). 
3.1.8 Carnivalesque as the ultimate alternative to officialdom 
 
During the Medieval carnival or ‘Festival of Fools’ (RHW), referred to earlier in this chapter, 
the status that reigned in everyday existence was eradicated and equality reigned instead. 
People were reborn into raw human relations which were experienced tangibly (Robinson, 
2011). Carnival is also a space that offers a ‘positive alternative vision’ not simply as a 
deconstruction of authoritative culture, but as another way of life predicated upon on a 
‘pattern of play’ (Robinson, 2011). It quashed barriers between people established by 
hierarchies, instead providing an image of teamwork and egalitarianism. Within carnival, 
Bakhtin explains that individual egos were pulled towards a united whole, constantly 
regenerating (RHW). All of these facets of Medieval carnival epitomise subversion which, 
says Glazener, ‘was directed against an official language that would deny the body, the 
cyclical nature of human life, and the triumph of the species over the death of the individual’ 
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(Glazener, in Hirschkop and Shepherd, 2001: 159). During carnival, repressed creative 
energies are found and revealed. It clarifies and celebrates the idea that the social structures 
and/or systems in place at any one time are transitory; that they are ‘historically variable and 
relative, and one day will come to an end’, an idea the people can rejoice in whilst in the 
carnival space and away from the ‘gloom’ that Bakhtin suggests permeated their official lives 
(RHW).  
 
3.1.9 The significance of carnival laughter  
 
Laughter appears to be the driving force of a carnivalistic awareness of the world and the 
back bone of the theory of carnivalesque. After its time, in a pre-class society, as a 
phenomenon hailed as sacred, a symbol of the comic - the comic being a concept that had 
parity of status with the serious – Bakhtin explains that laughter became something much 
more negative in the eyes of the ruling classes. This pushed it underground and as class 
society evolved laughter became the domain of the working classes and, far from being the 
negative phenomenon labelled by those at the top of class society, was a wholly positive 
symbol of freedom, liberation and belonging for the masses. On this theme Bakhtin suggests 
that, ‘[t]he people’s ambivalent laughter…expresses the point of view of the whole world; he 
who is laughing also belongs to it’ (RHW: 94). Akin to the notion of laughter as a driving 
force is the suggestion that it holds an inordinate amount of power, which is arguably 
transferred to those who engage in it (RHW; PDP). The different views of laughter held by 
those with societal power and those without it seem to place humour and laughter in the 
position of being simultaneously positive and negative (RHW: 94). Fundamentally for 
Bakhtin, however, carnivalesque laughter is wholly positive, a sentiment best expressed via 
Bakhtin’s (RHW: 94) suggestion that, 
 
‘True ambivalent and universal laughter does not deny seriousness but purifies and 
completes it. Laughter purifies from dogmatism, from the intolerant and the petrified; 
it liberates from fanaticism, from fear and intimidation, from dialecticism, naïveté and 
illusion, from the single meaning, the single level, from sentimentality. Laughter does 
not permit seriousness to atrophy and to be torn away from the one being, forever 
incomplete. It restores its ambivalent wholeness. Such is the function of laughter in 
the historical development of culture and literature’ 
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The different, and opposing, views of laughter held by those with societal power but 
positioned outside the carnival and those without social power but positioned inside seem to 
place laughter in a dichotomous position, as depicted in the image of the laughing folk 
mocking the gentry (RHW), below (Fig 8).  
 
Fig 8 
 
Carnivalesque Laughter does not only liberate people from fear, it contributes to overcoming 
it because of its complexity, strength and universality. It is a loud, collective, communal 
phenomenon best revealed in an unrestrained belly laugh. It facilitates freedom licensed by 
feast days and, in keeping with this positivity and openness, is a celebration of 
permissiveness. Further, in addition to being imbued with these qualities, carnivalesque 
laughter has epistemological status via carnival imagery that holds up emblems of power and 
authority as objects of derision. The chorus of laughter that responds to such images is far 
from negative and ‘permit[s] the expression of antifeudal, popular truth’ (RHW), revealing 
the assumed naturalness of the social order as fake. As such, in his work ‘Epic and Novel’, 
Bakhtin accredits laughter with investigative properties and the capacity to undertake a 
thorough scrutinisation of objects that appear within its range. In line with the idea of 
laughter as a ‘driving force’ is the suggestion it affords an inordinate amount of power to 
those who engage in it (Bakhtin, 1984). The different views of laughter held by those with 
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societal power and those without it seem to place laughter in a contradictory position as, 
within the middle ages it appears to be simultaneously positive and negative dependent upon 
the laugher’s status. Given the complex nature of carnivalesque laughter and that it is the 
driving force behind a carnivalistic view of the world, it follows that it is the focus of other 
carnivalesque features. One such feature of significance, Bakhtin terms ‘grotesque realism’.   
 
3.1.10 Grotesque realism and the grotesque, material body 
 
A strong theme within this Rabelaisian imagery, Bakhtin stipulates that the grotesque body is 
a ‘specific type of imagery inherent to the culture of folk humor’ (RHW). An extremely 
ancient concept, we find grotesque themes in mythology and of the Greeks and Romans of 
the pre-classic period. During this time, however, it was expelled from official life, deemed 
as inappropriate and unwanted in this sphere. Grotesque imagery emerged from its hiding 
place at the end of antiquity and embraced several art forms. Bakhtin explains that a new kind 
of grotesque materialised, but the influence of classical tradition on the aesthetic and artistic 
meant that grotesque imagery was not awarded a clear and stable definition nor was its 
meaning acknowledged in theory (RHW). 
The term, as recognized in the Middle ages and Renaissance, refers to ‘the lower bodily 
stratum’ (e.g. the genital organs, belly and buttocks) and a host of ideas that can be connected 
to this corporeal image. An example of this can be seen within the imagery of Rabelais’ most 
renowned tome, Gargantua and Pantagruel, as seen in Fig 9.  
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Fig 9 Grotesque imagery depicted in illustrations from Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel 
 
The corporeal nature of the images in Fig 9 encompasses notions of hyperbolism; 
exaggeration; excessiveness; conception, birth and renewal; and degradation - the lowering of 
all that is high, spiritual, ideal or abstract to the material level. Within carnivalesque imagery, 
therefore, it is common and positive to see, ‘images of the human body with its food, drink, 
defecation and sexual life’ (RHW). Throughout the experience of carnival an emphasis is 
placed on humanity, basic needs and the body, as well as sensory experiences, perhaps in 
contrast to the commands of the will. As a space, it lowers the spiritual and abstract to the 
material level, thus recognising embodiment, contrary to the dominance of traditions which 
look to escape (Robinson, 2010). The concept of grotesque, in some respects, represents this 
concept of lowering and embraces several features relating to the contrast between ideas such 
as birth and death, feasting and defecation. Bakhtin suggests that representations of the 
‘material bodily principle’ in Rabelais’ writing (and in the works of other Renaissance 
writers) are the personification of the traditional culture of folk humour. Moreover, the 
images characterise the specific ‘aesthetic concept’ emblematic of folk culture; an aesthetic 
concept that differs significantly from that of the periods in history that followed. He terms 
this ‘grotesque realism’ (RHW). Within a grotesque realist perspective all aspects of the 
human body are profoundly positive. The body is presented as something universal, 
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representing all the people, and very much not as separate from public life, or necessarily 
clandestine. Consequently, ‘it is opposed to severance from the material and bodily roots of 
the world; it makes no pretense to renunciation of the earthy, or independence of the earth 
and the body (RHW). Bakhtin stipulates it is important for us to note that the grotesque body 
does not represent a modern way of conceptualizing it i.e. as the biological, physiological 
manifestation of an individual. The material bodily principle is manifest in ‘the people’; the 
essence of whom grows, changes and renews. Thus, it is a concept that engenders 
grandiosity, hyperbole and immeasurability. The stand out motifs of this image of the body 
are ‘fertility, growth’ and as mentioned earlier, a wholly positive and assured ‘… brimming-
over abundance’ (RHW). Expressions of this bodily life do not represent the physicality and 
biology of individuals; instead they symbolize the ‘collective, ancestral body of all the 
people’ (RHW). The features of the material bodily principle and the grotesque body 
transport the notion of the everyday, mundane, monotonous existence of the body, to an 
energized, festive and celebratory space. The sense of this space is preserved within Rabelais’ 
writing and, to an extent, within other Renaissance literature. That Bakhtin was so interested 
in the notion of elevating the physical body to a higher, liberating plane, Hitchcock suggests, 
may relate to Bakhtin’s constant health issues which resulted in the amputation of his right 
leg. Hitchcock argues that, although ‘[p]eople don’t write about the body merely because 
their body appears in permanent revolution against them, but one might take on the 
possibility that Bakhtin’s excessive body, its grotesque order of pain, has a pertinent and 
permanent inscription in his theorization’ (Hitchcock, 1998: 78). Another integral feature of 
grotesque realism that combines the positivity depicted here with the concept of ‘bringing 
down to earth’ – an idea that, in every day parlance, could be argued as having negative 
connotations, is degradation. 
 
3.1.11 Grotesque realism: degradation 
 
It is impossible to understand grotesque realism without grasping the importance of 
degradation. In this context, the term refers to ‘the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, 
abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their 
indissoluble unity’ (RHW). Bakhtin writes of the popular dialogues of Solomon and Morolf, 
the comic nature of which was particularly popular during the Medieval period. Solomon is 
depicted as a wise King and Morolf as a clown with an ‘ugly face, misshapen body, and 
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ragged apparel’ (FMR: 94) The dialogues show ‘the contrast between extraordinary wisdom 
and sound common sense, which, in the affairs of life, so often proves superior to the former’ 
(FMR: 94) The moralistic tone of Solomon’s words contrasts with the facetious and 
degrading maxims of Morolf, the clown. Morolf continually pulls their exchanges down to a 
corporeal level and closer to ideas of feasting, digestion and the erotic. Morolf is fittingly 
representative of the role of the clown and fool in the Middle ages, whose role it was to 
debase all revered ceremonial and ritualistic acts to a fundamental, material level. It could be 
argued that Bakhtin understood the parodic role of the carnivalesque fool being to remind us 
that high art forms and all other features and spheres of everyday life stem from and return to 
the material body (RHW). Importantly, Bakhtin reminds us that grotesque realism is 
characterised by laughter as the people’s laughter connects with the grotesque realist ‘lower 
bodily strata’: it engenders degradation and materialisation (RHW).  
 
Degradation, in a Rabelaisian sense, means ‘coming down to earth’ and making contact with 
it: the earth being both something that consumes and brings into world, simultaneously. 
These two faces of degradation continue throughout Bakhtin’s definition via its concern with 
burying, sowing and killing as well as with the bodily lower stratum, concurrently. The lower 
bodily stratum in this context comprises the stomach and reproductive organs and, therefore, 
the acts of defecating, sex, conception, pregnancy, and birth (RHW). It is these associated 
ideas that help us to understand the powerfully positive forces generated by the grotesque 
body because degradation, in a carnivalesque sense, means to bring down - implying a 
negative move from, for example, respect to disrespect – but to bring down to an area of the 
body responsible for conception and birth (RHW). This is best summed up by Bakhtin for 
whom ‘grotesque realism knows no other lower level; it is the fruitful earth and the womb. It 
is always conceiving’ (RHW). Reflected in this imagery is the idea of the lower bodily strata 
as entirely positive and valuable: a foreign conception within many contemporary societies 
(McKenzie, 2005). 
 
3.1.12 Degradation, time and ambivalence  
 
A meaningful consideration of grotesque realism includes the determining trait of its relation 
to time. Bakhtin tells us that ‘the grotesque image reflects a phenomenon in transformation, 
an as yet unfinished metamorphosis, of death and birth, growth and becoming’ (RHW). Like 
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the material bodily principle, the relationship to time and space possessed by grotesque 
realism resonates with Bakhtin’s own health struggles and his experience of a phantom leg 
post amputation. Regarding phantom limbs, Bahktin suggests ‘[t]he object that has been 
destroyed remains in the world but in a new form of being in time and space; it becomes the 
“other side” of the new object that has taken its place’ (Hitchcock, 1995: 92). In this idea, we 
can see the significance of ambivalence in relation to the grotesque; particularly, here, in the 
meeting of the old and new incarnations of the limb. Ambivalence is another vital grotesque-
realist characteristic, found in ‘both poles of transformation, the old and the new, the dying 
and the procreating, the beginning and the end of the metamorphosis’ (RHW). Akin to the 
significant presence of ambivalence is the emphatic differences to be found in manifestations 
of grotesque realism throughout different periods in history. The different depictions of the 
phenomenon in the Middle ages and the Renaissance, when compared with those within the 
Romantic period are stark and the nature and ramifications of the differences are such that for 
a useful understanding of Bakhtinian grotesque, they should be explored. 
 
3.1.13 Medieval and Renaissance grotesque, Romantic grotesque and the changing role of 
laughter over time 
 
As already noted, grotesque imagery existed well before Bakhtin. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge that the definition of grotesque adhered to in this study is, as part of the 
carnivalesque lens through which children’ humour is explored, specifically Bakhtinian 
(predicated upon a medieval and Renaissance interpretation). Bakhtin writes of the difference 
between this incarnation of grotesque and that of the Romantic period. Medieval and 
Renaissance grotesque was irrefutably related to folk culture and belonged to everyone. In 
contrast, the Romantic version acquired a more clandestine character. It was almost an 
individual carnival, denoted by a stark sense of segregation. The rawness and corporeality of 
the carnival spirit became something personal, idealistic and much less visceral. No longer 
the tangible, material bodily experience of the people (RHW). Bakhtin stresses that the most 
significant difference between Romantic and Medieval/Renaissance grotesque was the 
understanding of and response to laughter. It endured, because, as Bakhtin notes, ‘no 
grotesque, even the most timid, is conceivable in the atmosphere of absolute seriousness’ 
(RHW) but was lowered to humour that engendered negativity e.g. irony and sarcasm. 
Laughter lost any connection with joy and celebration and its once constructive, revitalising 
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properties were minimised. Bakhtin makes much of this immensely significant change in the 
nature and place of laughter emphasising that ‘laughter is as a rule considerably muffled' 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries to the level of irony, humour, and other forms of 
reduced laughter' (PDP: 165). Providing further support for change in the status of laughter, 
he cites Romantic critic Jean-Paul’s interpretation of laughter which labels it as ‘destructive’, 
‘against all reality’ and that ‘through it, the entire world is turned into something alien, 
something terrifying and unjustified. The ground slips from under our feet, and we are dizzy 
because we find nothing stable around us’ (RHW: 42), perhaps signifying a political attempt 
to reign in the power of laughter as the great equalizer of humans and bodies. 
 
As Bakhtin states, despite exhibiting some changes due to the more formal nature of the 
times ‘…[t]he carnival spirit still reigned in the depths of Renaissance literature’ (RHW) and 
Bakhtin opined that ‘Renaissance realism did not cut off the umbilical cord which tied them 
to the fruitful womb of earth’ (RHW).  As part of the changing nature of carnivalesque 
imagery, Bakhtin writes of how the significance, importance and positive nature of parody 
transformed once it left behind the freedom of the Middle Ages. For him, …’medieval 
parody is unique, quite unlike the purely formalist literary parody of modern times, which has 
a solely negative character and is deprived of regenerating ambivalence’ (RHW). Further, 
Bakhtin laments that the notion of parody also changed over time. Medieval parody linked 
closely to positive carnivalesque degradation, associated with the grotesque, and brought the 
people’s fear down to earth (Robinson, 2011). Like so many other aspects of the 
carnivalesque, parody was unable to preserve this positivity, significance and authenticity 
after the end of the renaissance (RHW).   
3.1.14 Misinterpretations of grotesque 
There is significant potential for the grotesque to be misinterpreted when viewed through a 
modern lens. For other scholars of the grotesque, an inherent sense of fear permeates. It may 
not appear as a fear of the unknown, the uncertain or of death but, for example, in the case of 
Kayser, as a fear of life (Harpham, 1976). For Bakhtin, this is a contradiction to the essence 
of grotesque imagery for him, where death does not negate life but, instead, is hailed as the 
people’s collective body and a key component of life and ‘the condition of its constant 
renewal and rejuvenation’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 49/50). Moreover, Bakhtin emphasises that fear 
has no place in carnivalesque grotesque and instead ‘…is the extreme expression of narrow-
minded and stupid seriousness, which is defeated by laughter. Complete liberty is possible 
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only in the completely fearless world’ (RHW). Bakhtin’s emphasis on the freeing power of 
laughter from the confines of fear is expressed further in his comment that ‘only dogmatic 
and authoritarian cultures are one-sidedly serious ‘(PDP: 134) and the violent undertones of 
politics attempt to quash humour because laughter has no connection to violence (Billig, 
2008). The complexities of medieval grotesque hinted at here, prompt Bakhtin’s keenness for 
us to retain an air of caution when appropriating grotesque theory, suggesting that ‘the role of 
historians and theorists of literature and art’ might assume anyone looking to apply the idea 
as a theoretical frame ‘is to reconstruct this canon in its true sense. It should not be 
interpreted according to the norms of modern times; nor should it be seen as deviation from 
present-day concepts. The grotesque canon must be appraised according to its own 
measurements’ (RHW). 
 
Returning to the theme of changing perceptions of carnivalesque features over time, Bakhtin 
reminds us that within Medieval and Renaissance conceptions ‘…the system of grotesque 
imagery, death and renewal are inseparable in life as a whole, and life as a whole can inspire 
fear least of all’ (RHW). Around the time of the French monarch Louis XIV’s reign ‘the 
atmosphere in which Rabelais was understood vanished almost entirely’ resulting in a void 
forming between the culture of the time and Rabelais’ work.  The perception of his work as 
strange and as requiring specific literary interpretation and commentary was formed. Linked 
to this is the need to understand, from Bakhtin’s perspective, how this isolation of Rabelais as 
a literary figure gathered momentum over the following years. The changing view of 
grotesque realism from positive and renewing to negative and sordid, Bakhtin suggests, 
means that ‘[t]he link with the essential aspects of being, with the organic system of popular-
festive images, has been broken. Obscenity has become narrowly sexual, isolated, individual, 
and has no place in the new official system of philosophy and imagery" (RHW). In other 
words, images such as the illustration, below (Fig 10) are no longer welcomed, embraced and 
viewed with unbridled positivity and joy. Instead, they are labelled, in an everyday context, 
as suggestive and undesirable. 
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   Fig 10 
 
 
 
It would be incorrect to assume that this joyful relativism is universal, however, as it also has 
what Hollis describes as' a disturbing element' because it is usually those who have the least 
power who become susceptible to any danger that is born out of carnival and, as Bakhtin 
suggests, carnival's celebratory notion of a ''cheerful death'". Hollis argues that perhaps 
Boston had a utopian view of carnival that did not recognise the potential carnival can have 
in relation to violence, when used only as a textual metaphor. Given this, it is important to 
bear this in mind when using carnival as a lens through which to analyse young children’s 
humorous behaviours.  
 
3.2 Dialogism: from theory to methodology  
 
3.2.1 The roots of Bakhtinian dialogism  
The concept of dialogism stems from Mikhail Bakhtin’s philological and philosophical 
exploration of the significance of dialogue.  The term means, ‘many things to many critics, 
sometimes without reference to Bakhtin’ (De Man, 1983: 100). This study is concerned only 
with Bakhtin’s notion of the concept and attempts to gain optimum understanding of his 
thinking via his original works and those of his critics. Vice suggests that, even within 
Bakhtin’s own writing, ambiguity shrouds its precise definition and that this may, in part, be 
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due to his using it both as a means of describing utterances or ‘instances of language’ and, as 
an epistemological ‘defining quality of language itself’ (Vice, 1997: 45). In its 
epistemological form, dialogism is socially charged (Hirschkop, 1989).  In this context, 
‘…dialogism is not only linked to a system of concepts but has a social force or implication 
as well as a socially “concrete” meaning (to use Bakhtin’s language) which could be 
expressed as the difference between imagining dialogism as a debate in the Houses of 
Parliament or as an open air trade union meeting’ (Hirschkop: 1989: 3-4). Both applications 
of dialogism involve the acknowledgement of an utterance (in an instance of language) or of 
language itself (when it is a defining quality of language) to the relationship it has to its past, 
to which it responds, and its future, which it anticipates (Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The all-enveloping implications of the wider conception of dialogism need to be noted for 
application within this study, as does the idea that Bakhtin’s terms are themselves dialogic. 
He suggests that, ‘[t]he meaning of a concept like dialogism or carnival is a sedimentation of 
past usages, current and past social conflicts, the changing forms of ideological life; in short, 
these terms are themselves dialogical (Hirshckop: 1989: 3). Aside from both the wider 
epistemological and narrower linguistic meanings of dialogism, Hirschkop (1989) suggests 
there is an even more transparent explanation for any ambiguity surrounding Bakhtin’s 
dialogism. Firstly, he suggests that the wide array of interpretations is based upon dialogism 
as either a relation ‘among utterances or styles’ (an utterance being Bakhtin’s ‘basic unit of 
communication…marked entirely by social activity…’ [Holt, 2003]) or, ‘between any two 
intentions or an “authorial” and a “heroic” one’ (Hirschkop, 1989, always in operation, or a 
more specifically historical phenomenon, depending on confrontation between social 
conventions of style or genre’.  Arguably, within Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s later writing the 
former definition, that dialogism is ‘always in operation’, dominates (Hirschkop, 1989) and 
the Bakhtin Circle’s ideas about dialogism are underpinned by the proposition that dialogism 
is ever-present and, ‘in actuality, we never say or hear words, we say and hear what is true or 
false, good or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on’ (Voloshinov, 
1973: 70).  
 
3.2.2 Definitions of Dialogism 
The existence of multiple understandings of dialogism seems linked to a notable shift in 
Bakhtin’s (and Voloshinov’s) work between the 1920s to the mid 1930s (Hirschkop, 1989). It 
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is possible that his reaction to Saussure’s bureaucratised notion of langue being a ‘social fact’ 
in a society that Hirschkop describes as, ‘a disturbingly homogenous collective’ (1989: 8) 
prompted this shift. As Hirschkop identifies, this would have been a disturbing notion for 
Bakhtin so, although we cannot say for sure, it is not unlikely that his encounters with the 
ideas of Saussure and his sympathisers prompted the change of course in his and 
Voloshinov’s writing (Hirschkop, 1989). The nature of this change involved, at first glance, 
an apparent acceptance that, ‘the situatedness of an utterance can be expressed by the kind of 
abstract structures identified by linguistics’ (Hirschkop, 1989:9). This acceptance would 
require Bakhtin to renege on his belief regarding the significance of intonation, however: an 
untenable notion. Consequently, the two separate definitions of dialogism (those of it 
referring to the relationship between linguistically separate styles, and the relationship 
between utterances – the latter definition serving to support his notion of the ‘uniqueness of 
each speech event’ (Hirschkop, 1989:9) as previously mentioned) run through his writing, 
simultaneously.   
 
White (2009) employed a Bakhtinian dialogic methodology for her doctoral studies and 
offers a broad and clear definition of dialogism supporting the claim that, from a Bakhtinian 
perspective, it is profitable to view it as an epistemological phenomenon that can also be 
applied at a local level.  She contends that in its omni-presence and acknowledgement of its 
own relational nature, ‘[d]ialogism begins with the everyday exchange or communicative act 
(but not necessarily only words), and is embedded in reality (White, 2009: 54).  Arguably, the 
adoption of a definition due to its favourability is questionable, as it would seem to involve 
(potentially, at least) doing so to suit a particular project, rather than because the definition is 
particularly representative or accurate. However, Bakhtin supported others using his ideas to 
meet their own requirements, asserting that: 
 
‘[Language] lies on the borderline between oneself and other. The word in language is 
half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with 
his own intentions, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his 
own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the 
word does not exist in a neutral and personal language…but rather it exists in other 
people’s mouths, in other people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take the 
word and make it one’s own’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 292). 
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3.2.3 Dialogism as a framework 
To reach a satisfyingly comprehensive understanding of dialogism as an epistemological 
framework, we can explore its antithesis: monologism (Linell, 2003). Monologism can be 
described as a quality of discourse that refuses to acknowledge its relational nature 
(Shepherd, 2011). Within monologism there is no recognition of communication as a process 
through which knowledge can be constructed. Instead, communication is about representation 
and transmission of knowledge and emotions, born out of cognition, which precedes them 
(Linell, 2003). Monologism denies any possibility of meaning being constructed through 
communication or dialogue: knowledge is created, first, and then transferred via language. 
Consequently, monologism, for Bakhtin, is illusionary and can only ever be a smoke screen 
constructed to hide the ontology of dialogism. A definition of dialogism that provides an 
opportunity to explore its central features in greater depth stems from Linell (2003). He offers 
a more compositional explanation of the concept claiming that, despite a significant lack of 
consensus over a general theory of dialogism, it is possible to treat it as a, ‘fairly coherent 
theoretical framework’ (2003). The concept could be underpinned by three theoretical and 
epistemological assumptions about human action, communication and cognition: 
interactionism, contextualism and communicative constructionism (Linell, 2003). A variety 
of literature and theory can be drawn upon to support Linell’s assertion that these 
assumptions help us gain a more comprehensive understanding of dialogism (Linell, 2003).  
 
In order that the notions of interactionism, contextualism and communicative 
constructionism, as viewed within dialogism, can be explored adequately, however, we 
should note that, historically, there is evidence of at least two of Bakhtin’s key terms being 
misunderstood and (mis)used interchangeably (Linell, 2003). A possible reason for this is the 
tendency for Bakhtin’s terms to be used as, ‘separate thoughts’ and that this robs, ‘...them of 
their spirit' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 10). Consequently, before presenting a discussion 
based upon Linell’s central tenets of dialogism, two key terms will be clarified in relation to 
one another. This clarification should facilitate meaningful access to the ideas and, as varying 
approaches to dialogism have been developed in the interim, enable a more accurate picture 
of Bakhtin’s dialogism to be painted.  
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3.2.4 Dialogism and Interactionism 
Arguably a central tenet of dialogism, supported by much of the literature, is that language is 
always relational and ‘[c]ommunication and cognition always involves interaction with 
others (other persons, other systems, other dimensions of one´s self etc)’ (Linell, 2003). The 
idea that dialogism and interaction are inextricably linked is widely supported (Bakhtin, 
1981; Hirschkop, 1989; Vice, 1997; Linell, 2003; Holquist, 1984). However, contemporary 
debate arises over the connection between interaction and relation, and Bakhtin’s definition 
of the relational aspect of dialogism. Hirschkop asks whether Bakhtin defines dialogism as a 
relation, ‘among utterances or styles, or…[as] a relation between any two intentions or an 
“authorial” and a “heroic” one’ (Hirschkop, 1986). Whether the relational nature of dialogism 
focuses on intentions or utterances/styles, we can be sure there is no doubt that it is relational 
(Vice, 1997). Robinson agrees, suggesting that dialogism’s relational nature is evident in its 
premise that, ‘… a single consciousness separate from interaction with other consciousnesses 
is impossible’ (Robinson, 2011: np). Bakhtin’s tenet, that knowledge is dependent upon the 
interaction between consciousnesses and the outside world and that, ‘…we are shaped just as 
much, if not more, by the world, as the world by us’ (Shotter, 2008: 1) has support from 
Bergson who suggests, ‘not one of the categories of our thought – unity, multiplicity, 
mechanical causality, intelligent finality, etc. – applies exactly to the things of life... In vain 
we force the living into this or that one of our moulds. All the moulds crack’ (Bergson, 1911: 
np). This is a strong argument in support of one of Bakhtin’s central tenets of dialogism: the 
irreducible, unfinalisable epistemological nature of dialogue (DI); ideas that have been raised 
several times already but are worthy of further mention due to their gravity. 
 
Within Bakhtinian dialogism the conscious mind is a result of communicative relations. They 
do not exist in isolation and, as Robinson argues ‘there is no reason to assume dialogism 
stops at the limits of the inter-human’ (Robinson, 2011: np); again, reflecting its capacity to 
be an all-encompassing, epistemological and ontological phenomenon. The power expressed 
here must not be misunderstood only as the capacity of dialogism to withstand language’s 
potential to minimise and restrict; language-use can also amplify the dialogical landscape 
depicted here (DI). This ambivalence is reflected, too, in Dialogism’s fundamental 
multiplicity and the synonymous, constant presence of isolation and synchronicity (DI). 
Dialogism could be misinterpreted as a collection of separate perspectives on the same thing, 
but this would be a misconception. For Bakhtin, it is the bringing together of completely 
irreconcilable aspects of separate perspectives, importantly, that have equal value or 
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‘polyphony’. This leads us to another fundamental aspect of the theory: that the world is 
‘irreducible to unity’ (Robinson, 2011): it is ‘unfinalizable’ (PDP) and, unlike within the 
dialectic tradition, the reduction of individual voices to a single voice is denied. This means 
that a single truth or meaning does not exist in dialogism (PDP) arguably exuding a 
carnivalesque spirit if we consider that ‘[c]arnival shakes up the authoritative version of 
language and values, making room for a multiplicity of voices and meanings’ (Elliot, 1999: 
129). Lastly, as Robinson states, ‘truth is established by addressivity, engagement and 
commitment in a particular context’ (Robinson, 2011), denoting the significance of the hero-
author relationship, where heroes attempt to communicate and authors, to interpret their 
efforts (PDP). 
 
3.2.5 Dialogism and its paradigmatic quality 
 
By focusing on Bakhtin’s terms themselves, Hirschkop illustrates the all-encompassing 
nature of dialogism. He suggests that, ‘[t]he meaning of a concept like dialogism or carnival 
is a sedimentation of past usages, current and past social conflicts, the changing forms of 
ideological life; in short, these terms are themselves dialogical. (Hirshckop, 1989: 3). Again, 
highlighting the broad nature of dialogism in one context, Hirschkop says Dialogism is, put 
simply ‘a shorthand answer to the question: what happens when one understands something 
that is expressed?’ (Hirschkop, 1999: 4). He goes on to explain the metaphorical quality of 
dialogism, arguing that even when we first meet the term in Bakhtin’s writing and he 
discusses its capacity to be a particular relation between individual ‘voices’ ‘in which each 
takes its shape as a conscious reaction to the ideological position of the other’(Hirschkop, 
1999: 4), it remains simultaneously a metaphor for a wider defining facet of discourse: an 
idea to which dialogic research must attend (Sullivan, 2013). 
 
3.2.6 Language as voice 
Bakhtin often refers to language as voice. This, it seems, can be viewed as an, ‘empirical 
shorthand for [his] novel proposition about the dialogism of all utterances’ and links 
fundamentally to his emphasis on the importance of intonation. It is intonation, he suggests, 
that allows speakers to express their uniqueness in spite of the grammatically rule-bound, 
lexically conventional nature and pragmatism of a given language (Hirschkop, 1989: 6-7): an 
idea that seems to reflect the almost carnivalesque quality that language had for Bakhtin.  
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3.2.7 Heteroglossia 
 
Relating to Bakhtin’s interpretation of language as voice, heteroglossia describes a merging 
of world-views and voices through language that generates complex unity from an amalgam 
of utterances (Wills, 2006). More specifically, heteroglossia is, according to Allon White, 
‘Bakhtin’s key term for describing the complex stratification of language into register, 
sociolect, dialect, and the mutual interanimation of these forms’ (White, A. 1994:136). 
Holquist’s interpretation builds upon this, suggesting that this interanimation necessarily 
involves the two opposing forces of communication: centripetal, which draws utterances 
towards a structured language, and centrifugal, which pushes them away from a structured 
language and towards everything else to which they relate (Holquist, in DI pxix-xx). Bakhtin 
expounds this point proposing that, ‘[e]very concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves 
as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. Every utterance 
participates in the “unitary language” [in its centripetal forces and tendencies] and at the 
same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia [the centrifugal, stratifying forces]’ 
(DI: 272). Baxter and Montgomery warn us against confusing Bakhtin’s concept of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces with the Hegalian/Marxist idea of a finite dialectical 
synthesis (Baxter and Montgomery, 1996: 114). They suggest, that although apparently 
similar, they are different. The main difference between these two positions is the issue of 
(un)finalisability. Bakhtin suggests that the centrifugal and centripetal forces that act upon 
utterances lead them to a position of freedom where they can ‘go beyond the official 
discourse’ and become something new. This is in stark contrast to Hegelian ‘dialectics’ 
which is based on the premise that language is finalisable and we need to analyse individual 
statements within language in order that we might reach some form of closure or resolution 
(Baxter and Montgomery, 1996).  
 
Heteroglossia is the central condition residing over the process of meaning in an utterance. 
Bakhtin notes that it ensures the priority of context over text. Universally, there are 
contextual conditions e.g. existential, historical, social, meteorological, physiological, that 
will ensure that the meaning of a word uttered at that moment will differ from a meaning it 
would have under separate conditions (DI). All utterances, according to Bakhtin, are 
heteroglot because they are ‘functions of a matrix of forces’ essentially impossible to retrieve 
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and, resultantly, impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia helps us to conceive, as much as is 
possible, the moment where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide. Bakhtin phrases this in 
such a way that it facilitates an almost tangible sense of Heteroglossia. He explains that 
 
‘[a]ll words have the “taste” of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular 
work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word 
tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all 
words and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, 
tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in the word’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 293). 
 
White (2009) leads us to an even clearer understanding of heteroglossia in the context of 
methodology, expounding that a single heteroglot is a collision between the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces of communication that creates, ‘new meaning that goes beyond the official 
discourse’ (White, J. 2009:64). It is imperative from the perspective of dialogic research, to 
notice and analyse the potential production of heteroglots in the data for this study, because 
Bakhtin proposes that it is the multiplicity of heteroglots within any one language and of 
languages themselves that, in many ways, leads us to dialogism (DiN), so, to ignore them 
would be to be disloyal to a dialogic approach.  
 
3.2.8 Vygotsky and Bakhtin 
As an early childhood professional, Vygotsky and his theory of social constructivism have 
been an influential presence throughout my academic career and has become extremely 
influential throughout western ECEC, generally (Moyles, 1997; Bruce, 2002). Like Saussure, 
much of Vygotsky’s work is underpinned by a dialectic approach to language akin to 
Hegelian principles. Wegerif (2008) suggests that dialogism is often misappropriated and 
interchanged, misguidedly, with dialectics. He suggests that, ‘the term dialogic is frequently 
appropriated to a Modernist framework of assumptions, in particular the neo-Vygotskian or 
sociocultural tradition. However, Vygotsky’s theory of education is dialectic, not dialogic’ 
(2008: 1). This is an important distinction and, with the influential presence of Vygotsky in 
the field of ECEC, one that fuelled my desire to explore what characterises ‘dialogic’ and 
why it seems important for early childhood researchers to have clarity on this. Wegerif argues 
that the confusion between dialogism and dialectics comes from the misnomer that dialogism 
means no more than, ‘pertaining to dialogue’ (Wegerif, 2008). He argues this happens 
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because of a failure to question ontological assumptions. Basic Bakhtinian understanding of 
dialogism holds that truth is born when two or more voices are present. That is not to say that 
dialogism only pertains to a linguistic exchange between two or more interlocutors.  Instead, 
a simple but more accurate definition states it is, ‘when a speaker produces an utterance at 
least two voices can be heard simultaneously’ (Wertsch, 1991: 13 cited in Wegerif, 2008).  
This can be explained via Bakhtin’s idea of ‘inter-animation’ that suggests, ‘the meaning of 
an utterance is not reducible to the intentions of the speaker or to the response of the 
addressee but emerges between these two’ (Holquist, 1981: 429-430). As well as having 
relevance for the methodology of this study, the disparity between Vygotkian and Bakhtinian 
approaches, and the popularity and influence of Vygotsky in Western ECEC, bolsters a tenet 
of this study’s conceptual framework that suggests ECEC has an over-reliance on certain 
theoretical stances. It is necessary, therefore, for those ‘go to’ theories to be probed via the 
application of a different way of thinking.  The following chapter explains how the dialogic 
methodology adopted within this study aims to facilitate this different mode of thinking and 
employ it to explore where children’ humour fits into this discussion.  
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Chapter 4: A Bakhtinian inspired methodology 
 
 
4.1 A Dialogic approach to research  
 
A dialogic approach to research is novel when considered amongst established qualitative 
research methods (Sullivan, 2013). It is useful, therefore, to consider the ways in which a 
dialogic methodology has been employed before. White (2009) adopted a dialogic 
methodology for her doctoral study and argues that Dialogism can be explained both as ‘a 
unifying means of exploring voice; and its authorship – its lived construction, enactment and 
interpretation by another’ (White, 2009:10). Further, she argues that adopting a Bakhtinian 
stance on voice involves researchers focusing on participants’ point-of-view and paying 
attention as well to the discourses that influence their understandings. She suggests that the 
‘Bakhtinian hero’ attempts to communicate, and the ‘Bakhtinian author’ evaluates, 
endeavouring to make sense of what has been presented. Significantly, from a researcher 
perspective, White points out that it is the dialogue between the hero and author in 
‘authorship activity’ that the dialogic researcher focuses on (White, 2009: 10).  In the context 
of my study, much as in the context of White’s (2009, 2013), this means the children will be 
viewed as Bakhtinian ‘heroes’, displaying humour and attempting (or not) to communicate 
via their manifestations or appreciation of humour; and the practitioner researchers (PRs) and 
I will be viewed as Bakhtinian ‘authors’ who aim to interpret and evaluate children humour 
production and appreciation.  
 
4.1.2 Dialogism as epistemology 
White’s (2009; 2013a; 2013b) broad and clear definition of dialogism supports the claim that, 
from a Bakhtinian perspective, it is profitable to view it as an epistemological phenomenon 
that can also be applied at a local level.  She contends that in its omni-presence and 
acknowledgement of its own relational nature, ‘[d]ialogism begins with the everyday 
exchange or communicative act (but not necessarily only words), and is embedded in reality 
(White, 2009:54).  Arguably, the adoption of a definition due to its favourability is 
questionable, as it would seem to involve (potentially, at least) doing so to suit a particular 
project, rather than because the definition is particularly representative or accurate. However, 
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Bakhtin supported others adopting a considered approach to using his ideas for their own 
requirements, asserting that, 
 
‘[Language] lies on the borderline between oneself and other. The word in language is 
half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with 
his own intentions, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his 
own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the 
word does not exist in a neutral and personal language…but rather it exists in other 
people’s mouths, in other people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take the 
word and make it one’s own’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 292) 
 
Here, Bakhtin indicates that he never intended for his words to be final and that he welcomed 
his words being appropriated and interpreted by others. Consequently, if an interpretation of 
dialogism serves to support its application in an educational context, Bakhtin would endorse 
it, providing it preserves the spirit of his words and reflects an ‘attempt to understand how 
[he] came to assemble his potent analytical instruments’ (Shepherd, 2005 cited in Matusov, 
2007: 216). Matusov (2007) provides examples of educationalists’ ignoring the roots of 
Bakhtin’s ideas, resulting in his ideas being misappropriated. Matusov (2007) warns against 
educationalists neglecting the foundational work of philologists when drawing on Bakhtin for 
fear of losing the depth of understanding they provide – a notion I will keep in mind at all 
times throughout this project.  
 
4.1.1 Privileging the ‘pravda’ of participant voices 
A primary feature of my doctoral study is the exploration of child and practitioner 
perceptions of children’s humour in a nursery setting. More specifically, the study is 
concerned with the subjectivity of perception via Bakhtin’s concept of ‘field of vision’ 
through which ‘our internal micro-dialogue is informed by the emotional−evaluative stances 
and intonations of others’ (Burkitt, 2013: 267). In other words, the study is concerned with 
the way that perceptions are influenced and shaped by multiple voices and perspectives that 
stem from changeable social, historical, and physiological conditions (amongst others) or 
from the presence of ‘heteroglossia’ (Bakhtin, 1981). Sullivan suggests that, ‘[i]f …data is 
concerned with subjectivity, then it may be worthwhile shepherding it into the arms of a 
dialogic methodology’ (Sullivan, 2012: 1) because through the application of Bakhtinian 
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concepts, ‘[a] dialogical approach provides the tools for the methodological analysis of 
subjectivity in qualitative data…subjectivity [being] theorised as changing and responsive to 
others’ (Sullivan, 2012:1).  
 
Many other methodologies including grounded theory, interpretive phenomenological 
analysis, narrative analysis and varieties of discourse analysis offer tools to analyse 
subjectivity (Sullivan, 2012: 1). Some may argue that a dialogic methodology is like many of 
these approaches; however, one significant difference is that a dialogic methodology focuses 
on a Bakhtinian interpretation of dialogue where, ‘ideas are exchanged but ideas are actually 
lived (my emphasis) rather than abstract and are full of personal values and judgements’ 
(Sullivan, 2012: 2). The distinction between abstract and lived ideas is much easier to make 
in the Russian language (Bakhtin’s primary language) as there is a word for ‘truth as lived’ 
(pravda) and ‘truth as abstract’ (istina) (Sullivan, 2012). My study will focus intently on the 
lived experiences or truth (pravda) of the participants; the bearing this has on their thoughts, 
perceptions, values, beliefs and attitudes; and the relationship between these two foci and my 
research questions. It is important, also, to clarify my allegiance to Bakhtinian dialogism 
because, as Linell reminds us, the term dialogism ‘…can be used in many ways...[and]… is 
not one coherent school, or theory, not even something that ‘dialogists’ of different 
persuasions would agree upon’ (Linell, 2004: 4). Further, De Man notes that ‘[t]he term 
means, ‘many things to many critics, sometimes without reference to Bakhtin’ (De Man, 
1983: 100). This study is concerned only with Bakhtin’s notion of the concept and attempts 
to gain optimum understanding of his thinking via his original works and those who have 
made use of his theories.  
 
4.1.3 Dialogism and the notion of a framework 
  
Until recently, in educational research and the wider research community, dialogism had 
seldom been used as a methodology (Sullivan, 2012). Between 2012 and 2018 more interest 
has been shown in the methodological potential of Dialogsim but it is still a relative 
newcomer to the field. Therefore, the basis of my decision to use dialogism to underpin the 
study did not stem from a wide range of precedents. Instead, it was inspired in the first 
instance by the inextricable link between dialogism and carnivalesque and the idea that a 
primary concern of social scientists should be their ethical stance (Robson, 2011). When 
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reading a number of Bakhtin’s earlier works, it is hard to ignore his strong ethical position, 
that places ethics at the heart of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981). Frank elucidates, facilitating 
access to Bakhtin’s approach to ethics using an example of Bakhtin’s assessment of the 
Dostoevskian character, Devushkin. Frank writes of how Bakhtin describes Devushkin 
recognising himself in a character in Gorgol’s story ‘The Overcoat’.  Bakhtin writes that 
Devushkin, “…was outraged that his poverty had been spied upon, that his entire life had 
been analysed and described, that he had been defined once and for all, that he had been left 
with no other prospects” (PDP:58 cited in Frank, 2005: 965). Frank describes, “Devushkin’s 
feelings as providing a caution as to how social science should not leave its subjects feeling’ 
(Frank, 2005: 965). This has relevance for the emotional register of the KMs in the analysis. 
Sullivan argues that it is the ‘emotional register’ and ‘emotional intonation’ that allow a 
speaker to offer meaning and value within the utterances (Sullivan, 2013) and as a dialogic 
researcher I will need to attend to this when analysing the voices of the participants. 
Attention to this aspect of the data will facilitate meaningful consideration of the impact that 
emotional context can have within an utterance. Further to Frank’s assessment of 
Devushkin’s predicament, it seems reasonable to suggest any actions leaving participants 
feeling ‘spied upon’, ‘analysed’ - in the cold and callus sense of the word -  and/or ‘defined’ 
would be counter to the Economic Social Research Council’s key principles for ethical 
research. These include ‘minimis[ing] risk and harm’; conducting research with ‘integrity and 
transparency’; and the respect of the ‘rights and dignity of individuals and groups’ (ESRC, 
2015); as well as to Bakhtin’s fundamental allegiance to the ethical nature of language. With 
the need to uphold the highest ethical standards throughout, it is helpful to hold on to 
Musaeus’ reminder that, ‘’dialogism is not a method of data collection; it permeates the entire 
research study’ (no date: 32) and, as ethics are intricately woven through dialogism, they, too, 
permeate the whole study.  
 
From this perspective, dialogism provides the basis for an appropriate social science 
methodology. In another respect, it is far from ideal, given that one of its central premises is 
that of the unfinalisable nature of people and language (PDP). It could be argued that one aim 
of a doctoral thesis is to demonstrate accountability and that this could be described as a 
monologic aim, or as seeking to claim accountability for something and therefore claim ‘the 
last word’ (Bakhtin, 1984b). This contradicts Bakhtin’s theory by not providing an, 
‘empirically adequate description of the human condition’ or being ethically sound (Frank, 
2005: 965). Doctoral students, therefore, are presented with a problem:  how do you write a 
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thesis that draws conclusions that withstand rigorous examination whilst being true to the 
concept of unfinalisability?  Frank helps with this dilemma suggesting that, ‘…in Bakhtin’s 
dialogical ideal, the research report must always understand itself not as a final statement of 
who the research participants are, but as one move in a continuing dialogue through which 
those participants will continue to form themselves as they continue to become a may yet be’ 
(Frank, 2005: 966-7). This sentiment will be carried through the research process surrounding 
this thesis, and beyond. 
 
4.1.4 The idiosyncratic nature of dialogic research 
 
The idea that Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue assumes that authors try to communicate their own 
experiences to themselves, as well as to others, is key to dialogic research. This differs from 
other forms of analysis in that the participants are not subjects waiting to be known but are, 
themselves, knowers, and like researchers, are capable of cyclical interpretation of what is 
trustworthy, or worthy of suspicion (Sullivan, 2012). In addition, Sullivan argues that 
potentially, more than other approaches, a focus on Bakhtinian dialogue and therefore on 
lived experience or ‘pravda’, ‘brings an intense focus to the transformative effect of genres 
on experience, particularly on the experience of space and time (or ‘chronotope’ in Bakhtin’s 
words)’ (Sullivan, 2012: 15). Furthermore, a dialogic approach views discourse aesthetically 
which facilitates the privileging of subjectivity, through ‘…inviting and privileging 
observation and examination of the relational nature of research and…celebrat[ing] the 
subjective nature of the information gathered through this process (Russell, 2002).  Lastly, 
Sullivan suggests that bureaucracy, in the form of data preparation, and charisma, in terms of 
‘a capacity’ of the researcher ‘to actualise procedures’ using a charismatic writing style can 
feature in dialogic research analysis, to strengthen the dialogicality of the analysis: a point I 
return to in the process of data analysis and refer to in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
4.1.5 Dialogism, subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
 
Dialogic research, Sullivan (2012) suggests, differs from other methods that adopt a 
Bakhtinian view of dialogue in several ways but, predominantly, in its attempt to give 
subjectivity and experience a more central role. A dialogic approach to data analysis, Sullivan 
argues, offers methodological tools for the analysis of participant subjectivity (Sullivan, 
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2012). He suggests that subjectivity, in this instance, changes and responds to others and, if a 
researcher wishes to focus on subjectivity within data, it may be fruitful to adopt a dialogical 
methodology (ibid). Further, he suggests that it is important to distinguish the type of 
subjectivity the research is concerned with, highlighting three dominant conceptions: blank, 
complex and uncomplicated (ibid). He suggests that dialogic research can draw on ideas 
within all three of these conceptions of subjectivity to focus on a ‘dialogical subjectivity’ but 
that, crucially, the dialogic researcher focuses on subjectivity that relates to self and other 
and, therefore, is inherently social (Sullivan, 2012) and better described as intersubjectivity. 
To establish further how the analysis process can be classed as dialogic, it is important to 
review the nature of the questions that a dialogic researcher might ask of data. The types of 
questions associated with subjectivity may be worded like this: ‘what is it like to feel anger 
towards another person?’; ‘what is the significance of leadership in social groups?’; ‘or how 
do participants express responses to humour?’ Unlike the subjectivity at the heart of other 
methods that have a focus on it, these questions reflect the dialogic researcher’s interest in 
viewing participants as ‘conscious’ and ‘not already given’ with the focus being on voice as 
‘point of view’, not ‘individual[s] with experiences’ (Sullivan, 2012: 21).  
 
 
 
 
4.2 Grounding dialogic assumptions 
 
So far, several themes have been discussed in relation to their role in Bakhtin’s dialogic 
theory. However, there are several Bakhtinian theoretical assumptions named specifically by 
Bakhtin that underpin this study. It is not possible to offer an in-depth discussion of all of 
them here, suffice to say that the most pertinent are included here, but it should be noted that 
all of Bakhtin’s dialogic concepts have been considered carefully and reflected within this 
project.  The following discussion details the assumptions that this research and the analysis 
of data are grounded in and makes clear how each concept relates to the study. The concepts 
of hero and author were raised and discussed earlier, so will not feature here. 
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4.2.1 Bakhtinian Dialogue 
 
Many approaches to and interpretations of dialogue exist such as those of Buber, Habermas 
and Gadamer (Sullivan, 2012). This study adopts a Bakhtinian approach to dialogue as 
offered in Sullivan (2012: 212): that is, that dialogue is a vehicle for the exchange of lived 
experiences that are brimming with ‘personal values and judgments’. In the section to follow 
I will outline how this is relevant, particularly for the analysis of the data. We can understand 
the concept of love abstractly, as a strong feeling of affection; however, we acquire a 
different understanding of the sensation of love through experiencing and feeling it viscerally 
(Sullivan, 2012). The Russian language has two distinct words that describe abstract and 
lived truth, istina and pravda: often depicted by Bakhtin as representing contrasting sides of a 
single idea (Bakhtin, 1993). Sullivan (2012) argues that to experience another person as 
humorous involves both an abstract understanding of what it means to be humorous (istina) 
and the instant sensation of it in a specific encounter with another person; for example, if we 
make another person laugh, we may feel humorous (pravda). Bakhtin (1990) suggests that 
this type of lived experience is only available to us via someone else. He describes the act of 
seeing a part of someone that they cannot see themselves as ‘authorial surplus’, and suggests 
that in authoring another, we ‘gift’ them the opportunity to experience something in a way 
that would be impossible otherwise. White explains further that it, ‘[r]epresents the visual and 
discursive horizon of social partners who, as a result of their unique line of vision, are each 
privy to privileges and constraints which will influence their interpretations of other – 
literally and figuratively drawn from their unique ideological horizon’ (White, 2009: 58). 
Sullivan suggests that this affords power to authorship, giving it the capacity to shape others 
and that two important factors in this process are the intonation and emotional register of 
language (Sullivan, 2012). Bakhtin uses art as an analogy for this emotion-wracked moulding 
of others, suggesting that during encounters we offer one another a form which may be 
received willingly or resisted. Further, we have the capacity to shape our worlds as a work of 
art may be shaped, transforming our lives according to the social values we hold in esteem 
such as to be humorous, or a generous friend and dialogue can be a means of ‘feeling the 
different shapes and sounds’ of these ‘idea[s] […intonation…] through life’ (Sullivan, 2012: 
4). The distinction Bakhtin draws between abstract and lived experiences has direct 
implications for the analysis of data collected in this study. My focus will be on the lived 
experiences of the children and PRs, rather than the abstract, in an attempt to gain better 
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access to the subjectivity of the participants that is ‘changing and respon[ding] to others’ 
(Sullivan, 2012: 1). 
 
There are many rhetorical features of dialogue that can affect the meaning or interpretation of 
it. Those that are utilised within this study are helpfully précised by Sullivan in the table 
below, illustrating the relationship between each feature of dialogue and ‘the other’ (what is 
the other, here), and a short explanation of its meaning. 
 
 
Rhetorical feature Relationship to other Otherwise 
known as 
Hidden dialogue The other’s voice is continually anticipated. Reservations 
and 
hesitations. 
Penetrative word Capacity of other to reassure us when we are 
torn between different judgements. 
Interruption. 
Word with a sidewards glance Fearful of other’s judgements Disclaimer. 
Word with a loophole Escape from a definitive statement. 
Hope of vindication. 
Disclaimer. 
Sore-spots Strong reaction to other’s words. Extreme-case 
formulation. 
Stylisation Agreement with other’s words. Stylisation. 
Parody Disagreement with other’s words. Parody. 
Fig 11 (Adapted from Sullivan, 2012) 
 
4.3 Why Dialogism? 
Grounded theory, interpretive phenomenological analysis, narrative analysis and varieties of 
discourse analysis also provide methodological tools for analysis of subjectivity (Sullivan, 
2012). Consequently, it is important to distinguish dialogic research from the rest of the field 
and look at why a dialogic perspective on subjectivity lends itself to this study.  
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4.3.1 Trust and suspicion 
Sullivan (2012) describes a dilemma within many qualitative analysis approaches, concerning 
a “hermeneutics of suspicion” and a “hermeneutics of trust”’ (Sullivan, 2012: 9). He refers to 
Ricoeur’s (1981 in Sullivan 2012) theory distinguishing methods that adopt a critical 
approach and aim to remove the researcher from the content, and those that aim to retain an 
openness with regards to ‘truths’ of the data (Sullivan, 2012). He describes how some types 
of narrative analysis place distance between the researcher and the people in the research, 
instead encouraging the transcribed text to become the central concern. The researcher then 
looks at the data through rhetorical or social action lenses using, for example, Goffman’s 
theory of symbolic interaction; or, adopting a lens to explore power-relations, using, for 
example, Foucauldian theories suspicious of how truth claims are organised (ibid). 
Conversely, types of grounded and phenomenological analysis, Sullivan argues, utilise a 
more trusting approach which assumes the data contains ‘clues to another world’ (2012: 10). 
There are numerous variations of phenomenological and grounded approaches that 
demonstrate belief in the data; however, what seems most important for this study is to 
recognise that there is distinction to be made between data analysis approaches that trust the 
data and those that are suspicious of it (Sullivan, 2012). This does not mean, however, that 
analysis methods must fall into one or the other of these categories and Sullivan suggests that 
dialogic analysis, like some forms of narrative analysis that veer towards discourse analysis, 
can combine the two (ibid). It could be argued that it would be useful to adopt an analysis 
approach that combines trust and suspicion in way that enables researchers to gain insight 
into the lived experiences of participants, yet also bring in an element of suspicion in an 
attempt to inspire ‘an empathetic opening up of the possibilities of the data’ (Sullivan, 2012: 
14), and that a dialogic approach could facilitate that. 
 
4.3.2 Alternative methodologies that utilize Bakhtinian dialogue 
Sullivan (2012) suggests that there are many imaginative interpretations of and ways that a 
Bakhtinian approach to dialogue have been operationalised within research. For example, he 
highlights Hermans’ (2001, 2002) use of his ‘dialogical self’ theory, asserting how the self 
consists of numerous ‘I-positions’ each continually seeking to dominate; Wertsch (1991, 
1998) and his emphasis on ‘voices’ that are historical, social and institutional in nature and 
merge in discourse; Matusov’s (2009) focus on ‘interpersonal dialogic relations’ alongside 
the breadth of institutional relations in the context of education; Hicks’ (1996, 2002) use of 
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‘contextual inquiry’ focusing on detailed valuations of shifting cultural symbols through 
analysis of narratives and discourses; and McCarthy and Wright’s (2004) methods combining 
Dewian aesthetics and Bakhtinian dialogism.  
 
Given this range of approaches to Bakhtinian dialogue it is important to articulate why I did 
not adopt one of them. As the essence of dialogism does not facilitate a consistent 
methodological framework (Sullivan, 2012), it would feel disrespectful of the individual and 
subjective nature of the data in this study to appropriate any of the above approaches. In order 
that the methodology and analysis remain focused upon the voices of the participants, I 
reasoned it was necessary to create a novel framework that responds to the pravda of the 
participants.  
 
4.4 The Pilot Study 
 
As a precursor to the main study I conducted a pilot study; in part, to test a selection of 
dialogic research methods (forms of which were used by White in her 2009 doctoral 
research). Other reasons for the pilot were pragmatic, conceptual and ethical: to test the 
equipment; check the likelihood of capturing ‘enough’ of children’s humour on film; 
determine whether there are optimum times for capturing humour; facilitate the criteria for 
analysis design, including the significant Bakhtinian concepts that would be operationalized 
in the main study; ensure the methods are in place for ensuring children maintain the right to 
withdraw throughout; and to test interview/consultation techniques.  
 
4.4.1 Setting and participants 
The pilot study took place in an urban nursery setting for children between birth and five years 
old and involved two key early childhood practitioners and four children aged between 3 and 
4 years old (all names have been anonymised).  
 
4.4.2 Procedures 
Data were collected via video observations.  Two static cameras were set up to film the child 
and practitioner participants (Keyes, 2006; Loizou, 2007), and one head-mounted camera 
(similar to those worn in White’s 2009 doctoral research) worn by one of the practitioner 
participants. ‘Loosely structured’ interviews (dialogic encounters) were conducted and video-
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recorded (King and Horrocks, 2010) with all participants. During the dialogic encounters 
participants were asked to view video clips of the child participants spontaneously displaying 
or responding to humour and to express a response. Once the initial interviews were 
transcribed, in keeping with the dialogic methodology, secondary interviews were conducted 
presenting all participants with an opportunity to view the transcripts (and/or watch the 
interview video) and change/explain and/or expand upon their comments in the initial 
interview. 
 
The data were analysed dialogically drawing on Sullivan’s (2012) work, and utilising 
utterance as the unit of analysis - more than a sentence or word, an utterance is always 
answerable. Bakhtin suggests that because we ‘…live in a world of others' words." (Bakhtin, 
1984: 143) we need to recognise that "[a]ny understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is 
inherently responsive...’ and that, ‘[a]ny utterance is a link in the chain of communication" 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 68, 84). This reminds us that, "[t]he word lives, as it were, on the boundary 
between its own context and another, alien, context." (Bakhtin, 1981: 284): and hence the 
answerable utterance is a fitting unit of analysis for a dialogic study looking to bridge the gap 
between different contexts.  
 
Features of Bakhtinian carnivalesque were applied to the data, to generate a range of 
pertinent utterances, or ‘KMs’ (Sullivan, 2012). The most apparent features of carnivalesque 
within the data were concepts of hyperbole, grotesque and clowning, but other features were 
present also and will form part of the discussion. In this context exaggeration, excess and the 
moving of the particular to the realm of the universal personify hyperbole. The children’s 
appreciation of the grotesque focuses particularly on the scatological imagery associated with 
debasing and renewing properties of the lower bodily stratum (Bakhtin, PDP). The concept of 
clowning in the analysis revolves around Bakhtin’s suggestion that, ‘Clowns and fools...are 
characteristic of the medieval culture of humour. They were the constant, accredited 
representatives of the carnival spirit in everyday life out of carnival season’ representing, ‘a 
certain form of life, which was real and ideal at the same time (Bakhtin, 1984: 8). It also 
bears more resemblance to the ‘teasing’ highlighted by Cameron et al (2008) and not their 
use of ‘clowning’ as here clowning is seen as ‘attempting to provoke a response from a 
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communicative partner’ (Cameron et al 2008: 8) as opposed to attempting to repeat an act in 
order to ‘re-elicit (my emphasis) laughter from others’ (Cameron et al 2008: 8). 
4.4.3 Implications for main study 
Whilst my pilot study data do not show children engaging in an intentional and authentic 
Rabelaisian carnival, their actions and behaviours can be classified as embodying the spirit of 
Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, and this offers us potentially valuable insights into the nature of 
their humour (White, 2013). Shortcomings in my data collection methods will necessitate 
changes, from attempting to acquire the Bakhtinian notion of ‘point of view’ in opposition to 
truth (White, 2009) more effectively via the use of head cameras for all participants, 
including the children; to examining the effects of my involvement in the study and how this 
may affect the way children behave, and this will be discussed in more details in the next 
section. However, this does not detract from the discovery that the children produced and 
enjoyed humour that embodied a carnivalesque spirit. Although exploratory and limited, this 
initial study established thought-provoking correlations between the children’s humour 
captured and Bakhtinian carnivalesque (Tallant, 2015). Additionally, the pilot study 
established that a dialogic methodology was pertinent because, ‘[d]ialogic inquiry…involves 
the use of methods that ‘examine’ the active and responsive nature of language among 
participants in appropriating, constructing, and reconstructing knowledge for self and other’ 
(Kotsopoulos, 2010: 297). This is an apposite feature given the aim to explore how children 
use the ‘language’ of humour within early years settings; how practitioners and I perceive, 
relate and respond to children’ humour, and the significance of these factors for early 
childhood practice and pedagogy. 
 
 
4.5 Implications of Pilot Study for the Main Study 
 
4.5.1 Orientation period 
The pilot demonstrated there needed to be a substantial orientation period to familiarise all 
participants with the processes involved in the project. This was illustrated most clearly by 
the interviews with practitioners in which they found it very challenging to comment on what 
they were seeing without me prompting them with questions. This meant that the interviews 
were not sufficiently dialogic. Consequently, I planned to spend at least one month visiting 
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the nursery on a regular basis so that I would have made at least 8 visits lasting at least a 
morning or an afternoon before commencing data collection. During these visits I talked to 
the children and practitioners about the project, but also become part of the ‘everyday’ 
activities that go on in the nursery to enable the children and staff to become used to my 
presence. 
 
4.5.2 Participants 
It soon became clear that only having to two target children involved in the study was not 
going to allow for the collection of the type of data I was looking for. On realising this, I 
wrote in my research journal: 
 
‘I attempted to video snack time with one static camera and PPA wearing a head 
camera. There were some instances of humour but not from TC1 (Target Child 1). 
This seems to be a potential issue and it is worth considering all of the children in the 
room being TCs. It was particularly apparent when filming the children over 
lunchtime. The TC present did not express humour over the period of lunchtime. 
However, I saw three girls sitting on the table next to me playing and laughing, 
seemingly outside of the practitioners’ gaze. As this kind of humour is something that 
I am particularly keen to capture and explore in the main study, I think it is necessary 
to involve all children in the room. As previously mentioned it will involve all children 
in the room wearing a head camera as well as the PRs and myself’. 
       (Researcher journal, 7.4.14) 
4.5.3 Cameras 
The static cameras proved useful in the pilot as they captured the broad view of the room and 
whole instances of humour as well as practitioners’ activity and responses. However, the 
static cameras were not able to provide clarity of the detail of the humorous exchanges 
between children and adults as often the cameras were either too far away from the 
participants, or the noise levels in the room were such that the recording was not clear 
enough. Further, the static cameras did not adequately capture the participants’ ‘point of 
view’ (Bakhtin, 1986): a crucial part of a dialogic methodology. Consequently, head cameras 
would be worn by all participants, including the children, to enable detailed footage of each 
participant’s point of view to be captured and analysed. 
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4.5.4 Head cameras 
During the pilot study the head camera worn by the practitioners was not angled adequately 
and thus, the recorded images were too high, meaning that adults and children were not 
captured on film. This was something I could address successfully within the main study, the 
details of which are discussed further on in this chapter. 
 
4.5.6 Interviews as Dialogic Encounters 
During the pilot the recorded conversations with adults and children were referred to as 
interviews. The term interview seemed to have connotations for the practitioners which 
resulted in the conversations taking the form of question and answer sessions as opposed to 
conversations. The question and answer sessions hindered the dialogic processes that the 
project calls for so during the main study they will be known as dialogic encounters (inspired 
by White, 2009; 2013) to eliminate the notion of the traditional interview and its often 
monologic associations. 
 
4.5.7 Biographic Dialogic Encounters as Background Interviews 
 
Having completed the dialogic encounters for the pilot study it became clear that primary and 
secondary dialogic influences are not enough. In order to meaningfully access the thoughts 
and beliefs of the practitioners that lead to them viewing children and humour in particular 
ways it seems necessary to conduct the third style of dialogic encounter prior to the other 
two. This is biographic in nature. Rodriguez (2004) argues that finding out about a person’s 
history can offer clues as to why they think in and feel particular ways.  Further, borrowing 
from the essence of Pinar’s (1975) phenomenologically inspired concept of currere, Pinar 
suggests that visiting aspects of the past that ‘hover… over the present’ may allow us to 
recognise how the ‘biographic past…is contributive to the biographic present’ and that a 
researcher attending to a participant’s past, may have an opportunity to reflect upon ‘the 
present…acting out of the past’ and the ‘superimposition of past issues and situations and 
persons onto the present’ (Pinar, 1975: 7). 
 
4.5.8 Research journals 
For the pilot study, I provided the practitioners with research journals and asked them to 
record anything that they thought would be useful or interesting and that they would like to 
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discuss. As mentioned earlier, the practitioners did not write anything in their journals and 
explained they had forgotten about them during the data collection. Consequently, in the 
main study, the journals (other than my own) were available to the PRs, and I explained their 
purpose and value as clearly as I could, but they did not constitute a formal data collection 
method.  
 
 
4.6 The Main Study 
 
4.6.1 The setting and participants 
 
To locate the study and identify participants, I approached one setting, the manager of which 
was known to me. It was a private, urban ECEC setting, comprising eight rooms arranged by 
children’s ages, and an outdoor area. The setting is registered to care for up to 106 children at 
any one time. This study was focused in one of the eight play rooms with eighteen children 
between the ages of 3 and 4 years old of British and Eurasian extraction and involved 4 early 
childhood practitioners all based in one room, one of whom was the room leader. To identify 
each participant whilst upholding anonymity, stickers were used to represent each child and 
adult. The children and practitioners each chose a sticker to represent themselves and this was 
applied to their head camera. The stickers are used in the findings chapter to differentiate 
between the participants. At the time of the study there were 29 early years practitioners 
employed at the nursery. All of them held at least a Level 3 qualification apart from one, who 
was working towards it. One practitioner, based in the room this study took place in, held 
Early Years Professional Status, a postgraduate qualification, and another was undertaking 
study. 
 
All participants took on the role of ‘researcher as dialogic partner’ in context with their 
own role within the nursery and within the research, reflecting Christensen and James’ 
(2002: 482) concept of ‘ethical symmetry’ which assumes ‘the ethical relationship 
between researcher and informant is the same whether he or she conducts research 
with adults or children’. Moreover, ideally, the process of deconstruction and reconstruction 
in dialogic research ought to be conducted by both researcher and participants, implying a 
need for participants to be co-researchers, and for an equitable balance of power, or 
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polyphonic (Bakhtin, 1981) relationship between researcher and researched to be established 
and maintained throughout the research process (Sullivan, 2012). Arguably, universal 
equality between researcher and participants is impossible, particularly given the parameters 
of doctoral study and the requirement for doctoral researchers to have ultimate control over 
the thesis. It seems reasonable (from a doctoral perspective) and necessary (from a dialogic 
perspective), however, for a dialogic research project to have a polyphonic data collection 
process, requiring researcher and participants alike to contribute to the creation of meaning 
(Sullivan, 2012). This approach can provide an opportunity for the participants’ point-of-
view to be prioritised throughout the thesis. White’s (2009) research reflects this as she, too, 
experienced the challenge of the requirement to demonstrate fundamental authority over her 
thesis whilst remaining faithful to the dialogic nature of her research (White, 2009). 
Ultimately, White recognised the impossibility of preserving a multiplicity of voices 
throughout her thesis that could communicate with one another, openly and candidly (RHW). 
As this is one of dialogism’s central tenets, clearly reconciling the need to be faithful to a 
dialogic approach and meet the requirements of doctoral research was problematic. She 
suggests she was only able to achieve this by highlighting the parallels between her dilemma 
and what she sees as a, ‘central flaw in Bakhtin’s earliest philosophy when applied to real 
people in real contexts; that is, there are always powerful and not so powerful voices at work 
within language’ (White, 2009: 210). This ‘flaw’ as White suggests, appears to have been 
addressed by Bakhtin later in his life, which has only been brought to the attention of the 
English-speaking world because of recent translations of some of his later works. For 
example, Emerson (2016) suggests it was only later that Bakhtin started to offer thoughts 
about human studies as a research field, which supports White’s idea that his earliest works 
do not necessarily lend themselves, directly, to social science research. In response to this, in 
her Jubilee Lecture at Sheffield University, Emerson spoke about an epistemology continuum 
that, for Bakhtin, places ‘thing cognition’ which searches for and reveals ‘precision and 
exactness’, labelling what it reveals in order to assess or pass judgement on it, at one end; and 
‘personality cognition’ that is never revealed by ‘formal or forced interrogation’ and only 
reveals itself in response to being asked (Emerson, 2016), at the other. Dialogic researchers 
are concerned with personality cognition (Bakhtin, 1981) and, therefore, it is fitting to 
framing research participants as ‘dialogic partners’ (White, 2009) who are asked to reveal 
their reality to achieve dialogic validity (Lincoln, 1995). One way of safeguarding dialogic 
validity is for the dialogic partners’ voices to remain prominent, post project completion. To 
do this, we can follow the lead of Ginsburg’s 1989-1998 ethnography on pro-life and pro-
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choice women, by acknowledging the uniqueness of the dialogic partners’ voices and 
ensuring that they do not become subsumed into overarching social theories and, therefore, 
become lost in them (Sauukko, 2005). 
 
Further, with the adult participants in this study being referred to as practitioner 
researchers, the children are referred to as child researchers throughout the thesis. I 
recognise that the children have limited capacity as researchers in this project. Firstly, a 
sophisticated understanding of the context, premises and aims of the study are not 
accessible to the children due to their young age (Clarke, 2005). Secondly, the doctoral 
nature of this study presents limitations as to what can be achieved given a limited time-
frame and access to resources. However, this does not mean that the children cannot be 
presented with an opportunity to contribute to the analysis process, as the practitioners 
are, by offering their views and responses to aspects of the data. Arguably, this justifies 
affording them a type of researcher status because, although I am ultimately responsible 
for the findings, conclusions and implications of the study, I argue it is important to 
recognise the central role that the children and practitioners have in the production but 
also the analysis of the data. This theme is reflected in Sullivan’s conceptualization of the 
dialogic partnership between researcher and participants in a dialogic approach to data 
collection and analysis (Sullivan, 2012). In addition, all the participants being known as 
child or PRs (children and PRs) helps to lessen the effects of status within the project, 
however minimally, but any efforts to combat the ill effects of hierarchy are welcome 
(Albon and Rosen, 2015).  I am referred to as ‘the researcher’ throughout and accept 
ultimate responsibility for the overall outcomes of the project, until after completion, 
when the child and PRs will be invited to continue our partnership. As already alluded to, 
the practitioners’ and children’s roles as researchers were limited (and this was made 
clear to them from the beginning) but their contributions and insights as to the evolving 
data throughout the collection process are valued highly and form a significant and 
foregrounding element of the dialogic research process (Sullivan, 2012; White, 2013). As 
mentioned earlier, White (2009) struggled with many of the issues raised in this section 
during her doctoral study and suggested that it was a notion she returned to several times 
throughout the process and attempted to address. Ultimately, she tried to ensure that 
participant point-of-view (Bakhtin, 1986) was foregrounded throughout her thesis, to be 
as faithful to the dialogic underpinnings of her project as possible, which supported the 
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research of other dialogic researchers who experienced similar issues within their 
research (Bingham and Sidorkin, 2001; Brown and Renshaw, 2006; Lensmire, 1997 and 
Maybin, 2006). This was borne in mind throughout my own study and continually 
reflected upon throughout the research. 
 
Throughout this study ‘young children’ refers to children between the ages of 3 and 5 years 
old, unless otherwise specified. Commonly, children at this age are referred to as ‘pre-school 
children’, however, I am not comfortable with this term due to its deficit-focus on what 
children will become, as opposed to a focus on who they are. 
 
4.6.2 Data collection 
The collection of data for this study involved several interconnected methods including 
observations; filming; Dialogic Encounters as interviews with the PRs and children; research 
journals; and analysis journals, in line with the complexity of a Bakhtinian dialogic approach 
to research and the need to be faithful to Bakhtinian ideology. The methods employed are 
outlined below, first in table format and then in more detail. 
 
 
Data collection stage Data collection methods 
Round A Video recorded observations 
(using head cameras and 
static cameras) 
Biographic Dialogic 
Encounter 
Child Dialogic Encounter  
Practitioner Dialogic 
Encounter 1 
Practitioner Dialogic 
Encounter 2 
Round B Video recorded observations 
(using head cameras and 
static cameras) 
Child Dialogic Encounter  
Practitioner Dialogic 
Encounter 1 
Practitioner Dialogic 
Encounter 2 
Practitioner Analysis Journal 
Fig 12 Overview of data collection methods 
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4.6.3 Observations 
I collected data via video observations of child dialogic partners between the ages of three 
and five years old who attend the 3-5-year-old room in an urban nursery, and two PRs 
who, respectively, attend/work for a nursery setting for children between the ages of 
three months and five years old. A static camera was set up within the nursery to capture 
an overall view, as seen in projects conducted by a number of early childhood researchers 
(Keyes, 2006; Loizou, 2007; Riordan and Marshall, 2008), and used in addition to head 
cameras worn by myself and all participants (as seen in White’s 2009 study) in an attempt 
to gain access to the participants’ and my own point-of-view (see Appendix for a diagram 
of my head camera design). I viewed the footage from the static camera after every 
filming session to identify any potential humorous encounters (as categorised in 
agreement with the PRs prior to filming - see Appendix…). The head camera footage from 
the participants involved in the humorous encounters was be isolated and displayed 
using ‘polyphonic video’ that displayed multiple perspectives of the same event, 
simultaneously, on a split screen (a technique first used by White in her 2009 project) 
using the video analysis software Transana. 
 
4.6.4 Dialogic Encounters 
‘Loosely structured’ Dialogic Encounters (conducted in lieu of the more traditional interview) 
were carried out with the children and PRs and video-recorded. In the first instance, Biographic 
Dialogic Encounters (Sawyer and Norris, 2012) were engaged in, followed by initial (DE1) 
then response (DE2) interviews (Dialogic Encounters) being conducted and video-recorded by 
a static camera (as seen in research by King and Horrocks, 2010). The Biographic Dialogic 
Encounters (BDE) took place with practitioner participants only; to provide footage for 
analysis by the participants and myself during the Primary Dialogic Encounters (DE1). In 
addition, footage of the children and PRs producing and/or responding to humour was watched 
and analysed by the PRs and me in each DE1. Secondary Dialogic Encounters (DE2) were 
conducted with the PRs to provide an opportunity for us to watch the footage of the Primary 
Dialogic Encounters to reflect on and respond to the dialogue therein. Primary Dialogic 
Encounters (DE1), in which the children had an opportunity to watch the footage of themselves 
engaging with humour, were conducted.  
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The child and adult researchers were asked to view clips of themselves and/or the child 
researchers displaying or responding to humour that may be considered carnivalesque 
(categorised via a Bakhtinian-inspired method), and to express their responses. Once the 
initial dialogic encounters were transcribed, based upon the decision for all participants 
to act as co-researchers, secondary dialogic encounters were conducted, presenting co-
researchers with an opportunity to view the transcripts (and/or watch the consultation 
video) and change/explain and/or expand upon their thoughts about the conversations 
in the initial consultation, having had time to consider their initial responses.  
 
4.6.5 Research Journals 
Throughout the pilot process all researchers had the opportunity to keep research 
journals; however, neither of the PRs found time to write in them. Thus, in the main study, 
the PRs were offered the opportunity to write in a research journal but I did not anticipate 
them doing so, so did not rely on this as source of data. The children in this study were 
offered an opportunity to have open access to a video diary and research mediator (an 
adult, known to them, that the child could speak to about their participation in the 
research) so they could voice any thoughts, ideas or concerns they may have had with 
regards to the research topic and process. This was in lieu of a research journal. The 
children’s research mediator was their Key Person who was the adult within the nursery 
with whom they had a particularly close relationship and was someone the children knew 
they could trust (Elfer et al, 2005). Given the young age of the children, the project 
information was presented to them in an appropriate and accessible manner, during a 
carpet time session, by one of the PRs.  
 
4.6.6 Cameras 
Small, unobtrusive static cameras attached to the wall by Bluetac were set up around the 
room in the nursery to film the PRs, children and me, as seen in research conducted by Keyes 
(2006), Loizou (2007) and Riordan and Marshall (2008). In addition, all children, PRs and I 
wore a head-mounted camera. Everyone had his/her own head-mounted camera for the 
duration of the research. The use of head-mounted cameras by adults is well established in 
research with young children (Pereira et al, no date; Darbyshire et al, 2005; Yoshida and 
Smith, 2008; Aslin, 2009) as they provide a non-disruptive and accurate practitioner-eye 
view of children. Children wearing head-mounted cameras for research purposes, for aiding 
access to a child’s point of view, is also well-documented in published research by Aslin 
 90 
(2008, 2009, 2012), Murray et al (2007) Adolf et al (2008), Clearfield (2011), Frank (2012) 
and (White, 2009). For the main study, I used an adapted head camera band to avert the 
angle-problem encountered in the pilot. At the beginning of the research process I introduced 
all participants to the head cameras and head band by sitting with them in a group and 
explaining that each child and adult who takes part in the project had their own head camera 
and head band. So, the children felt a sense of ownership over their head bands, and to help 
them feel empowered and capable as participants (Hoffman-Ekstein et al, 2008) or child 
researchers, everyone had the opportunity to decorate and personalise the head bands using 
fabric paints and crayons, in an attempt to, ‘adopt practices that resonate with children’ own 
concerns…’ (Christensen and James, 2008: 8). This activity was successful and enjoyed by 
children and staff alike.  
 
4.6.7 Primary Dialogic Encounters (DE1) 
PRs and children viewed video clips of the practitioner and child participants spontaneously 
displaying or responding to humour and expressed responses. This approach aided recall for 
both adults and children (Dockett and Perry, 2005). In line with a dialogic approach, the 
participants also developed categories or ‘sub-genres’ (Bakhtin, 1984b) (as seen in White’s 
2009 doctoral research) for the displays of and responses to humour, which were compared 
with previously prepared carnivalesque codes.  The films watched in the DE1s comprised of 
multiple screens displayed side by side, each depicting the same event but from the individual 
perspectives of those involved (a screenshot of the multiple screens can be seen in Fig 19). In 
this respect, the video technique used was ‘polyphonic,’ an approach created by White (2013) 
in light of Bakhtin’s notion of ‘polyphony.’ This term, inspired by Bakhtin’s interest in 
Dostoevsky’s novelistic approach, when used in a research context, requires the researcher to 
consider the nature and position of the multiple voices and perspectives present (Sullivan, 
2012). These unique viewpoints include what Bakhtin describes as an individual’s ‘visual 
surplus’ (White, 2014), a concept closely related to polyphony and that explains the way 
individuals have a unique field of vision, allowing them to see and interpret the world in a way 
that is inaccessible to others (White, 2016).  
 
The clips were selected from the overall camera footage of the children and PRs by viewing 
the static camera films first. Laughter and smiling, as humour cues (Provine, 1996) were used 
to identify humorous events. I took note of who had a role in the event, then looked for the 
event on each of the head camera films of those involved. This provided each person’s 
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perspective of the event. I gathered the clips together and uploaded them to Transana – a video 
analysis software, that allowed me to play up to 4 clips alongside one another simultaneously 
as a ‘polyphonic video’ (White, 2009). During the DE1s, the PRs (two at a time, to maintain 
the staff-child ratios in the nursery – Elsa and Gerda, followed by Ana and Bulda) and I sat in 
the family room at the nursery, watched the polyphonic videos and talked about what was 
happening, whilst I filmed our Dialogic Encounter. All the children were invited to watch the 
polyphonic videos with me whilst sitting on the carpet, as I filmed the Dialogic Encounter, and 
the children were free to come and go as they pleased. Technical difficulties prevented the 
adoption of a polyphonic approach when videoing the DE1s with the PRs and we were unable 
to use head cameras when the children were watching because there were children present who 
did not have consent to be filmed. I did not think it was ethical or appropriate to ask those 
children not to be in the room, so the DE1 was filmed with a static camera that only focused 
on the children. 
 
4.6.8 Secondary Dialogic Encounters (DE2) 
As explained, earlier, Secondary Dialogic Encounters (DE2) were conducted with the PRs 
(Sullivan, 2012) presenting them with an opportunity to watch the video of the first Dialogic 
Encounters and explain, change and/or expand upon their comments in DE1. These were 
conducted in the spirit of dialogic unfinalisability to signal to the participants my wish for them 
to be content with their words and phrases uttered in DE1 and to be in keeping with the ethos 
of unfinalisability and help keep the participants and their views at the centre of the research 
(Sullivan, 2012).  Technical and logistical problems prevented us from carrying out a DE2 with 
the children. 
 
 
4.6.9 PR Analysis Journals 
The PRs had a third and fourth opportunity to corroborate/clarify their opinions, thoughts, ideas 
and analyses, the last of which was as close to the end of the project as was feasible for them 
and myself; once again in the spirit of recognizing the changing and unfinalisable nature of 
dialogue. This process does not mean that once the PRs voices were heard for final time (before 
submission of the thesis), that the PRs voices were final at this point: only that I interrupted the 
dialogue at this point to reflect on their perspectives and draw conclusions based on what was 
presented.  
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4.6.10 Ethical considerations 
I provided opt-in consent forms and a project information sheet (see Appendix) for the parents 
of all child participants to sign (Wiles et al, 2004). I (along with the child participants’ research 
mediator) consulted the child participants to make clear to them that if they did not wish to take 
part in the research at any point all they need do is express their wishes. I remained sensitive 
to the children’s efforts to communicate their ongoing consent to take part and fully respected 
their wishes should they demonstrate that they were not content at any stage of the process. I 
remained sensitive to my ‘ethical radar’ (Skånfors, 2009) which may alert me to the various 
ways ‘children can and do express their resistance’ (Skånfors, 2009:15). This became 
particularly evident during the second round of observations, when a number of the children 
decided they did not want to wear their head cameras anymore and each of them felt 
comfortable enough to take it off, without saying anything, and place it in the camera box, or 
give it to a member of staff.  
 
4.6.10.1 Locational considerations  
The door to the outside space remained closed for the duration of the observations to prevent 
children from inadvertently filming anyone with their head camera, anyone who had not 
given consent for this. A large photograph of a head camera and an arrow attached to a 
cardboard box was placed in front of the door to the toilets. This meant that it was not 
possible for children to walk into the children without circumnavigating the box. The 
children were asked to place their head cameras into the box before going into the toilets to 
prevent inadvertent filming whilst the children were in there. An adult also monitored the 
door to the toilets during filming to ensure children did not forget to take off the camera 
before going into the toilets. This was effective and no incidents of children wearing head 
cameras in the toilets occurred (for a photograph of the sign, see Appendix). 
 
4.6.10.2 Research mediators 
In response to Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 
the child participants had open access to a ‘research mediator’ who was their Key Person 
(Elfer et al, 2005) and who were available to answer any questions the children had over the 
course of the research and beyond and was available to advocate on their behalf at all times. 
As far as I am aware, the children did not express any thoughts about the research process to 
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their mediators. All of this information was presented to the children in an appropriate and 
accessible manner by me and their key person.  
 
4.6.10.3 Access to video footage 
I made it clear to all children, parents of children and early years practitioners who may 
have been captured on video that selected sections of the video would only be used for the 
purpose of my research and would not be viewed by anyone other than myself, my 
examiners, all research participants, the child participants’ parents and my doctoral 
supervisors. The videos were kept safe and secure at all times on a password protected 
computer in my home. It was made clear to all participants that they had the right to 
withdraw at any stage of the research process. 
 
4.6.10.4 Practitioner participants 
I provided opt-in consent forms for the four practitioner participants, for all parents of the 
children who may be captured on video during the process of the pilot study and opt-out 
consent forms for all early childhood practitioners in the same situation (Wiles et al, 2004).  
 
 
4.6.11 Ethics – a Bakhtinian stance 
White reminds us that, ‘a Bakhtinian approach to dialogic research is fundamentally 
concerned with morality and, as such, an ethical entreaty permeates every facet of 
research design, analysis and presentation of results’ (White, 2009: 70). In addition, she 
suggests that, ‘dialogic inquiry involves a combination of reflexivity and accountability 
to the participants by giving value to their contributions’ (2009: 70). In her dialogic 
study, White ensured, ‘that value was given to the aesthetic process of interpretation, 
and to the changing, shaping, and altering points -of- view of the participants, alongside 
my quest as a doctoral candidate in search of insights’ (White, 2009: 70, 2013a; 2013b). 
She found maintaining this position particularly challenging at times, in part because 
when she conducted her study there were few, if any, precedents on which to draw. 
Consequently, my own research acknowledges the struggles experienced by White and 
these remained prevalent throughout the research process, to anticipate and lessen the 
challenges I faced.  
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The first of these challenges was gaining access to Bakhtin’s notion of point-of-view – 
given the existence of what Bakhtin terms ‘authorial surplus’, which refers to the 
author’s perception of the hero: something to which the hero never has access. I 
experienced difficulties in acknowledging this authorial surplus and looking beyond it. 
White (2009) does not mention how she approached this in her study. This is an issue I 
acknowledged during the data collection process and my resolve lies in the idea that 
acknowledging its presence provided me with an opportunity to respond to the 
challenge. Secondly, White struggled with the apparent dichotomy between a central 
tenet of dialogism being, ‘that multiple voices should remain in play and be able to 
speak frankly with one another’ (White, 2009: 210) and attending to the polyphonous 
relationship between herself and the participant researchers, a polyphonous 
relationship in which all members are equal (Ooi, no date); and being a doctoral student 
tasked with producing, ‘theory within the monologic discourse of the traditional thesis 
genre’, a position which affords more power to the student than the participants (White, 
2009: 210). Ideally, the process of deconstruction and reconstruction in dialogic 
research ought to be conducted by both researcher and participants, implying a need 
for participants to be co-researchers, and for an equitable balance of power, or 
polyphonic (Bakhtin, 1981) relationship between researcher and researched to be 
established and maintained throughout the research process (Sullivan, 2012). Arguably, 
universal equality between researcher and participants is impossible, particularly given 
the parameters of doctoral study and the requirement for doctoral researchers to have 
ultimate control over the thesis. It seems reasonable (from a doctoral perspective) and 
necessary (from a dialogic perspective), however, for a dialogic research project to have 
a polyphonic data collection process, requiring researcher and participants alike to 
contribute to the creation of meaning (Sullivan, 2012). This approach can provide an 
opportunity for the participants’ point-of-view to be prioritised throughout the thesis. 
White’s (2009) research supports this as she, too, experienced the challenge of the 
requirement to demonstrate fundamental authority over her thesis whilst remaining 
faithful to the dialogic nature of her research (White, 2009). Ultimately, White 
recognised the impossibility of preserving a multiplicity of voices throughout her thesis 
that could communicate with one another, openly and candidly (Bakhtin, 1984b). As 
this is one of dialogism’s central tenets, clearly reconciling the need to be faithful to a 
dialogic approach and meet the requirements of doctoral research was problematic. She 
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suggests she was only able to achieve this by highlighting the parallels between her 
dilemma and what she sees as a, ‘central flaw in Bakhtin’s earliest philosophy when 
applied to real people in real contexts; that is, there are always powerful and not so 
powerful voices at work within language’ (White, 2009: 210). This ‘flaw’ as White 
suggests, appears to have been addressed by Bakhtin later in his life, which has only 
been brought to the attention of the English-speaking world because of recent 
translations of some of his later works. For example, according to Emerson (2016) it 
was only later that Bakhtin started to offer thoughts about human studies as a research 
field, which supports White’s idea that his earliest works do not necessarily lend 
themselves, directly, to social science research. In response to this, in her Jubilee 
Lecture at Sheffield University, Caryl Emerson spoke about an epistemology continuum 
that, for Bakhtin, places ‘thing cognition’ which searches for and reveals ‘precision and 
exactness’, labelling what it reveals in order assess or pass judgement on it, at one end; 
and ‘personality cognition’ that is never revealed by ‘formal or forced interrogation’ and 
only reveals itself in response to being asked (Emerson, 2016), at the other. With 
dialogic researchers only ever being concerned with personality cognition (Bakhtin, 
1981) it can be argued that participants within a dialogic research study can be framed 
as ‘dialogic partners’ (White, 2009: p x) who are asked to reveal their reality to achieve 
dialogic validity (Lincoln, 1995). One way of safeguarding dialogic validity is for the 
dialogic partners’ voices to remain prominent, post project completion. To do this, we 
can follow the lead of Ginsburg’s 1989-1998 ethnography on pro-life and pro-choice 
women, by acknowledging the uniqueness of the dialogic partners’ voices and ensuring 
that they do not become subsumed into overarching social theories and, therefore, 
become lost in them (Sauukko, 2005). 
 
Fig 13 (below) is an example of the procedures established for the collection of data and the 
dialogic engagements. A regular routine was set up to facilitate the smooth running of the 
data collection whilst ensuring that it slotted around the PR’s and children’s daily routines.  
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Fig 13 
 
Initially I asked the PRs to create their own humour categories whilst watching the 
polyphonic videos of children appreciating and producing humour. This was to ease them in 
to the process, as well as to focus their minds on what they looked for when categorising 
children’s behaviour as humorous; a method that can help participants with orientation into a 
research mode (Cohen and Manion, 2014). For a detailed timeline of the data collection 
please see Appendix. 
 
4.6.3 Data Analysis 
4.6.3.1 A dialogic approach to narrative discourse analysis 
In line with the dialogic nature of the methodology, the study adopts a dialogic approach to 
narrative discourse analysis (Sullivan, 2012), predicated, as outlined earlier, upon Bakhtinian 
dialogism. In offering a Bakhtinian framework for narrative analysis I have drawn on closely 
related concepts: authorship, dialogism, carnivalesque (it being inextricably linked to 
dialogism) and the utterance. Along with his theory of carnivalesque and the associated 
corporeality of Medieval folk humour and grotesque realism, Dialogue is arguably the other 
concept most associated with Bakhtin, and with carnivalesque, cuts through his life’s work. 
Yet, it is often a misunderstood concept (Hirschkop, 1998). Dialogue is not just a verbal 
rejoinder between speakers or writers; rather, it is a way of perceiving the world and human 
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beings’ position in the world. In this sense it becomes an epistemology, a praxis. According 
to this framework, one becomes a subject only by participating in dialogue. Bakhtin stresses 
the inherent connection between personhood and dialogue by stating that, ‘[i]n dialogue a 
person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first time what he is (1984: 
252). Moreover, he argues that the very possibility for humans to experience consciousness is 
only possible through a relationship with another. He writes, ‘I am conscious of myself and 
become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of 
another’ (1984: 287). Hence, he bridges the intimate cognitive awareness of the self with the 
surroundings in which this takes place. For analysis to happen, arguably it is necessary to 
reduce the raw data in some way in order that it can be addressed in the write up. Sullivan 
argues that in many qualitative approaches, the creation of hierarchical categories drawn from 
a coding of the data, plays a key role in this process (Sullivan, 2012); however, in line with a 
dialogic approach, in this study I adopt utterance as the unit of analysis which creates an 
opportunity for a more creative and, in some ways, charismatic approach (Sullivan 2012). A 
dialogical approach to data analysis, Sullivan (2012) says, creates a context in which a range 
of traditional and novel analysis tools can be used in tandem to support and strengthen one 
another. Here, I outline and justify the novel data analysis tools adopted in this study. 
 
4.6.3.2. Genre analysis 
In recent years, a number of education researchers have adopted a generic approach to 
analysis (White, 2009). For example, White’s doctoral study employed genre as an analytical 
tool, allowing her a means of focusing on ‘the toddler­as­hero in relation to adult­as­author’ 
(White, 2009: 61). Further, utilising genre in this way offered an opportunity for White to 
move to a space, away from adult constructions of metaphoricity, that she argues facilitated 
an aesthetic exploration of the everyday communications within the setting, perhaps in a way 
that an analysis not operationalising genre would not have. Moreover, a focus on genre 
provides opportunity to focus on form and content which White suggests allowed for the 
exploration of secondary genres in the setting which, in turn, added to the nature of the 
authorship of her participants (White, 2009). 
Genre analysis has been employed by a growing number of researchers in education (Linell, 
1998), both to examine the genres of teaching (Edwards, 1997; Moen, 2005; Rockwell, 2000) 
and learning with school-aged children (Maybin, 2006). The language of preschoolers 
(Cohen & Uhry, 2007; Gillen, 2002; Ishiguro, 2009) and a two year old child at bedtime 
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(Dore, 1995) have also been investigated using genre as a central analytic category. These 
authors conclude that children are highly skilled at moving between genre depending on their 
contexts, and that the associated dialogue alters (in content and form) between different 
social contexts. A similar phenomenon is evident in a study of three- to- five-year olds by 
Sawyer (1997) who found that different styles of language, which he calls “role voicing”, 
were employed across genders and age groups in play contexts. Following on from this idea, 
Rockwell (2000: 272) makes the important point that “diverse speech genres in play held 
together as a single performance”, arguing for a consideration of multiple genres within 
utterance. Alongside a broader dialogical analysis of the data, the first part of the analysis 
adopted a generic approach because the primary feature of the data is a carnivalistic sense of 
the world. Focusing on the carnivalesque as a genre, therefore, aided an in-depth analysis of 
the conceptualization of children’s humour as carnivalesque. The following section that 
focused on the PR’s responses and perceptions also adopted the broader approach of dialogic 
analysis, coupled with a slightly more in-depth analysis of chronotope. Both of these 
analytical tools are discussed and justified in the next section. 
 
 
4.6.3.3 Genre in dialogic analysis 
Encouragement for the analysis of the data via genre comes from Sullivan (2012) who argues 
that genres ‘create effects of reality and truth, authority and plausibility, which are central to 
the different ways the world is understood in the writing of history or of philosophy or of 
science, or in painting, or in everyday talk’. The notion of ‘creating effects’ appears to fit 
with one premise of Bakhtinian dialogism, that ‘a person also cannot be fully revealed to or 
known in the world, because of constant change and ‘unfinalisability’’ (Robinson, 2011). 
From a dialogic perspective, therefore, it could be argued that we are all effects of ourselves 
when viewed by others. Given they can never ‘know’ us, we can never be ‘revealed’ to them 
and we all possess something of each other that an individual cannot possess of themselves – 
authorial surplus. 
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4.6.3.4 Data analysis tools 
 
4.6.3.4.1 Soundbites and created dialogues 
Sullivan (2012) suggests that whilst going through the data to find KMs we can come across 
smaller sections of data or ‘soundbites’ that express an experience or experience in an 
interesting manner. They provide a means of giving a taste of the generic or chronotopic 
quality of a group of comments that focus on aspects of a particular topic. Another dialogic 
tool that involves soundbites and is utilized within the analysis is that of ‘created dialogues’ 
(Sullivan, 2012). The sound bites from a range of contexts are brought together in a new 
context, defined by a shared topic of discussion. Sullivan argues that created dialogues can 
‘show…how anticipated voices and viewpoints of different people enter into direct dialogue 
with each other’ (Sullivan, 2012: 108). This allows a researcher to focus on the generic 
qualities within the created dialogue and the significance of this in relation to the research 
questions. As Sullivan points out, this research tool has an imaginary quality, offering as a 
dialogue, a conversation that never took place. For this reason, he cautions that it ‘probably 
ought to be contextualized by more traditional data methods’ (Sullivan, 2012: 8). For this 
reason, I have only included a limited number of created conversations within the analysis 
and ensured that they are surrounded by whole utterances to privilege the voices of the 
participants. I could have avoided the use of created conversations completely; however, I 
argue that their place within the analysis adds strength to the themes generated by the 
participants and helps to communicate the participants’ points-of-view (Bakhtin, 1984b) 
more effectively: arguably reflecting the polyphony and heteroglot nature of the participants 
voices more powerfully.  
 
4.6.3.4.2 Created dialogues with an invisible other 
Bakhtin also uses this technique when analyzing Dostoevskian texts. Further, he introduces 
his conceptualization of a person’s ‘inner speech’ and suggests a method of exploring the 
possibilities of the impact the presence of Heteroglossia in all utterances may have on 
someone. He invites us to, 
 
‘[i]magine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second speaker 
are omitted, but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated. The second 
speaker is present, invisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these 
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words have a determining influence on all the present and visible words of the first 
speaker. We sense that this is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, 
and it is a conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word 
responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something 
outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person 
(Bakhtin, 1984b: 197). 
 
Bakhtin’s sentiment here (despite them having some fundamental differences in stance over a 
number of ideas) resonates significantly with Vygotsky’s thoughts about ‘inner speech’. 
Krasny suggests that the ‘intra-psychological functioning implicit in inner and egocentric 
speech’ (Krasny, 2002: 46) rests on Bakhtin’s epistemological belief that the social and the 
utterance are inextricably linked.  Following this, Vygotsky’s thoughts on the subject seem to 
render Bakhtin’s social theory of utterance all the more prominent. This is most visible in 
Vygotsky’s assertion that, 
 
‘When we speak of a process, ‘external’ means ‘social. Any higher mental function 
was external because it was at some point before becoming an internal, truly mental 
function…All higher mental functions are internalized social relationships…Their 
composition, genetic structure, and means of action…is social. Even when we turn to 
mental processes, their nature remains quasi-social. In their own private sphere, 
human beings retain the functions of social interaction’ (1981: 162-164). 
 
The notion of inner speech being essentially social, as persuasively argued by Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky, is the reason I decided to utilize created dialogues (Sullivan, 2012) with an 
invisible other in the analysis. I wanted to highlight the inherent socialness of our words and 
analyse the significance of this in relation to perceptions of and perspectives on young 
children’s humour and the other themes that form part of this research. I reasoned that 
employing this strategy was an apt way to do so. 
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4.6.3.5 Utterance as the unit of analysis 
 
The major unit of analysis in Bakhtin’s framework is the utterance and he makes a clear 
distinction between the structural linguistic symbols (e.g. at the level of the phone, or the 
phrase, or the sentence structure), most studied at his time, and the nature of the utterance. 
While linguistic units are neutral (in other words, they cannot contain social evaluations or 
emotional-volitional tone, which is an important feature of voice as Bakhtin construes this 
notion), the utterance is described as active and alive.  
 
Sullivan’s approach of using KMs is classified by using ‘utterance’ as the unit of analysis. As 
Sullivan puts it ‘KMs are an utterance of significance’ (2012: 72) and utterances differ from a 
sentence or word via their addressivity and answerability (Bakhtin, 1986). Helin (2013) 
suggests that using utterance as a unit of analysis provides opportunity to heed ‘Bakhtin’s 
suggestion for approaching relationality…through paying attention to utterance chains in the 
unfolding’ (2013: 226). This is possible because ‘an utterance ends when the speaker makes 
room for an active responsive understanding to be developed’ meaning ‘a response does not 
necessarily need to be in the form of spoken words; it can be silence, or something else that 
passes as an appropriate response in the dialogic moment’ (2013: 226). In addition, given 
their flexible parameters, it is possible that a word imbued with intention and reactivity can 
be an utterance, as can a chapter in a book (Bakhtin, 1986). Further support for utterance 
being a fitting unit of analysis within dialogic research comes from Wertsch, (1998:50) who 
argue that it is the ‘real unit of speech communication’. The analytic approach adopted in this 
study is encapsulated in Fig 14. 
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Fig 14. Analytic framework 
 
4.6.3.6 Key Moments (KMs) 
The KMs in this study were chosen using a set of general criteria focusing on content. 
Sullivan argues that this it is possible to decide upon specific criteria in dialogic research 
based on a bureaucratic relevance to research questions and a charismatic interest in the ideas 
contained with the utterance (Sullivan, 2012). The KMs from the Dialogic Encounters were 
consequently selected based on the following criteria: i) anecdotes about experiences of or 
with humour; ii) descriptions or analyses of children’ humour; iii) responses to humour or 
ideas associated with humour. The KMs from the observations of children’s humour were 
chosen due to their illustration of children’s engagement with humour: humour being 
categorized by the presence of laughter or smiling, in response to laughter being the driving 
force of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque (Bakhtin, 1984).  
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of an underworld 
 
An analysis 
‘Roi pour rire’ 
(‘For laughter’s sake’) 
Francois Rabelais 
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Key to icons used within this chapter 
 
 
The carnivalesque genre and chronotope. 
 Soundbite: excerpts from the data brought 
together under a particular theme. 
 
KM: an utterance – utterance being the unit 
of analysis in this study. 
 Created conversation: Excerpts of 
participants voices pieced together to 
illustrate a theme across a large section of 
data. 
 Created conversation that involves dialogue 
with an invisible other. 
Fig 15 
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This chapter offers an analysis from multiple perspectives to reflect the intersubjective nature 
of the interactions presented and reflected upon by all participants in the study. Using 
utterance as the unit of analysis, salient and pertinent utterances from the data are presented 
here as KMs (from here on referred to as KMs). The KMs were chosen after reading through 
the entire data set looking for utterances that were rich with examples of a range of 
Bakhtinian dialogic concepts, as outlined in the previous chapter. The KMs appear in this 
chapter in the centre of the page. This formatting represents the central role that the 
participant researchers’ voices have within this analysis. It is important for the participant 
researchers’ voices to be privileged within this study as there is significant potential for their 
voices to be undermined or over-ridden by my own authoritative researcher voice and the 
authoritative voices within the literature and theory (Sullivan, 2012). This would neglect the 
polyphonic, heteroglot context in which the ‘heroes’ are being authored within this research 
and hence become monologic: the antithesis of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1984b). As noted in the 
outline of the methodological approach the utterances are presented throughout the chapter 
predominantly as KMs. They also appear via a variety of other dialogic methodological 
devices throughout the analysis: soundbites, or smaller selections of data brought together as 
they speak on a pertinent theme in an interesting way; created dialogues and created 
dialogues with an invisible other, both detailed in the methodology, and both of which 
highlight the dialogic nature of the utterances by decontextualizing and then re-
contextualising them to provide a fresh perspective (Sullivan, 2012).   
 
Threaded through this chapter are Bakhtinian analyses of both the children’s and 
practitioners’ voices that draw on and are consistently in touch with the voices of both the 
children and the practitioners in addition to my own voice. This is an attempt to avoid doing 
research ‘on’ the participants instead of researching ‘with’ them (White, 2013). The strong 
ethical stance that underpins a Bakhtinian dialogic approach to research asks that researchers 
respond sensitively to the potential that research has to finalise participants, or to present their 
voices in such a way as to suggest we can ‘know’ the participants’ viewpoints. This would be 
a monologic approach to authoring the participants (PDP) and would, therefore, pledge 
allegiance to the antithesis of this study’s approach. 
 
Here the children’s experiences of and thoughts about humour are focused on closely, as are 
the practitioners’ professional reflections and analysis of these, coupled with my own 
analysis guided by a Bakhtinian dialogic lens. All of the data presented here are framed 
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within a carnivalesque genre and chronotope thereby addressing the first research question, 
which specifically asks about the nature and manifestations of young children’s humour in a 
nursery setting and adult reactions and responses. Framing the data in this way also provides 
the beginnings of a justification for reflecting upon young children’s humour using a 
Bakhtinian carnivalesque lens.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the analysis was organised into two rounds and data 
from both rounds feature in this analysis. Not all elements of the data collected feature here 
as the scope of the study did not facilitate this, due to the large quantity of data collected.  
 
To revisit the research design, briefly, each round involved the following steps:  
 
1. The children’s every day encounters were filmed via the use of head cameras worn by 
all participant researchers (children, PRs and researcher - me).  Examples of humour 
(classified by the presence of laughter and/or smiling cues – Provine, 2008) were 
collected and transcribed into KMs to be analysed and discussed in the Dialogic 
Encounters (DE1s and DE2s) with the PRs and children. 
 
2. I engaged in Biographical Dialogic Encounters (BDEs) with the PRs. These initial 
encounters were designed to find out about the PRs’ experiences with and perceptions 
of humour throughout their childhoods and adult lives; their thoughts about the nature 
of and significance of humour and laughter inside and outside of ECEC; and to 
discuss how they came to be ECEC practitioners. This initial encounter was an 
important beginning to the data collection process and was designed to set the scene 
for the PRs and I to explore young children’s humour and their responses to it via a 
Currere (Pinaar, 2004) inspired method. Akin to method that involves 
autobiographical reflection on experiences with education that shape our 
understanding of self in society (Pinaar, 2004), the BDEs were designed as an 
opportunity for the PRs to reflect on their experiences of humour throughout their 
lives, explore their personal relationships with humour and begin to link this to their 
views on young children’s humour and its place within ECEC culture and pedagogy.  
 
3. DE1 - this encounter took place after the observations and after the first analysis 
which was conducted by me as the lead researcher, during which I scanned the videos 
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for examples of humour and created KMs out of that process. During this encounter 
the practitioners and I watched the collection of KMs on the video and analysed what 
was happening and whether something was significant. 
 
4. DE2 - the purpose of this encounter was to revisit Dialogic Encounter one, sometime 
after it had taken place, to check whether any thoughts had changed or whether the 
practitioners or I thought that we had seen our ideas had been misrepresented in 
Dialogic Encounter one. In a sense, it was a form of member checking which Sullivan 
suggests  has an important role within dialogic research, due to the recognition of the 
presence of multiple voices (heteroglossia, DI) and their hierarchical positions in 
relation to one another (polyphony, DI; Sullivan, 2012). 
 
5. And, lastly, the dialogic analysis journal - I provided the PRs with a dialogic analysis 
journal that included transcripts of all the encounters we had shared, alongside data 
from the children. The idea was to provide the PRs with a further opportunity to 
ensure that their voices were being represented in a way with which they were 
comfortable. 
 
The first part of this chapter includes analysis of all of these elements of each round of data 
collection, although not necessarily in chronological order as the analysis is organized by 
genre and chronotope (with an emphasis on genre) in the first section, and chronotope and 
genre in the second (with an emphasis on chronotope). This structure facilitated a more 
participant centred focus.  
 
Importantly, for the first round of data collection I did not introduce the practitioners to 
Bakhtin's theory of carnivalesque; instead, asking them to create their own categories to 
frame the children’ humour in the filmed KMs we watched. This was to allow the 
practitioners, in the first instance, time to think more deeply about their own understanding of 
humour and children’s humour and, as part of this, to experience the process of categorizing 
the humour they observed. The methodological decision to support initial reflection and 
categorization before introducing concepts from the theory of carnivalesque is supported by 
White (2009) who reminds us that it can take a considerable amount of time to become 
familiar enough with a new theory to apply it meaningfully to everyday situations. In 
addition, having drawn on specific comments the practitioners made during the Biographic 
 108 
Dialogic Encounters at the start of the project, I was aware that they felt the need to get used 
to thinking about theory in detail, not having had the opportunity to engage with theory for 
some time.  
 
After watching the videos of the KMs highlighting moments of humour, as seen from the 
perspectives of those involved, the practitioners created the following categories as being 
characteristic of the KMs in the first round of data: feel good, jolly, physical, nonsense, 
silliness, playing with words and sounds, energetic, cheeky, developing own sense of 
humour, toilet humour exploring humour, social element and testing boundaries. These were 
generated by watching the videos of the KMs that involved examples of children and their 
humour and writing down on a pre-prepared table words that they thought reflected the 
nature of the humour within those KMs. The process by which the practitioners generated the 
humour types is discussed in more detail in Part Two of this chapter. 
 
5.1 KM DE1 “I fell on my bottom!” 
 
We begin with a KM that focuses on the children watching and responding to video footage 
of all KMs in Round One of the data collection process. The video footage was presented in 
the polyphonic video format (White, 2009) which saw head camera footage from multiple 
children displayed side-by-side and playing simultaneously (see still image example, below). 
 
 
 
KM DE1 ‘I fell on my bottom’ 
 
(This formed part of the Dialogic Encounter with the children. It is important to note that 
DE1 with the children was not recorded using the polyphonic video technique for ethical 
reasons - there were children present who did not have parental permission to be part of this 
study and may have been inadvertently filmed had children been wearing head cameras - 
thus, the discussion and analysis of DE1 does not include reference to the technique.) 
 
The children are sitting around a laptop waiting to watch 
films of themselves that were captured from the head cameras 
they wore during the observation process. The films are made up 
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of more than one screen, each screen showing the images from an 
individual head camera or from one of the static cameras—see the screenshot in Fig 19. 
 
Imogen: Oliver’s on it. (In the video, Oliver is dancing and then slips, 
falling on to the floor). 
VIDEO: Oliver: I fell on my bottom! (smiles). Elsa: You fell on your bottom? Oooooh. 
(Sebastian laughs and Oliver, Imogen and Annabelle smile, then Oliver looks at Laura). 
Laura: (With a neutral facial expression) You fell on your bottom, Oliver. 
(Oliver smiles, walks away from the laptop and falls over exaggeratedly, whilst laughing. 
Annabelle watches him and then exaggeratedly falls off the child-sized sofa. Laura, now 
smiling) Are you falling again? 
Oliver: Yeah (smiles and comes back and sits down on front of the screen). 
I want to see me again. 
Laura: You want to see you again? (The other children do not seem keen to do as 
Oliver suggests) Well, we've got another one here and I think Nathaniel is in this one... 
(The video continues to play and all the children watch the screen as Nathaniel is 
singing in the video. Oliver then jumps up and falls onto the floor, exaggeratedly, once again. 
He turns back to the screen smiling. Oliver laughs and Sebastian laughs, too. Sebastian jumps 
up and falls onto the floor.) 
Imogen: It goes like this, (falls on to the floor) buuurrrr (smiles). 
 
THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE (represented by individuals’ 
head-camera-stickers and individual interests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLIVER 
IMOGEN 
ANNABELLE SEBASTIAN 
NATHANIAL 
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5.1.1 I fell on my bottom’ - a practitioner perspective 
 
KM from Ana and Bulda DE1 
 
Laura: Oliver laughs when he says ‘I fell on my bottom’. Why is that funny in your opinion? 
Bulda: Well, it’s almost like adults watching… 
You’ve Been Framed…it’s that, that, slapstick humour isn’t it… 
Ana: Energetic…not necessarily based on language… 
Bulda: No, no… 
Ana: It’s more of a… 
Bulda: It’s more of an active-y thing isn’t it? 
Ana: Yeah. 
Bulda: Yeah…laughing at each other WITH each other, ‘cause obviously he wasn’t hurt 
because he’d have been upset… 
Laura: Yeah, that’s interesting, because Oliver laughed as well, didn’t he? 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Laura: But sometimes I think if people hurt themselves… 
Bulda: He might have got cross if they’d have laughed. 
Laura: People might laugh but the person themself isn’t laughing 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Ana: Yeah. Yeah. And whether they’d have laughed if he had hurt himself…it would have 
been different. If he hadn’t have laughed as well…and then, you know, he would have been 
upset, it would have been interesting to see if they’d have laughed or not. 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Ana: Whether they’d have found it funny… 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Laura: Yeah, that would have been interesting…and how do you think…how do you think 
you might have reacted if…? 
Ana: The same, I think… 
Bulda: Yeah, might have said, ‘oo are you alright?’ but then… 
Ana: If he’d have laughed…but if he didn’t laugh then I might have said ‘^ooo, never mind, 
up you jump’ and all those kinda… 
Bulda: Shivying him up kinda… 
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Ana: Yeah. Yeah. 
Bulda: (quietly) getting on with it. 
Ana: But then maybe be careful just in case it did go wrong…BECAUSE they kind of have 
to learn that, yeah, those things can be funny but obviously try not to do it too much because 
you could hurt yourself (laughs…B smiles). 
 
 
5.1.2 A Bakhtinian analysis of ‘I fell on my bottom’ 
 
Table 1, below, (as with all the subsequent analysis summary tables in this chapter) maps out 
an overview of the Key Moment in relation to the genre and discourse, emotional register of 
learning/truth, time-space elaboration of genre (or chronotope), and context, from a 
Bakhtinian perspective (Sullivan, 2013).  
 
 
5.1.2 Dialogical map of ‘I fell on my bottom’ 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE FOR ‘I FELL ON MY BOTTOM’ 
Participants KM Generic 
features/ 
Discourse 
Emotional 
Register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotop
e) 
Context 
Esme, 
Annabelle, 
Alice, Oliver, 
Sebastian, 
Dave, 
Nathaniel, 
Yanto and 
Laura (me) 
Dialogic 
Encounter 1 
(Child 
participants) 
Performance, 
free 
communication 
between 
unlikely 
individuals, 
clowning, 
mimicry 
Humour/the 
comic, joy, 
denial, 
uncertainty, 
togetherness 
Reflecting 
on the past, 
time as full 
of potential 
Organised 
Dialogic 
Encounter – 
the children 
watched the 
video on own 
volition and 
were free to 
stop watching 
at any point. 
Fig 16 
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5.1.3 General Analysis 
“I fell on my bottom” can be characterised as embodying the carnivalesque genre and 
exhibiting a carnivalesque discourse, due to the children’s (in particular, Oliver, Annabelle 
and Esme’s) engagement in playful performance where a blurring of boundaries between the 
performers and the audience occurs. Bakhtin argues that ‘carnival does not know footlights, 
in the sense that it does not acknowledge any distinction between actors and spectators’ 
(Bakhtin, 1984a: 6) illustrating that a performance in which the boundaries are blurred could 
be described as carnivalesque. Further, he suggests that ‘[c]arnival is not a spectacle seen by 
the people; they live in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the 
people’ (ibid.), an idea that reflects Annabelle and Esme’s acts of mimicking Oliver falling 
over and their apparent display of an emotional register of desire to be part of the 
performance.  
 
Further evidence of the carnivalesque nature of this KM comes from the instances of 
clowning that can be seen. Oliver’s staged fall—after seeing himself fall over in the film—
and Annabelle and Esme’s mimicry, embody the idea of carnivalesque performance as acts of 
clowning. Bakhtin stipulates that clowning and fools ‘are characteristic of the medieval 
culture of humor’ and that in medieval times clowns and fools were ‘constant, accredited 
representatives of the carnival spirit in everyday life out of carnival season’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 
8) illustrating that the children’ ‘performances’ could be described as being carnivalesque in 
spirit, and as inhabiting a chronotope in which time is full of potential. I argue that clowns 
represent a sense of ‘standing on the borderline between life and art’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 8), 
thus placing the children in a position to play their roles however they wish and, importantly, 
in a space which is outside of any perceived need to be understood by others.  
 
Previous experience of the children’s friendship groups, coupled with testimonies from the 
PRs, suggests that the alliance between Oliver, Esme and Annabelle was not necessarily a 
common occurrence. The data indicates that a shared desire to engage in a humourous 
carnivalesque performance brought them together, an idea that Bakhtin argues reflects the 
essence of relationships and communication within carnivals, where ‘a special form of free 
and familiar contact reigned among people who were usually divided’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 10). 
 
Perhaps significant to Oliver recreating his fall was the fact that I highlighted the act. Oliver 
does not react immediately to seeing himself fall over in the video. He looks over at me, as if 
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checking to see what my reaction is. It is possible that my comment inspired Oliver to 
recreate the moment he fell over in the video, potentially, because of his initial perception 
that I was someone who would usually reside above Oliver in the nursery social hierarchy. 
My comment seemingly removed any hierarchical boundaries between me and Oliver as it 
identified an action often found in the slapstick humour genre, and a part of the body that 
falls into Bakhtin’s theory of the ‘lower bodily strata’. Both ideas embody a carnivalesque 
view of the world: a view that Oliver may have perceived as not usually adopted by adults. 
This suggestion is supported by the soundbite, below, taken from a Dialogic Encounter with 
the practitioners where they discuss childrens’s perceptions of normative adult behaviour.  
 
5.1.3.1 Soundbite  
G: I think they [children] find it funny when grown-ups say...something that they know is 
...°silly.  
Laura: Why do you think that is? 
G: Perhaps, more the children... 
Elsa: I don't know but they do though...(small laugh). 
G: (smiles) They DO don't they? Because if we're...if they say something and we find it 
funny and maybe they haven't, and we repeat it, suddenly it's funny.  
Elsa: Yeah 
Laura: So there's a... 
G: Perhaps grown-ups shouldn't be...silly 
       (Elsa and Gerda, DE1) 
 
The notion of time being full of potential pours through this KM. Arguably, it is most evident 
in the children’s enjoyment of watching themselves on the screen; the re-enactment of past 
events they are reminded of by the video; and the contagious nature of their smiles and 
laughter. The children’s shared experiences of reminiscing, re-enactment and humour within 
the KM embody a sense of potential, possibly highlighting for the children that things are 
never finished, never completed, and can be renewed (Bakhtin, 1984a). In essence, old 
experiences can become new experiences and be played with all over again: a theme which is 
central within a carnivalesque view of the world. 
 
For ethical and methodological reasons (Tallant, 2015), it is important to note the final 
column of the analysis table: the context. I fell on my bottom took place in a familiar 
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environment for the children and one where I was a visitor and where they welcomed me into 
what they viewed as ‘their’ space. This offered them an opportunity to feel an element of 
control. I asked all the children, individually, if they would like to watch a video of 
themselves and that, if they did, it would be playing over in the corner of the room. Once a 
group of children had sat down waiting for the video to play, I asked if any of them minded 
me playing a video that starred all of them, and whether they minded all of us watching it. In 
addition, I reminded them that they could, at any time, ask me to stop the video if they 
changed their minds and that they were free to stop watching the video whenever they chose. 
A number of children did just that, returning later when they deemed something of interest 
might be occurring. That they felt free (Bakhtin, 1984a) and at liberty to dip in and out of the 
screening is another indication that the carnivalesque genre was at play in I fell on my 
bottom.  
 
5.2 KM ‘Dinosaurs and bird poo’ 
 
Simon: (laughing)...you couldn’t go in there with 
that bird poo. But you could clean the bird poo up and 
put it in a bucket. Laura: Oh, and where would I put 
the bird poo then? Sian: (shouts) 
IN THE DINOSAUR’S MOUTH (laughs). 
Laura: (In an exaggerated tone) 
In the dinosaur’s mouth (laughs)? Simon: No, in the sink (laughs). 
Laura: In the sink (smiles). What would happen to the sink if I 
put all of that bird poo down there? Simon: (smiling) It would 
be smelly (laughs). You could put it in the bath (laughs). Laura: We 
could put it in the bath – hmmm (smiles). Sian: Just do it (smiles). 
Laura: A bath is for getting us clean. If we put bird poo in it, do you 
think a bath would get us clean? Simon: You can put soap in bird 
poo (smiles). Laura: Hmmm – or perhaps it should just stay outside? 
Sian: Yeah, I think so. Laura: Do you think so? Simon: Yeah, so the 
birds can eat it (laughs). Sian laughs, too. The practitioners ask 
all the children to tidy up because it is time for lunch. Simon: 
(to me) Do I have to tidy up now? Laura: We all do because it’s 
lunch time. 
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THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE (represented by individuals’ 
head-camera-stickers and individual interests): 
 
 
 
5.2.1 ‘Dinosaurs and Bird poo’ - A practitioner perspective 
KM from Dialogic Encounter with PPA and PPB 
 
PPB: That's just a typical Simon comment really... 
PPA: Yeah, anything that come out of his mouth... 
PPB: He'll often...at the dinner table he'll always sit there and say things like that, and you're 
like, 'be sensible Simon' (laughs). Random things...It's just, usually in play it wouldn't 
normally matter but because they were at the dinner table, and then when he says something 
then they all start saying things and that sort of then gets a bit more than what he just started 
it as. 
Laura: So, it escalates and everyone else gets quite excited? 
PPB: Yeah so then we have to say, 'ok, calm down and eat your dinner' (laughs). 
A Bakhtinian analysis of ‘Dinosaurs and bird poo’ 
 
5.2.2 A dialogical map of ‘Dinosaurs and bird poo’ 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE FOR DINOSAURS AND BIRD 
POO 
  
Participants 
KM Genres and 
Discourse 
Emotional 
Register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope) 
Context 
Simon, 
Sian and 
Laura (me) 
Dinosaurs 
and Bird 
Poo 
Carnivlaesque 
– grotesque 
body, anti-
reality, 
degradation, 
clowning 
 
Inside-out 
discourse 
(anti-
authoritative, 
irreverent) 
Humour/the 
comic 
 
Joy 
 
Jouissance 
(Barthes, 
1975) 
 
Displeasure 
 
Time as full 
of potential 
and 
uncertainty 
 
Awareness of 
burgeoning 
sense of self 
in relation to 
the outside 
world 
Free-play 
 
Getting to 
know an 
unfamiliar 
adult 
 
Moving 
between 
carnivalesque 
and ‘real 
world’ spaces 
LAURA 
(RESEARC
SIMON 
SIAN 
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Moral 
Satisfaction 
Personal 
Power 
Fig 17 
5.2.3 General Analysis 
In this KM we observe two children, Simon and Sian aged 4 and 3, respectively, and me - the 
researcher. The play, which featured all three of us and was focused around a large tray of 
porridge oats, seemed to create a moment in which the children accepted me as an equal in 
the humorous encounter. The children were interacting with plastic dinosaurs in the oats and 
initiated a dialogue about where dinosaurs lived. After spotting a poster on the wall about 
birds, the children suggested some dinosaurs lived in nests. The dialogue moved on to 
explore what else might live in a nest. It was at this point, specifically when the children 
proffered that a nest might be my home, that the conversation developed a carnivalesque hue. 
 
The imaginary scenes that the children engage in illustrate an engagement with their ‘right to 
emerge from the routine of life, the right to be free from all that is official and consecrated’, a 
state Bakhtin suggests is ‘typically carnivalesque from beginning to end’ (1984b: 257). In 
addition, the children enjoy delving into grotesque imagery. Cohen reminds us that, ‘carnival 
abuses and the term grotesque were not negative for Bakhtin, rather they connected to real 
life as a way to mock fear and generate renewal and rebirth’ (Cohen, 2011: 192) and the 
occurrence of ideas of this nature helps us to classify this KM as carnivalesque. The children 
seem to experience a great deal of pleasure from engaging with grotesque imagery. Daniel 
(2006) argues that this can be likened to Barthes’ (1975) concept of ‘jouissance’ as 
emphasised by Kenway and Bullen (2001) and that Grace and Tobin suggest is ‘...an intense, 
heightened form of pleasure, involving a momentary loss of subjectivity. It knows no bounds’ 
(Grace and Tobin, 1997: 177). Moreover, Bakhtin contends that ‘[t]he comic, in general, is 
based upon the contrast between the feeling of pleasure and displeasure...’. It could be argued 
that we see in the KM an opportunity for, ‘displeasure…caused by the impossible and 
improbable nature of the image...’. This occurs when the subject of bird poo in a dinosaur’s 
mouth is raised. However, ‘...this feeling is overcome by two forms of pleasure: first [the 
children] find some place for this exaggeration in reality’ (Bakhtin, 1984b: 306) through 
comments that challenge pervasive cultural norms: namely those that are reinforced by adults 
and that dictate the types of behaviour that are socially acceptable, or not (Tallant, 2015). 
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‘Second...’ Bakhtin tells us, ‘[the children may] feel a moral satisfaction’ (Bakhtin, 1984: 
306) gleaned, perhaps, ‘from having joked successfully with incongruous and grotesque 
images in the face of prevailing discourses that frame this kind of humour as ‘inappropriate’, 
as well as in the face of the adults who perpetuate and embody these discourses’ (Tallant, 
2015). Further, Bakhtin indicates that ‘[t]he essential principle of grotesque realism is 
degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to 
the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity’ (Bakhtin, 
1984b: 20). The children’s enjoyment of grotesque images here, and elsewhere in the data, 
illustrates their engagement with material bodies and corporeality and its role as an 
opportunity for them to relish the sense of expertise it affords – after all, we are all experts on 
our own bodies. Engaging with grotesque realism in this way, it appears, presents Sian and 
Simon with the chance to feel empowered when in their everyday lives they likely experience 
a lack of power. Here, they can demean adult authority through engagement with ideas that 
dominant cultural discourses hold as distasteful, savouring the power that goes with having 
control over their own bodies. The children may connect with this experience in particular 
because as children of 3 and 4 years old, they will likely have only relatively recently gained 
understanding of and control over their bladders and bowels. This awareness and power may 
facilitate a feeling of empowerment fuelled by their own corporeal awareness. Loizou’s 
argument, that power is a fundamental feature of humour that children utilise to negotiate 
their social surroundings (Loizou, 2007), resonates here.  
 
Another carnivalesque theme present in this KM is nonsense; more specifically, something 
Kennedy terms, ‘loose nonsense’ (Kennedy, 1991) or playing with shifting the laws of nature 
in a haphazard way. For example, the conversation about people not wishing to live with bird 
poo seems logical at first, but morphs into a discussion about bird poo in a dinosaur’s mouth. 
Simon appears determined to bring logic back to the dialogue by making a sensible 
proposition that we might put the bird poo in the sink – somewhere he identifies as clean, 
unlike poo. Once again, however, nonsense trickles back into the conversation through 
Simon’s idea that this would be smelly, and that it should go in the bath. The carnivalesque 
presents here in multiple ways: firstly, carnival is the definitive anti-reality - an illogical 
world; secondly, nonsense establishes a sense of turning the world on its head (Bakhtin, 
1984b). The children’s playing with ideas also resonates with notions of clowning. Sian’s 
remark that we could put the bird poo in the dinosaur’s mouth appears especially playful and 
gives the scent of performance and playing the fool (Bakhtin, 1984b).  
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For Bakhtin, carnival is egalitarian and a time for communication between all. At first, the 
children had demonstrated an awareness of hierarchy and treated me as an additional 
practitioner, whose status signalled an ability to sanction or overrule their behaviour. 
However, during our play, our conversation sauntered into carnivalesque space, intimating 
that I transformed from ‘authority figure’ to ‘equal’ in the children’ eyes. After PPA signalled 
it was time to prepare for lunch, Simon checked with me whether he had to tidy up. This 
effected a shift from our carnivalesque play space back to reality, where hierarchy returned 
and I was placed in the perceived role of ‘practitioner’ again. As a result, for Simon, I was an 
appropriately authority figure to provide him with an answer. For Bakhtin, the time and 
spaces of carnivals propagate equality, free and familiar interaction between people and 
carnivalistic misalliances. Subsequently, although outside the carnivalesque space the 
children and I were separated by hierarchy, within it we were equals (Bakhtin, 1984b). The 
children’s contentment for my position as an authority figure to become distorted could 
suggest that their nursery provides a safe space in which they can learn about social order and 
practice communicating within it. Further, in the nursery space children may project 
imaginary identities onto practitioners to test out the social acceptability of children engaging 
in certain behaviours or using particular language. For example, practitioners may be 
positioned by children as authority figures, friends or adversaries. Children using adults to 
test hypotheses about the social acceptability of behaviours is supported by Sutton-Smith 
who argues that children engage in ‘testing play’ as, ‘...a form of self- validation’ (Sutton 
Smith, 1970: 9). It is possible, therefore, that children may project different identities onto 
practitioners depending on the nature of their tests (Tallant, 2015). Further, it may depend on 
whether children perceive the environment as a sweeping Rabelais-esque carnival in which 
practitioners are a part, or as an underground realm that only children populate, outside the 
official world they occupy alongside adults for the majority of the time (Bakhtin, 1984). 
Other data from this study demonstrate that children may do both. For example, in the 
scenario below, the children are sitting around a table eating at snack time, away from the 
gaze of adults, who are busy preparing the snack. This lends the soundbite an air of 
‘underground’ as we would not have known about the exchange had it not been caught on 
film by the children’s head cameras. 
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5.2.3.1 Soundbite from KM ‘Hello’ 
Louis walks through the door of the nursery whilst the children are sitting in groups, at 
tables, with their snack. 
Oscar: (Calling) Loooouis (distorted speech). 
Yanto: Hello Louis. 
Oscar: Hello Louis poois (laughs). 
Nathanial: Yanto, Oscar said Louis poo...pooooois._ 
 
THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE (represented by individuals’ 
head-camera-stickers and individual interests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, it might be said that Oscar’s carnivalesque greeting of Louis was mildly abusive given 
he is using grotesque imagery in ‘name-calling’. Bakhtin argues that carnival abuses do not 
have the negative connotations we might associate with them. In this carnival space I argue 
that Oscar is not being vindictive or cruel to Louis; he is playing with words, names as labels, 
sounds and grotesque imagery in the spirit of carnivality. The enjoyment and inherent 
positivity within this occurrence is heightened by the lack of adults in this scenario, as this 
adds to the depth of carnivalesque experience. Conversely, the soundbite and KM, below, 
paint an altogether different picture of carnivality where a practitioner is joining in, and being 
welcomed into, the children’s carnival: 
 
5.2.3.2 Soundbite from KM ‘Eggs, beans and sausages’ 
Elsa: Emily's been a good girl too. (Emily is laughing, and Elsa laughs too. The camera 
pans around and shows Eloise smiling.). What is she doing? Well she's giggling actually. 
She's giggling in my ear. (Emily continues to laugh). Yes. She's being cheeky too. 
Bye bye. Ooooo, it's my nanna now. My nanny’s on the phone. You talk to my nanna. 
Emily: Hello, bye bye (laughs and Eloise laughs too). 
Elsa: (laughs) you've not said hello to my nanny... 
Eloise: (mimes taking the phone from Elsa) hello, bye bye (laughs and Elsa laughs). 
LOUIS NATHANIAL YANTO OSCAR 
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Elsa: Can you tell her what I've been doing? 
Emily: It's my, it's my ya ya (laughs). 
Elsa: (smiling) It's what? 
Emily: (laughing) It's my (Eloise laughs) ya ya. (all laugh). 
Elsa: Who's ya ya? (all laugh). What does ya ya mean? 
 
THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE (represented by individuals’ 
head-camera-stickers and individual interests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following KM also involves an adult as part of the children’s carnivalesque scene. Here, 
not only is the adult (me) part of the children’s carnival, but the children enjoy playing with 
grotesque imagery, and, as also highlighted in KM Dinosaurs and poo, in this KM they seem 
to exhibit a similar experience of jouissance. 
 
5.2.3.3 KM Sticky play dough 
 
The children are sitting around a table, with me, playing with some 
very sticky and gooey home-made play dough. 
Sebastian: It can stick on your hand. And I got it stuck on my finger. 
Megan: And it can stick on your face (smiles). 
Laura: (Smiling) It can stick on your ^face? 
Emily: And it can stick on your head (smiles). 
Laura: Your ^head (smiles)? 
Sebastian: And it can stick on your knickers. 
All the children laugh, loudly. 
Laura: On your knickers? 
All the children laugh even more loudly 
ELOISE EMILY 
ELSA 
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Emily: And on your arm (smiles). 
Sebastian: (smiling) And ↑your bottom. And your bottom. 
Laura: On my ^bottom? My goodness. That would be uncomfortable. 
Megan: And on Sebastian's bottom (giggles). 
All the children laugh. 
 
THE CHILDREN (AND RESEARCHER) 
(represented by their head-camera-stickers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In two of the examples above, as in KM ‘Dinosaurs and Bird Poo’, the children have 
assigned adults a role as ‘fellow carnival-goer’ who is not above them in the social hierarchy 
in the interaction. Further, as the children’s awareness of the status gap between them and the 
adult outside of the game grows, the sense of enjoyment they feel when the adult joins them 
in their carnivalesque foolery potentially heightens their pleasure and is empowering. Lastly, 
in all of the examples involving adults, the children may be assigning the adults different 
roles in an attempt to negotiate the presence of ‘multiple voices within the adults (and all) 
utterances’ (Holquist, 2002: x_). This instance seems to represent myriad messages about 
status and power and is in response to the existence of ‘hidden dialogicality’: meaning that 
‘each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to...[an]... invisible 
speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of 
another person’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 197). If the children are attempting to elicit a sense of what 
lies beyond the immediate situation, in this way, it may facilitate an exploration and 
subsequent expansion of their understanding of the rules of the social world.  
 
 
 
 
EMILY 
SEBASTIAN 
MEGAN 
LAURA 
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5.3 KM – Cups 
 
PPA: You haven’t eaten much rice today? 
Weren’t you hungry? Aren’t you hungry for your yoghurt then? 
James: Yeah (throws head back and laughs then looks at Oliver). 
Oliver throws his head back and laughs as well, then looks at James. 
The practitioner is engaged in a conversation with 
children on the other table. Oliver looks at the practitioner, turns 
around and says in a staged voice: 
Oliver: I’ve got 1 toilet at home. 
Imogen: I’ve got a pink cup (her cup is green). 
Still using the staged voice, Oliver points at Imogen’s cup. 
Oliver: Pink. 
Imogen: Green (smiles). 
Oliver: 
(Still using a staged voice) No, pink (smiles). 
I’ve got a yellow one (his cup is blue). 
 
THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE  
(represented by images of individual interests): 
 
 
                                                                      
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
JAMES IMOGEN 
OLIVER 
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5.3.1 ‘Cups’ – a practitioner perspective 
 ‘He'll often...at the dinner table he'll always sit there and say things like that, and 
you're like, 'be sensible Simon' (laughs). Random things...It's just, usually in play it 
wouldn't normally matter but because they were at the dinner table, and then when he 
says something then they all start saying things  and that sort of then gets a bit more 
than what he just started it as.’ PPB DE 
 
5.3.2 A dialogic map of ‘Cups’ 
Bakhtinian analysis summary table of ‘Cups’ 
  
Participants 
KM Genres and 
Discourse 
Emotional 
Register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope) 
Context 
PPA, James, 
Oliver, 
Imogen 
Cups Carnivalesque 
genre - 
clowning, 
mimicry, 
subversion 
Inside-out 
discourse 
(anti- 
authoritative, 
irreverent) 
Double- 
voiced 
discourse 
Humour 
Joy 
Connectedness 
with peers 
Time as full of 
potential and 
uncertainty 
Lunchtime 
 
Interaction 
with peers and 
practitioner 
Fig 18 
 
5.3.3 General Analysis 
While not limited to these moments, there is a variety of evidence that suggests carnivalesque 
humour flourishes during mealtimes, as in the KM above (Tallant, 2015). The humour 
present in ‘Cups’ has a range of carnivalesque features, that help to frame it within the genre. 
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The children appear to personify the spirit of clowning, demonstrating examples of mimicry, 
when Oliver copies James by laughing after throwing his head back; ‘playful performance’ 
and ‘playing the fool’, exemplified by James’ staged voice; and possible subversion 
(although this is speculative) when James glances at the practitioner, notices her attention is 
not on him, and then turns to another child to have fun by clowning (Bakhtin, 1984). This 
speculation is reinforced by Da Silva Iddings and MacAfferty (2007) whose study also 
involved young children’s enjoyment of subversive behaviour. Further, evidence of a 
‘double-voiced discourse’ (Bakhtin, 1984a) is identifiable within this suggested subversive 
behaviour when Oliver comments ‘I’ve got one toilet at home’ as this may be a response to a 
hidden practitioner voice, disapproving of scatological talk at the table, as his comment 
occurs in a lunchtime context. The excerpt from the KM (above) strengthens this, particularly 
when PPB says:  
 
‘…usually in play it wouldn't normally matter but because they were at the dinner table…’ 
 
These comments point towards a reluctance to welcome certain themes and behaviour in a 
meal context i.e. ‘the dinner table’; instead, demonstrating apprehension when contemplating 
a situation where she experiences a loss of control over the children’s behaviour. DaSilver 
Iddings and McAfferty (2007) also noted the tensions between practitioner/teacher desire for 
control in a classroom context and children’s behaviours that the teacher anticipates might 
challenge this. However, practitioners’ desire for control and rationality in ECEC settings 
may be at odds with what they really want for young children. In the soundbites, below, Elsa 
emphasises what is of value to her in her capacity as ECEC practitioner, emphasising, 
 
‘I think the most important thing is to get...when the children come in...to make them happy. I 
think that is the most important thing’ (Elsa). 
 
She goes on to mention her awareness of supporting children in preparation for their next 
phase, suggesting that, 
 
‘Everything comes from being happy and settled and we give them the tools to do that and 
when they go on to school’ (Elsa). 
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However, significantly, her personal values concerning her views on the role of practitioners 
being to ensure children’s happiness, comfort and to facilitate their developing friendships, 
come through at the end of utterance, after what seems to be a response to hidden 
dialogicality. She is discussing that children are ready to learn by the time they leave the 
ECEC setting to go to school, when she appears to be interrupted and subsequently feel the 
need to qualify that she is not suggesting the children do not learn through play at nursery. 
She says, 
 
‘I think they're [children] always ready to learn and... I mean, they learn lots here, don't get 
me wrong, we learn a lot through play, but a lot of it is to make sure they are comfortable and 
happy and make friendships...’ (Elsa).  
 
Here, Elsa seems to respond to a voice that assumes her initial emphasis on children being 
‘ready to learn’ might mean that she does not think children do, or perhaps should, learn 
whilst they attend an ECEC setting. She clarifies that and emphasises her view that children 
‘learn lots here…through play’ but finishes with her main point (before the interruption), that 
practitioners’ have a responsibility to ensure children’s comfort, happiness and successful 
friendships: suggesting that these relate closely to her own personal and professional values. 
That the PRs do not perceive children’s time in an ECEC setting is focused on ‘school-
readiness’ is seconded by Elsa, Gerda and Ana when, 2 years later, (collectively, as they 
explained that ‘[d]ue to a busy period at Nursery, we have looked at your questions together 
and have jointly responded.  Sorry it’s taken so long. Elsa, Gerda and Ana’), they said, 
 
 
‘[c]hildhood is about learning and having experiences to enable them [children] to grow and 
develop into well rounded young adults...’ adding that part of the practitioner role is ‘to guide 
them [children], [and] talk about feelings and emotions’ (Elsa, Gerda and Ana). 
 
 
The soundbites above suggest that, as a collective, the PRs overall focus and values are not 
necessarily predicated upon the values of the EYFS (DfE, 2012) that privilege school-
readiness over attending to children’s immediate selves. Although, the comments do have the 
sense of a progressive chronotope that highlights children’s state as transitory, via their 
emphasis on growth, development and becoming ‘well rounded adults’. Arguably this future-
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orientated authoritative rhetoric is difficult to avoid given the discourse of children as human 
becomings’ (Qvortrup, 2005) that permeates ECEC policy, curricula and, arguably, wider 
society.  This has potential implications for practitioners’ capacity to recognise and, more 
significantly, support children’s carnivalesque humour, particularly given its complex, 
subversive, resistant (RHW) nature.  
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 5.4 KM ‘GOOD MOVES’ 
 
Elsa’s Perspective = Black  Ana’s Perspective = Blue 
Ana and Tim are sitting down and Ana is reading Tim a story. A 
group of children is gathered around the computer. 
Elsa is with a group of children playing at the sand tray in the other 
section of the room, away from the boys who are playing on the 
computer. 
Ana: …said the wizard and with a flick of his bony fingers he turned 
the king and the queen and all the party guests into stone. 
Nathanial: I made a train track. 
The children at the computer start dancing and laughing 
Ana: Oh look, they’re having a dance. 
Elsa: (To Nathanial) Did you? Yummy…Let me just see what the 
boys are doing next…door…I can hear something… 
Marcus: (laughing) I’m dancing! 
The children continue to dance around, laughing and shrieking 
Elsa: (Smiling) What are ^you doing? 
Elsa: (Smiling) Are you dancing? (Elsa: (Smiling) Are you 
dancing?) 
Oscar laughs, loudly. (Oscar laughs, loudly). 
Yanto: We’re still dancing, Oscar. 
The boys at the computer continue to dance and jump and laugh. 
Yanto: Oscar, we’re still dancing. 
Oliver falls over and laughs. (Oliver falls over and laughs). 
Oliver: (laughing) I fell on my ^bottom. 
Ana (to Oliver): (laughs) I know… 
Elsa: (Smiling) You fell on your bottom (small laugh)? 
Tim: (smiling) He fell on his bottom. 
Oliver: (laughing) Yeaaaah. 
Ana: (Laughing) He diiiiiiiiid. Oscar’s dancing… 
Tim: (Smiling) He fell down on his bottom. 
Ana: (smiling) He did fall down on his bottom didn’t he? 
Elsa: (smiling) You’ve got some good moves (laughs). 
Ana: (smiling) Good moves Marcus… Oscar… 
The children continue to dance and jump and make joyful shrieking 
sounds and Ana laughs. 
Elsa watches the children dancing and laughs. 
Yanto: (Smiling) Woooo^ooooo 
Elsa: (Smiling and playing air guitar) Got my guitar… (Elsa: 
(Smiling and playing air guitar) Got my guitar… ) Ana laughs 
Oliver: It’s finished. Oliver: It’s finished. 
Elsa: Is it finished?   …what does that mean then, if it’s 
finished?(…what does that mean then, if it’s finished?) 
Oliver: It’s my turn. 
Elsa: Is it your turn? Ok then what are you going to do? 
Tim: (pointing to the story book that Ana is holding) I’d like this… 
Ana: Oh sorry, I was reading a story wasn’t I? 
Oliver: I’m gonna… Another child speaks but what they say is 
inaudible. 
The clip finishes. The clip finishes. 
THE OVERT VOICES PRESENT IN THE UTTERANCE 
(represented by their head-camera-stickers): 
TIM 
YANTO 
ANA 
ELSA 
OSCAR 
NATHANIAL 
MARCUS OLIVER 
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5.4.1 ‘Good moves’ - a practitioner perspective 
 
 
Fig 19 
 
5.4.2 A dialogic map of ‘Good moves’ 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE OF GOOD MOVES 
  
Participants 
KM Genres and 
Discourse 
Emotional 
Register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope) 
Context 
Elsa, Ana, 
Tim, Yanto, 
Oliver, 
Marcus, 
Nathanial, 
Oscar 
  
Good 
Moves 
  
  
Carnivalesque 
genre - 
clowning, 
mimicry 
Subversion 
Inside-out 
discourse (anti- 
authoritative, 
irreverent) 
Double- voiced 
discourse 
Humour 
Joy 
Connectedness 
with peers 
Time as full of 
potential and 
uncertainty 
  
Child-led 
interaction 
with peers 
and 
practitioner 
Fig 20 
 129 
5.4.3 General Analysis 
In KM Good Moves we have another example of children and adults enjoying together 
children’s carnivalesque behaviours, including clowning and mimicry. The discourse 
threading through the KM is inside-out due to its carnivalesque and, therefore, anti-reality 
and non-hierarchical nature (Bakhtin, 1984a). This discourse also links to the KM’s 
emotional register ringing with humour, joy and the feeling of togetherness engendered by a 
carnival atmosphere (Bahktin, 1984a).  In addition, and significantly, we can see both Ana 
and Elsa’s perspective of the event in the transcript because they were each wearing head 
cameras that recorded the KM from their individual perspectives which, arguably offers an 
opportunity to consider the chronotopic nature of the event as we have access to two separate 
perspective of the same scene. From the beginning we can see that Ana is the first to notice 
the children dancing and that this appears to distract her from reading a story with Tim. 
Shortly after this, we see that Elsa is busy engaging with Nathanial and other children around 
the corner from (and out of sight of) the dancers and can hear (but at that point cannot see) 
something is happening in the other part of the room, so she leaves the sand tray to 
investigate. We do not know the reason for her interest in the dancing but, given emphasis is 
placed upon early childhood practitioners to ensure children’s safety (Jones, 2003) we could 
speculate – particularly given other comments that Elsa makes throughout the data about the 
importance of ensuring children’ safety - that she heard the music and laughter and went to 
check that the situation was not becoming out of hand. However, it is equally possible that 
Elsa was aware of being in the midst of filming using our head cameras, and she responded 
because she heard laughter and thought there may be an opportunity to film children 
engaging with humour. Monahon and Fisher (2010) argue that modifications in research 
participant behaviour due to an awareness of being ‘watched’ is known as the ‘observer 
effect’ and it is likely that Elsa could have been experiencing this. Both seem likely scenarios 
and it seems reasonable to surmise that elements from each were present in Elsa’s decision to 
leave the sand tray to join the dancing children. In both instances, Elsa and Ana stop what 
they are doing and are taken along by the carnivalesque moment before them. This act 
communicates the chronotope of this KM as being filled with a sense of potential and 
uncertainty. It suggests that ‘[r]eality has other possibilities…’ and reflects the idea that 
‘whatever we choose, we could have chosen something else and so could have become 
someone else’ (Morson, 2010: 210-211). The next KM discussed, here, shares this 
chronotopic air; however, this example illustrates how children can move in and out of 
carnivalesque spaces with some speed.  
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5.5 KM ‘Eggs, beans and sausages’ 
 
Elsa and Eloise are sitting together at a table. Elsa is pretending to be on 
the phone to Eloise's nanna. 
Elsa: Hello Eloise's Nanna (Eloise giggles). Hello. Yes, she's been a good girl (Eloise 
giggles). Bit cheeky is our Eloise... 
Eloise: Yeah. 
Elsa: Isn't she? What is she doing? She is playing with the tea set. 
She's making me eggs, beans and sausageeeeees. (Eloise laughs). Yum yum yum. Egg, beans 
and suasages. 
Eloise:  Have you finished...can I have it back? 
Elsa: I have...ooo...whose is it now? 
Emily: It's my nanna (smiles). 
Elsa: Is it your nanna? Oh you say hello to your nanna...well...oh...(Elsa mimes 
being on the phone again). Hello Emily's nanna. (Emily laughs). Yeah. 
Eloise: I've got eggs now. I've got eggs 
Elsa: Emily's been a good girl too. (Emily is laughing and Elsa laughs too. The camera 
pans around and shows Eloise smiling.). What is she doing? Well she's giggling actually. 
She's giggling in my ear. (Emily continues to laugh). Yes. She's being cheeky too. 
Bye bye. Ooooo, it's my nanna now. My nanny’s on the phone. You talk to my nanna. 
Emily: Hello, bye bye (laughs and Eloise laughs too). 
Elsa: (laughs) you've not said hello to my nanny... 
Eloise: (mimes taking the phone from Elsa) hello, bye bye (laughs and Elsa laughs). 
Elsa: Can you tell her what I've been doing? 
Emily: It's my, it's my ya ya (laughs). 
Elsa: (smiling) It's what? 
Emily: (laughing) It's my (Eloise laughs) ya ya. (all laugh). 
Elsa: Who's ya ya? (all laugh). What does ya ya mean? 
Emily: Ya ↑ya means...mummy. 
Elsa: Ah, is that mummy in French? Mama? 
Emily: That's my, that's my mummy. 
Elsa: Oh. Go on then, say hello to your mummy. 
Emily: You say hello to my mummy. 
Elsa: Oh hello, it's a dog. Hello ... 
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Emily: No it's ↑NOT a dog, it's my mummy. 
Elsa: Oh hello Emily's mummy. Yes, she’s looking forward to going 
to the hotel tonight. Yes.' 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
5.5.1 ‘Eggs, beans and sausages’ - a practitioner perspective  
 
Soundbite from Ana and Bulda DE1 
 
Laura: Oh yeah. (all laugh). There is a bit more of that* [*the children enjoying toilet humour 
at snack time]... 
Bulda: Do you think that's them learning and trying to work out when it's acceptable to use 
toilet humour? 
Ana: Yeah that’s true... 
Bulda: Because they are all repeating it and going 'she hasn't said ‘no, don't say that right 
now', because obviously if they say it at the snack table we'll often go 'not using those sorts of 
words while we're having our dinner' you know...you know perhaps they're going 'oooo (...) 
Ana said it too... we can say bottom - WaHay'. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELOISE EMILY 
ELSA 
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5.5.2 A Bakhtinian analysis of ‘Eggs, beans and sausages’ 
 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE OF EGGS, BEANS AND SAUSAGES 
Participants KM Generic 
features/  
Discourse 
Emotional 
register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope/s) 
Context 
Elsa, Eloise  
and Emily 
‘Eggs, 
Beans  
and 
Sausages’ 
clowning,  
anti-
reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
humour 
joy 
connectedness 
 with  
peers and 
authority  
figure 
jouissance 
(Barthes,  
1975) 
displeasure 
personal power 
Time as  
having   
potential  
and  
uncertainty 
 
Free-play  
time. 
Interaction  
with  
peers and a 
practitioner 
moving  
between 
carnivalesque  
and ‘real  
world’ spaces 
Fig 21 
 
5.5.3 General Analysis 
The occurrence of role-play where the children and practitioner inhabit a pretend ‘second life 
outside officialdom’ (Bakhtin, 1984a) and encapsulate a sense of ‘anti-reality’ (Bakhtin, 
1984a) supports the KM’s categorisation within the carnivalesque genre. Again, the 
experience appears to unite those who, outside of the carnival space, may be separated, this 
time by barriers of age and hierarchy, but within this carnivalesque space are ‘considered 
equal’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 10). In everyday nursery life we may see a natural divide between the 
children and the practitioner as a result of the significant age difference and due to the 
hierarchy that exists between adults, in this context viewed as human ‘beings,’ and children, 
who are often viewed as ‘human becomings’ (Qvortrup, 2005).  In addition, the experience 
seems to facilitate the formation of ‘human relations’ that are ‘not only a fruit of imagination 
or abstract thought’ (Bakhtin, 1984a: 10) but are ‘experienced’ (ibid.), placing the scenario 
within a chronotope that embodies potential, as ‘pravda’ or ‘lived truth’ (Sullivan, 2012) and 
in the sense that length of time and parameters of space appear indeterminate, yet almost 
tangibly real. This is supported by the actions of Eloise, Emily and Elsa whose polyphonic 
video footage seems to show them engaging in focused interactions. This can be seen via the 
 133 
children’s and practitioner’s screens showing whomever is speaking at the time, with the 
head cameras remaining focused on the speaker until someone else takes over. Research 
supports the idea that the levels of focus seen in this carnivalesque interaction could signify 
significant and meaningful human, relational communication, as well as the children’s desire 
to engage in attuned, concordant, intersubjective experiences with others; a phenomenon 
which it is argued develops from an early age (Stern, 1985; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). 
 
The emotional register of KM Eggs, beans and sausages has a sense of Barthes’ (1975) 
jouissance or sheer ‘bliss’, particularly when Emily joins in and is laughing as she is trying to 
say ‘it’s my ya ya’; an invented phrase which is nonsensical. Emily’s anticipation of Elsa’s 
response elicits an almost hysterically joyful response in her, akin to Barthes’ concept which 
he suggests, in its most simplistic incarnation, is a form of joy on a higher plane. Barthes’ 
Jouissance, however, is not a simple concept; rather, it is imbued with complexity and is an 
word missing that has been written about widely particularly by Barthes and Lacan (Stolzfus, 
1989). The complexity of jouissance, at times, resonates with that of the carnivalesque and 
this theme will be discussed further in the final chapter as, arguably, it has implications for 
young children’s carnivalesque humour in ECEC. 
 
Although this KM only lasts for minutes, it appears that jouissance and displeasure both 
inhabit the space. They do so at separate times but, that they both appear in this short scenario 
illustrates the speed at which the mood apparently changes. The moment of change occurs 
when Elsa takes the play in a different direction by suggesting that there is a dog on the other 
end of the phone. Emily reacts to this quite strongly, highlighting her displeasure at this turn 
of events, and exclaiming ‘[n]o it’s ↑NOT a dog, it’s my mummy,’ seemingly wishing to 
leave Elsa in no doubt that this turn of events was unwelcome. In this moment, Emily steps 
out of the play frame (Garvey, 1977) to correct Elsa and there is a sudden change of 
emotional register. Far from this event souring the mood and pushing KM 2 away from the 
carnivalesque genre, this sudden change strengthens the notion of the KM’s carnivalesque 
nature. The concepts of change and the unexpected can both be described as being 
carnivalesque traits (Bakhtin, 1984a) and, although there is sudden jump from being inside 
the play frame to being outside, Elsa takes the issue in hand and immediately attempts to 
rescue the situation.  
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Another identifiable carnivalesque trait present within this KM is the idea that the children 
and Elsa are acting out a scenario which seems familiar to all present and almost re-
modelling it and playing with it as the children explore one another’s developing 
personalities. At the same time they are almost testing what they believe Elsa’s personality to 
be, almost in an act of transactional analysis (Solomon, 2003) and whether or not it can be 
flexible within a play scenario. Elsa tells the person on the phone that Eloise is being ‘good’ 
and that she is also ‘cheeky,’ suggesting that it is possible to be both and the two are not 
mutually exclusive. In this act, Elsa seems to be confirming that she is happy to blur any 
existing hierarchical boundaries and relinquish any sense of authority, momentarily, to 
exaggerate her practitioner role for the purposes of the play and engage with the children as 
an equal: the blurring of hierarchies, equality and exaggeration all being strong carnivalesque 
themes (Bakhtin, 1984a). 
 
Outside of the carnivalesque space, when the barriers between adults and children are 
restored, it can be argued that the children only have access to imagined equality between 
themselves and practitioners. Entering into a space characterised by a carnival spirit enables 
them to engage in a lived experience of truth or ‘pravda’ of ‘free and familiar contacts’ 
(Bakhtin, 1984a) between themselves and the practitioner. Here ‘pravda’ is explained by 
Bakhtin as ‘individual truth’ that is ‘artistic and irresponsible’ as opposed to truth as ‘istina’ 
which is said to represent universality (Bakhtin, 1993). 
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5.6 KM - How did she get up there? 
 
(This clip follows on from eggs beans and sausages). 
 
As the video starts we hear Eloise's very high-pitched laugh, 
almost like a squeal. 
 
Elsa: oh, what you doing? Eloise always jumps up onto 
my lap...how did you get up there? (Eloise is laughing). 
(Slightly laughing) Get down. NO. (Eloise's laughter increases in 
volume and goes up in pitch). No, get down...no thank you (laughter stops) 
because you are going to 
get yourselves hurt and you're gonna fall, so you need 
to get down. Cheeky. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.1 A dialogic map of ‘How did she get up there?’ 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE OF HOW DID SHE GET UP THERE? 
Participants KM Genres and  
Discourse 
Emotional register 
of learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope) 
Context 
Elsa, Eloise How 
did she 
get up 
there? 
Carnivalesque  Humour/the comic, 
joy, opposes social 
hierarchy, 
rebellion/resistance? 
Seizing the 
moment/ 
borrowed 
time? 
Spontaneous 
– children 
and Elsa 
playing -
mood is 
positive and 
Eloise 
seems to 
takes things 
a step 
further 
Fig 22 
 
ELOISE ELSA 
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5.6.2 ‘How did she get up there?’ - a practitioner perspective with accompanying analysis 
 
The following KM is lengthy, so is presented below with analysis woven through it to 
preserve its momentum whilst highlighting elements that are significant from a Bakhtinian 
and theoretical perspective placing emphasis on the chronotope of the KM. My analysis is in 
grey, distinguish it from the data. 
 
    5.6.3 KM from Ana and Bulda DE1a 
 
Laura plays the ‘what is she doing?’ clip… 
Bulda: Hmmmmm…it’s a little bit…false and a little bit…put on, the laughter… 
Ana: The laughter. 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Ana: Quite manic, I thought… 
Bulda: Yeah, it doesn’t sound like a genuine hoo haa ha, ‘that’s funny’ laughter, it’s like 
(with raised eyebrows, eyes down and a grin) huh huh huh huh kind of ‘look what I’ve done’. 
Ana: Yeah. 
 
This exchange between Ana and Bulda over the nature of the laughter in KM How did she 
get up there, reflects their opinion that not all forms of laughter indicate humour: an idea that 
appears throughout the body of literature on humour and laughter (Chapman and Foot, 1980). 
Laughter can occur for a number of different reasons, only one of which denotes enjoyment 
of humour. Others include, as a response to anxiety, shock and uncertainty (ibid). Arguably it 
is significant that the PRs, here, indicate that this is their understanding as current theory 
argues that it can be detrimental to children if practitioners misconstrue the cause of their 
laughter because some laughter can be perceived as negative (ibid). This discussion of 
laughter appears to sit within a carnivalesque chronotope, with its associated raised 
eyebrows, sly grins and suggestion of children’s subversive laughter. Arguably, this 
illustrates that Ana and Bulda are able to recognise and, seemingly appreciate, this 
carnivalesque behaviour. Their words and actions suggest they are classifying this laughter as 
somewhat negative, potentially manipulative and circumspect. This is contrary to the idea 
that Eloise’s laughter, here, is ambivalent carnivalesque laughter. This view of children’s 
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laughter removes the need to label it as positive or negative and therefore, potentially 
removes the chance of adults misconceiving the laughter. The conversation continues: 
 
Ana: Yeah, like ‘(quickly) I’m getting away with it, I’m getting away with it ha ha ha ha ha 
ha’ manic kind of thing. You know? 
Ana: Nervous laughter. 
Ana: Yeah. And that kind of happens…oh…as Elsa is starting to change from…you 
know…’^oh, what are you doing?’, whereas, suddenly her tone changes when she seems to 
think ‘actually no’ (laughs). 
Bulda and Ana: Yeah (smile). 
(Pause) 
Ana: Someone could get hurt here? 
Bulda: Yeah, yeah. 
Ana: And the laugh kind of…escalates in this sort of ^ hhuhuhuhuhuhuuhuhuhuhuhuh…(…) 
Bulda: Yep, yep. 
Laura: So how does that kind of thing make you feel? As…as…in your role, as a 
practitioner? What’s…you know…do you have a kind of a response to that? 
Bulda:…I guess it’s just how you react to that ‘am I gonna be told off?’ feeling (moves head 
down and looks up) isn’t it? 
Ana: And maybe you could (…) 
Bulda: Yeah. 
Ana: …ought to be something that is worthy of…you like say whether you find it fun, too, or 
not or whether it is a question of actually ‘no that’s not funny’ and then you can learn that 
that’s not funny… 
Laura: Ok. 
Bulda: And like Elsa said…she explained to them why she was saying ‘you can’t do this (…) 
you might fall. WE know how we are going to react to that and be calm about it…but what’s 
to say the child doesn’t know that you’re not going to go ‘OH NO GET DOWN’ RAA RAA. 
And be really firm with them…in other situations maybe parents wouldn’t act calmly to them 
if they’d done climbing on the sofas or whatever, at home. So, they are manic…laughing, 
manically, because they are not quite sure how the adult will react. 
Ana: So that’s why you’ve put here ‘testing boundaries’…? (see Fig 15) 
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Fig 23 
 
Ana: Yeah. They are learning about it… 
Bulda: Yeah. And ‘how are you gonna react if I do this?’ 
Laura: Yeah. And do you think that partly the reason it might be FUNNY is because ‘I don’t 
know if I should be doing this, whoah, hang on (laughs) this is a bit (sharp intake of breath)’? 
Bulda: Yeah. 
 
In this section Ana and Bulda discuss the carnivalesque subversion that can be seen in ‘KM 
How did she get up there?’ and frame it as ‘testing boundaries’, a theme which reflects a 
chronotope of hesitation and anticipation and fits well into the carnivalesque genre where 
challenging authority and subversion are rife (Bakhtin, 1984b). They are also illustrating an 
understanding of the different aspects of children’s lives that can influence their behaviour. 
This is particularly evident when, referring to the potential differences in early childhood 
practitioners’ and parents’ responses to children’ behaviour, Bulda says, 
 
‘WE [practitioners] know how we are going to react to that and be calm about it…but what’s 
to say the child doesn’t know that you’re not going to go ‘OH NO GET DOWN’ RAA RAA, 
and be really firm with them…in other situations maybe parents wouldn’t act calmly to them 
if they’d done climbing on the sofas or whatever, at home’  
(Bulda) 
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Bulda’s comments suggest that any subversion or challenge to authority that children engage 
in may not be in response to the ferocity with which they are reprimanded at nursery for 
undesirable behaviour. Bulda appears confident in her assertion that, as practitioners, they 
know that they will consistently respond calmly to the children. She suggests that children 
may not necessarily understand that, however, because they may have experienced different 
responses to particular behaviours from parents and, therefore, anticipate a similar response 
from the adults at nursery. This gives the scent of a dualistic chronotope that might flit from a 
sense of time and space as uncertain and potentially troublesome; to a safer, calmer, slower 
chronotope. The PRs comments suggest that Eloise may be in a state of flux between these 
two chronopic states. It would be interesting to look into this further to explore children’s 
perspectives on their anticipated responses of practitioners and parents to particular modes of 
behaviour. If a significant number of children were under the impression that practitioners 
may react sternly in some situations, this may encourage their engagement with subversive, 
carnivalesque humour. If the opposite were the case, however, the children’s engagement 
with the carnivalesque may not be linked to their desire to challenge adult responses to 
behaviours the children deem inappropriate or unacceptable. Instead, it may result from a 
broader sense of social rules that permeate through the variety of experiences that children 
have that filter through to them from the wider, macro aspects of our social lives to the more 
intimate micro influences (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). 
 
In the section, below, Ana and Bulda talk about the close emotional proximity that laughter 
and crying have with one another. 
 
Ana: It’s a bit like when an adult…actually it’s because you want to cry. Do you know what I 
mean? Like the nervous kind of ‘^heh heh it’s really funny, heh heh, oh yeah maybe it’s not’ 
(laughs). 
Ana: That’s really interesting as well, because it might not be funny… 
Bulda: No, it’s like when you have an automatic reaction…yeah, yeah, when you think 
people are laughing at you and those kinds of things it’s not necessarily how it is meant to be 
interpreted. 
Ana: Yeah. So in that instance where it becomes a bit manic…maybe it’s not humour. 
Ana and Bulda: No. 
L Maybe it’s laughter as a response to…feeling slightly uncertain and a bit… 
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Ana: Yeah…it’s a bit like when you…if you have to tell a child ‘no’ or tell them off as it 
were and they smile at you. That’s not necessarily them finding it funny, that is their ‘ah, I’ve 
done something wrong and I don’t know what to do now, ha ha, kinda…it is that…they 
think…do you know what I mean? They don’t understand it, necessarily…again, it’s not a 
humour thing. They are not finding it funny. They are not finding it funny. They are 
obviously nervous because they know they have done something that they shouldn’t have. 
 
Ana’s reference to the idea of laughing and crying being so close to one another, that it is 
possible to laugh when you are upset and/or shocked and almost simultaneously feel like 
crying, is interesting. The current research stipulates that there are different reasons for 
laughter and, as mentioned earlier, only one of them links to humour (Chapman and Foot, 
1980). This point is furthered by Giles et al (1970) who argue that laughter stimuli are not 
necessarily discrete and that humorous laughter may be accompanied by some of the criteria 
identified above but most particularly, by social factors. This is supported by McGhee’s 
(1979) suggestion, highlighted in Chapter 2, that humour researchers, ‘…can only make an 
educated guess regarding humour perceptions on the basis of behavioural cues’ (McGhee, 
1979: 68). This point resonates with the messy ambivalence of carnivalesque laughter that 
seems to embody the notion of children’s laughter as a complex response to a range of 
stimuli, and not one that should be assumed is a humorous reaction. This is compounded by 
looking at this through a carnivalesque lens. I argue that all forms of laughter could be 
framed as carnivalesque humour, given the complexity of this genre and chronotope, coupled 
with its ambivalent yet, at the same time, nuanced nature. Further, as our understanding and 
perception of laughter has changed over time it has moved from a phenomenon that was 
wholly positive – at least within folk culture, if not in the domain of the higher classes - in the 
Middle Ages and in Rabelaisian Renaissance, to something which is often seen in a negative 
light today. Consequently, if we move our contemporary perspective of laughter aside, it 
might be profitable to recognise it as wholly positive, particularly when relating to children in 
the nursery setting and framing their humour and laughter within that context as ‘carnivality’. 
Moreover, it is worth pursuing the idea that laughter can be both related and unrelated to 
humour at the same time because this would be essentially carnivalesque in spirit (Bakhtin, 
1984a). On the theme of the relationship between laughter and humour, Smuts argues that 
‘[w]e laugh for a variety of reasons—hearing a funny joke, inhaling laughing gas, being 
tickled—not all of which result from what we think of as humor’ (my emphasis) (Smuts, 
2010: np). What we understand humour to be, arguably has bearing on our view of whether 
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or not something is funny. Further, it also seems to link to our perception of the relationship 
between laughter and humour. This theme is borne out in the last element of the KM, when 
the conversation turns to making links between what may be perceived as non-humorous 
laughter and children’s attention seeking behaviour. 
 
Laura: So, do you think it’s quite important to recognise the difference [then] and do you feel 
that you can [read different types of laughter]? 
Ana: Yeah. Mmmm. I think that you don’t always think about it all the time because that’s 
only because we’ve spoken about it now that I’ve suddenly remembered…from training and 
when you talk about things…a bit like when you think children are being naughty, you think 
‘oh it’s(…)’ but, actually, that they want that negative attention and they want any kind of 
attention when they’re…and when you’re in those situations and a child is being mischievous 
and they are laughing at you and you’re thinking ‘really this is not funny’ and you say ‘this is 
not funny’ and I do it a lot…and you say that but actually maybe you need to actually maybe 
think they are not finding it… 
Bulda: Actually, they are not laughing they are just struggling to deal with it. 
Ana: Yeah. 
 
The idea of children laughing when adults do not approve of their behaviour seems to be one 
that both Ana and Bulda can relate to, in this example.  That they surmise children might be 
laughing because they are potentially seeking ‘negative attention’, fits with Ana’s view that 
what they are laughing at ‘is not funny’: it suggests that if something is perceived by an adult 
as not funny, any laughter associated with it will be perceived as negative by them. This 
poses the question: how can a person be sure that another person is or is not finding 
something funny? Perhaps the laughing child who is exhibiting challenging behaviour is 
finding the situation simultaneously funny and unfunny in true, ambivalent carnivalesque 
style (Bakhtin, 1984a).  
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5.7 KM - Eeny meeny miny mo (that’s not funny) 
 
Emily: And afterwards…so, you argued and I said say eeny meeny miny mo, catch a pira pira 
po, eeny miny eeny mo, catch a pira pira po. 
Marcus: (laughing) I just …. On my tummy 
Emily: No, you laughed…that’s not funny. NO. 
Sebastian: If you laugh, you think it’s funny, if you don’t laugh, you don’t think it’s funny. 
Marcus: I didn’t…I just laughed a bit and I did…it’s not funny. 
Sebastian: MIRIAM did…. 
Megan: What? SO? No…I didn’t… 
Sebastian: YOU DID. Me now. Eeny meeny miny mo…eeeny meeny mini mo, catch a pira 
pora po, eeney meeny miny mo. Me (laughs). 
 
5.8 KM - Eeny meeny miny mo…a chair 
Eeny meeny miny mo…a chair 
Megan: NO…eeny meeny mini mo, catch a pirate on the toe, eeny meeny mini mo……a 
chaaair (laughs). 
Emily: NO not a chair…on MEEeee. 
THE CHILDREN… 
(represented by their head-camera-stickers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst exploring footage from the children’s head cameras it was exciting to discover that 
they had engaged in conversation, away from adults, about the connection between laughter 
and thinking something is funny. This means that the children’s voices form part of our 
enquiry of ‘what is funny’, without adult influence having been used to acquire their views, 
somehow framing their contribution as more authentic because the topic is one they 
expressed interest in without coercion (Albon and Rosen, 2015). 
MEGAN SEBASTIAN 
EMILY 
MARCUS 
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5.8.1 A dialogic map of ‘Eeny meeny miny mo…that’s not funny’ and ‘Eeny meeny miny 
mo…a chair’ 
 
BAKHTINIAN ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE OF ‘‘Eeny meeny miny mo…that’s not 
funny’ and ‘Eeny meeny miny mo…a chair’ 
Participants KM Genres 
and  
Discourse 
Emotional 
register of 
learning/truth 
Time-space 
elaboration 
(chronotope) 
Context 
Megan, 
Sebastian, 
Emily and 
Marcus 
Eeny 
meeny 
miny 
mo…that’s 
not funny’ 
and ‘Eeny 
meeny 
miny 
mo…a 
chair’ 
clowning,  
anti-reality 
and reality 
resistance, 
subversion, 
internally 
persuasive 
discourse 
humour 
joy 
connectedness 
and 
disconnectedness  
 with  
peers  
displeasure 
personal power 
Time as  
having   
potential  
and  
uncertainty 
 
AND 
 
Time as 
paused 
Sitting 
around a 
table with 
peers, 
playing 
with home-
made 
playdough. 
Fig 24 
 
5.8.2 General Analysis 
 
Their discussion of what is funny and how we know if a person finds something funny begins 
with Emily’s comment ‘No, you laughed…that’s not funny…NO’. Her statement suggests 
that she perceives laughing as a response to finding something funny. Her comment ends 
with the strong suggestion that Marcus should not be laughing as he should not find ‘it’ 
funny. It is difficult to determine what Emily means by ‘it’ because she seems to not to notice 
that Marcus was laughing at the squashed playdough on his t-shirt, but we cannot be sure of 
this. That Emily considers Marcus to be laughing ‘at’ her, is also supported by a perception 
that she was the last one to speak and attention being away from Marcus until she heard him 
laugh. These factors combined could have cause her to think he was laughing at her. In 
addition, Emily’s eagerness to tell Marcus ‘that’s not funny. NO’, compounds this idea, as we 
are likely to have a stronger emotional reaction to the thought of being laughed at, than to 
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disagreeing an experience is funny (Loizou, 2005). From that moment, it appears the object 
of the laughter may be misconceived. However, Sebastian seems clear that laughter equals 
finding something funny and no laughter equals not finding something funny. In response to 
Sebastian, Marcus’ comment seems intensely dialogic (Bakhtin, 1984b) and to be in response 
to another, invisible, voice. Below, this voice is brought to life, not to make any claims about 
the content of the invisible other’s utterances; instead, it is offered to illustrate the suggestion 
that Marcus’ comment contains spaces or pauses where evidence of ‘sore-spots’(Bakhtin, DI) 
appear that could indicate the presence of an invisible voice that Marcus is responding to 
strongly, albeit unwittingly. As Sullivan argues, created dialogues can ‘show…how 
anticipated voices and viewpoints of different people enter into direct dialogue with each 
other’ (Sullivan, 2012: 108). In attempting to understand the analytical purpose of created 
dialogues with an invisible other, first it is helpful to consider Bakhtin’s concept of hidden 
dialogue. He asks us to ‘[i]magine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the 
second speaker are omitted, but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated. The 
second speaker is present, invisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these 
words have a determining influence on all the present and visible words of the first speaker’ 
(PDP:197). The created dialogue, below, illustrates the ‘deep traces’ of an invisible other’s 
words: 
 
 
 
5.7.2 CREATED DIALOGUE WITH INVISIBLE OTHER 
Sebastian: If you laugh, you think it’s funny, if you don’t laugh, you don’t think it’s funny.  
Invisible other: (to Marcus) You laughed at Emily. 
Marcus: I didn’t… 
Invisible other: But you were laughing? 
Marcus: I just laughed a bit and I did… 
Invisible other: You found what Emily said funny? 
Marcus: … it’s not funny. 
Invisible other: So, you were laughing at something else, then? 
--------- 
It could be argued that the next example of an invisible other’s presence, arises from one of 
Megan’s comments.  Megan and Marcus both seem to be focused, primarily, on Marcus and 
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the playdough on his t-shirt. Neither seem to be aware of what Emily is saying and doing. It 
could be that both Megan and Marcus experience confusion as a result of this, and, from a 
Bakhtinian perspective, that this is reflected within the hidden dialogicality (Bakhtin, 1984b) 
of Marcus’ comments as he struggles to understand the context of Emily and Sebastian’s 
observations. This could be said of Megan, too, and the invisible other’s presence in her 
comments, when brought together with Marcus’ created dialogue, may have looked like this: 
 
 
5.7.3 CREATED DIALOGUE WITH INVISIBLE OTHER 
Sebastian: If you laugh, you think it’s funny, if you don’t laugh, you don’t think it’s funny.  
Invisible other: (to Marcus) You laughed at Emily. 
Marcus: I didn’t… 
Invisible other: But you were laughing? 
Marcus: I just laughed a bit and I did… 
Invisible other: You found what Emily said funny? 
Marcus: … it’s not funny. 
Invisible other: (to Marcus) So, you were laughing at something else, then? 
Sebastian: (to Emily) MEGAN did…. 
Megan: What?  
Invisible other: You laughed at Marcus and the play dough squashed on his t-shirt, didn’t 
you? 
Megan: SO?  
Invisible other: So, I think Sebastian has the impression you laughed at Emily. 
Megan: No…I didn’t. 
 
The hidden voices displayed in these created dialogues cannot offer us a clear indication of 
the content of the hidden voices comments. However, arguably what they can offer is a sense 
of how Bakhtin’s notion of hidden dialogue and the idea that other voices live even our 
apparent ‘monologues’. In addition, they serve to highlight potential confusion over what the 
children really think is or is not funny and why. Having a clear understanding of what is or is 
not funny and the underpinning reasons, however, could be argued as being somewhat 
illusive and this is supported by comments from the PRs, presented as soundbites in the 
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created conversation, below, that illustrates their awareness of and views about the 
differences in appreciation of humour. 
 
5.7.4 CREATED DIALOGUE: A Sense of Humour 
 
(Taken from Ana and Bulda’s BDE and Elsa and Gerda’s BDE) 
 
Ana: Because one person’s sense of humour is different to another person's... 
Gerda: My son doesn't like [Sarah Millican] ...he does a brilliant impression of her, which is 
hilarious, (all laugh) but just doesn't...and I do...and sometimes I don't know if it's an age 
thing? Because I remember my Mum not liking certain comedy shows...but I always think it 
was an age thing…But she didn’t like the young ones...it was almost like...and I think now 
I'm at the age where there's some things that my children laugh at that I don't particularly find 
funny... 
Ana: Yeah, the age thing…I do…I mean, I did like the silly, like toilet humour jokes and 
those kind of things, and I like things like The Inbetweeners and stuff because it's just...it is a 
bit silly and they do, do sort of... 
Gerda:…I like Only Fools and Horses and those sorts of things - I liked all the Ronnie Barker 
things, 'Porridge, Open All Hours...there's not a lot I don't...well for some reason I don't like 
Mrs Brown's Boys - I just can't see it...there's something in that I just don't get. 
Bulda: Yeah, I understand that. I can't stand these movies these days that...overdo slapstick 
humour...I just...It's just ridiculous and silly and I just don't find it funny at all…I can cope 
with some of it but then it's like no, that's just daft now.  
Elsa: Yeah, I don't like anything too...oooh...too dry or risqué - I don't like a lot of blue jokes 
because I feel embarrassed, I think...especially if I don't know the person...like if it 
was…people tell jokes and I feel very...I don't know what it is but I don't like it. I don't know 
them. Now...I mean my partner could tell me a really rude joke and I'd laugh and think it was 
really funny but if I don't know... 
 
 
This created dialogue gives a flavour of the participants’ thoughts and feelings about humour. 
It begins with Ana’s suggestion that there is no such thing as a ubiquitous sense of humour: 
individuals’ appreciation of humour differ. This is a significant comment because if there is 
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acknowledgment that individuals can appreciate humour differently, it is likely there will be 
acknowledgement that children and adults can appreciate humour differently, as well. Gerda 
supports this assumption and takes the notion of difference further, specifically raising the 
subject of potential generational differences in humour appreciation. Gerda and Ana are of 
different generations and Ana appears slightly hesitant and almost apologetic of the fact she 
enjoys ‘silly’ humour. It could be argued that as silliness and seriousness appear polarised in 
many areas of British culture, and, further, if silliness is associated with humour, the 
suggestion that an adult may enjoy silly humour could label them as the antithesis of 
seriousness. With the value that is arguably placed on seriousness within our society, ‘outing’ 
yourself as a silliness sympathiser places you in a potentially precarious position where it is 
as if you are admitting that you do not need to be taken ‘seriously’. This can help to explain 
Ana’s slight hesitance and lowering of voice at times when discussing the things she finds 
funny as it could be argued to be not be taken seriously is something many adults try to 
avoid. A desire for adults to steer clear of the messy label of ‘silly’ suggests that there may be 
forms of humour which are perceived as more acceptable i.e. less silly, and therefore more in 
keeping with an English fondness of sensibility that keeps humour contained within 
manageable and controllable boundaries. Gerda’s insinuation that she does not enjoy the 
humour presented in the television programme, Mrs Brown’s Boys, points to this, as in many 
ways the programme epitomises silliness: the central character parodying the role of an Irish 
mother with a large family who have a penchant for slapstick behaviour. Bulda enters the 
conversation with a comment, echoing Gerda’s sentiments, in relation to what she sees as 
‘ridiculous’, ‘silly’ films that ‘overdo slapstick humour’. She suggests that this form of 
humour can only be tolerated so much until it completely breaks the boundaries of rationality, 
at which point she (and potentially, Gerda and others who share her appreciation of humour) 
cease to understand the appeal. Finally, Elsa’s comment builds on the idea that all the 
practitioners, except Ana, seem clear about the forms of comedy they do not find funny, but 
takes the dialogue in a slightly different direction by introducing the potential for certain 
types of humour to go beyond evoking indifference or dislike, and to cause embarrassment 
and discomfort. 
 
Evidence within the data suggests that embarrassment and discomfort are not the only 
potentially negative responses to certain aspects of humour. Another potentially negative 
response from the PRs in the data was directed towards the potential for children’s laughter to 
become out of control.  We can see this theme, clearly in two the KMs, below. 
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5.8 KM from Elsa and Gerda BDE: Calm down! 
 
Elsa: They laugh when they are surprised by something... or...I'm just trying to think... 
Laura: It can be a bit tricky trying to think back...I mean there doesn’t have to be anything, 
I'm not waiting for you to come up with something else (all laugh)...it might just be those 
things... 
Elsa: No, it is that kind of thing isn't it? Silly rhymes, nonsense-y things they like...they do 
silly things, don't they? Like they'll put dressing up things on and put them on differently... 
Gerda: Sometimes it's intentional and sometimes it’s not is it? Sometimes they do things 
because they seem to know it's going to be funny...but other times they just do it and....I mean 
even playing racing chasing games in the garden and they want you to chase them and they 
think it's hilarious don't they?  
Laura: What? You chasing them? 
Gerda: Yeah, you know you're chasing them and then you're either side of the tree (moves 
from side to side as if looking around a tree) and they find it hysterical. (All laugh). 
Elsa: Yeah you know, calm down. 
Laura: (laughs) you just said calm down, does it get like that then? 
Elsa: Oh yeah, sometimes they are really....and you think, 'that's enough now or you are 
going to hurt yourself' or... 
Gerda: They might start something gently and its funny but then they just take it a bit too 
far...I can't think of any sort of... 
Elsa: No, I can't...they'll get...like moving around and doing something...like spinning and 
things like that... 
 
5.9 KM from Ana and Bulda BDE: We’re going to have to calm this down 
 
A: ↑THEY sometimes start laughing though... at almost nothing. 
B: Yeah. 
A: And they just can't stop laughing...they are all laugh...or they laugh at things like...like, I 
don't know...like one of the little boys makes up songs and he's just singing, and they are 
saying silly words and they are laughing and... 
L: It was like the other day... 
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A: (laughing loudly) YEAH, yeah.  
B: It's like that Christmas song we're learning at the moment, with the running... 
A: Yeah. 
B: And they all just think this bit of music is really funny and they are just in hysterics half 
way through. 
L: So, what's that about? What's the bit of music?  
A: Well it's about the shepherds. 
B:            It's about the shepherds. 
A: And they run off to see the angel and it is quite upbeat, and we sort of went like that... 
B: Like running... 
A: Yeah, and they started going like that... 
B: And they started doing it and every time they do it they are all just giggling, because they 
just think it's really funny, and we're thinking 'we've got to do this as a play'  
A: (laughs) to our parents. Yeah. Please stop having fun (laughs). 
B We're going to have to calm this down. 'NO MORE FUN. NO LAUGHING'...oh dear (all 
laugh). 
 
The idea that humour and laughter can become ‘too much’ links to the view that there are 
contexts in which particular humour is appropriate and contexts in which it is not. Ana and 
Bulda explore this idea in the KM, below. 
 
5.10 KM from Ana and Bulda BDE: A time and a place for humour?  
 
 (relates to the KM of the same name under the first question about what adults find funny – 
need to make links…) 
B: But they do that with laughing too...they'll say something they'll think is really funny and 
you're just like 'well, that's not funny (laughs) what are you laughing at?'... 
L: So why do you think they do that? I don’t have an answer... 
A: I think it's that process of learning the...learning...not necessarily about humour but the 
language and the words and the…and what effect they have on people. 
B: Yeah, yeah, 
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A: Whether it...'Cause it's a bit like us as an adult...like you say, you learn about other 
people's sense of humour so you learn what you think would make them laugh, so 
it's...that...sort of... 
B: It's also social etiquette...what is acceptable when? because obviously sometimes they'll 
start with dirty words at the dinner table and we're quite firm then with the... 
A: Yeah. 
B: 'That's not acceptable' but if they are doing it within play then well then does it really 
matter if you said bum? 
A: If you're changing a baby's nappy, or a nappy...yeah 
B: Yeah. 
L: So it's context dependent? 
A: Yeah. 
 
Beginning with the suggestion that children can laugh at things that adults cannot relate to, 
and therefore do not find funny, this KM ends with Bulda commenting that she perceived 
there to be appropriate and inappropriate contexts for humour, particularly scatological 
humour. She suggests that she would not welcome this form of humour at the ‘dinner table’ 
but that she would find it acceptable if it occurred during play and Ana agreed that the 
appropriateness of humour is context dependent. Children’s carnivalesque behaviours that 
embody a sense of resistance and rebellion, for example engaging in toilet humour whilst at 
the ‘dinner table’, could be argued as a response to the cultural elaboration of the importance 
and significance placed on politeness and manners by adults (Tallant, 2015) as well as to a 
sense of rationality that Duncam (2009) suggests can be found in school environments. The 
soundbites below continue the idea of the appropriateness and inappropriateness of types of 
humour and contexts for humour, highlighting that the PRs recognise the potential tensions 
that can arise for adults and children as a result of differences in sense of humour and a need 
to consider other people’s feelings and be sensitive to the idea that they might feel 
embarrassed or hurt by something that another person finds funny. 
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5.11 Soundbites of humour and the comfort/discomfort and appropriate/inappropriate 
divide 
 
The soundbites in the table, below, highlight the variety and range of views held by the PRs 
relating to humour, generally, including: that what ‘funny’ means is not necessarily universal; 
appreciating or not certain kinds of humour; the different ways that humour can make a 
person feel; concern for other people’s perception of you on discovering that you find certain 
things humorous are just some of the themes running through the table. 
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Fig 25 
 
I argue that they also reflect a theme that runs through the analysis chapter that paints a 
picture of humour as complex, messy, ambivalent, at times troubling, challenging; yet also 
fun, foolish, empowering, grotesque and necessary that is, for much of the time, an aspect of 
children’s lives that is welcomed by the PRs. However, this complexity may be a large part 
of the explanation for humour not being recognized in an official, early years curricula 
Soundbites of humour and the comfort/discomfort and appropriate/inappropriate divide 
Ana Bulda Elsa Gerda 
One of my friends, 
she’s got a really 
dirty mind so 
everything is very, 
when it's humour it's 
very innuendo-y - 
whereas other 
things, it’s more like 
child-like 
humour...you find 
silly little things 
funny like fluffy 
unicorns and stuff 
like that, you 
know...just… 
Yeah, it doesn't sound 
like a genuine hoo haa 
ha, 'that's funny' 
laughter, it's like (with 
raised eyebrows, eyes 
down and a grin) huh 
huh huh huh kind of 
like 'look what I've 
done'. 
 
I mean I don't think 
people think of it quite as 
much...but it is that...isn't 
it...you don't kind of think 
of things to make people 
uncomfortable but 
sometimes it is funny 
(laughs quietly). 
I mean looking back the 
Young Ones was not 
really...you know...it was 
quite political, but not as 
near the mark as a lot of 
comedy NOW. 
Because, you know, 
you could hurt 
somebody's feelings 
and you just have to 
say to them 'look, 
you might find this 
funny, but they 
might not'  
 
Obviously if they say 
it at the snack table 
we'll often go 'not 
using those sorts of 
words while we're 
having our dinner' you 
know...you know 
perhaps they're going 
'oooo (...) Ana said it 
too... we can say 
bottom - wahay' 
Well, they were 
embarrassing...that sort of 
thing...so... 
Or if you laugh they may 
think badly of you, so... 
Yeah...and you kind 
of have to see what 
the situation is to 
then be able to 
assess whether...like 
I say, it's not 
necessarily whether 
you find it funny or 
not, it's whether it IS 
funny or not... 
When it's acceptable 
to laugh at somebody, 
when it's acceptable to 
use those words... 
 
But that's me...I feel... it 
makes me feel a bit 
anxious and a bit...I don't 
know, I just don't like it. 
(...) 
He found it funny that you 
were uncomfortable... 
Because they like 
words like bottom 
and butt and bum 
don't they (A and B 
laugh) because it's 
that (...).  
Yeah. At least you 
have put in those 
foundations for what 
should be followed. 
I feel silly now. It's like if, you know, if 
they drop something, 
or...and it's funny for 
whatever reason, and then 
they might start 
throwing...because they 
are trying to get that 
reaction again... 
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capacity in this country (Tallant, 2015). The ambivalent nature of children’s carnivalesque 
humour and as it appears within the utterances presented and analysed in this chapter, 
underpin the arguments I put forward in the next and final part. This chapter tells the story of 
children’s carnivality and offers reasons why and how I believe the findings of this study 
could be of significant benefit to young children and the ECEC field. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and (Non)Final(isable)Thoughts 
6.1 Young children, humour and ECEC settings: towards children’s humour as 
carnivality 
 
The data from this study illustrate multiple examples of young children’s humour that present 
as Bakhtinian carnivalesque. From embracing clowning and foolery, grotesque realism and 
experiencing a sense of free and familiar interaction; to engaging in carnival performances, 
playing with social hierarchy, and to resisting adults’ attempts to finalise them and claim, 
albeit implicitly, that they, and we all, can be ‘known’. The picture of children inhabiting a 
carnival space within a nursery setting has been painted throughout the thesis and directs us 
to the value of viewing ECEC settings as housing children’s own Carnivalesque space: a 
space in which they display and revel in, to coin a term, ‘carnivality’. This chapter tells the 
story of children’s carnivality (and uses that term throughout to describe the children’s 
engagement with carnivalesque humour) as seen within the findings in the data and puts 
forward a case for reframing children’s humour in order to facilitate a new wave of early 
childhood practice that seeks to listen to children using a fresh approach. Firstly, the primary 
features in the data that enable us to think of children’s humour as carnivalesque are 
discussed. Following this, the PRs become the focus, when the findings that offer a 
practitioner perspective are discussed alongside potential barriers to ECEC embracing 
children’s carnivalesque humour. This involves the consideration of a potential struggle 
raised within the data, sparked by early years professionals’ and children’s fundamental 
differences, and accentuated by children’s capacity for ‘jouissance’. The chapter moves on to 
consider aspects of the data that I argue prompt an exploration of the potential rift between 
social constructions of young children as innocent and naturally developing, held in ECEC in 
England and that appear in the findings, and the idea raised in the analysis that children have 
an affinity with ‘carnivalesque jouissance’. Building upon this, a call to arms is issued where 
I argue that early childhood practitioners need to become conversant in the language of 
young children’s carnivalesque humour, particularly if children are to benefit from a 
meaningful relational connection with adults in ECEC. Lastly, I argue that young children 
and ECEC practitioners could benefit from a change in the EYFS: a move towards a focus 
that considers the development of children’s humour and, importantly, that embraces a more 
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holistic discourse of valuing humour as an inevitable and necessary part of children’s 
experiences within ECEC settings.  
 
6.2 Reframing children’s humour in ECEC as ‘Carnivality’ 
The findings of this study offer a wide range of examples of children’s humour clearly 
presenting as Bakhitnian carnivalesque. Here, the detail of how this appears within the 
analysis is offered, alongside a review of how these findings sit with the current literature and 
research on children’s humour. This discussion addresses the first of this study’s research 
questions: RQ1. What are young children’s manifestations and perceptions of and reactions 
to humour within an early years’ setting, from a child, practitioner and Bakhtinian 
perspective? In the spirit of unfinalisability, I begin a dialogue inviting post-thesis responses 
from the PRs and children in the study and the ECEC field as a whole and make the case for 
reframing young children’s humour in ECEC settings as carnivalesque. 
 
6.2.1 Children as carnival performers and clowns 
A theme within the children’s humour depicted in the analysis chapter is their engagement in 
playful carnivalesque performances that fit with Bakhtin’s description of them as not 
differentiating between audience and performers: instead, involving everyone in the 
carnivalesque space and embodying a sense of revitalisation, rebirth, renewal and possibility 
(RHW). The children find themselves in carnival situations, where old experiences can 
become new experiences and be played with all over again. We can see this in the mimicry of 
Oliver’s fall, engaged in by children in KM I fell on my bottom: mimicry looming large in 
Bakhtin’s carnival imagery (White, 2013) and strengthening the carnivalesque essence of this 
event. Another clowning behaviour seen in the data is children’s engagement with ‘loose 
nonsense’ (Kennedy, 1991) or, playing and fluctuating with the laws of nature in a chaotic 
way. This playful behaviour embodies the sense of ‘anything goes’ that Bakhtin stressed was 
an integral feature within a carnival sense of the world (RHW). Further, this finding fits well 
with the re-envisioning of children’s humour as ‘a different kind of play’ (see Loizou, 2005, 
Chapter 2) and, when combined, are ideas that create a strong case for framing these aspects 
of children’s behaviour as playful carnivalesque performances. Akin to the image of playful 
performances is the carnivalesque clowning and foolery that the data show children engaging 
with. If we view ‘[c]lowning [as being] about the freedom that comes from a state of total, 
unconditional acceptance of our most authentic selves’ (Henderson in Davison, 2016), or as 
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‘[a] quest for liberation from the “social masks” we all wear’ (Murray, 2003: 79, on Jacques 
Lecoq), and as Bakhtin’s and Rabelais’ representatives of a carnivalesque spirit and 
atmosphere (RHW), we cannot and should not ignore the preponderance of these images in 
the data. Further, it is important to recognise and value the significance of children’s 
engagement with clowning and appreciate the empowered position it affords when acting 
and/or re-enacting moments that resonate for them, and that personify the spirit of 
carnivalesque clowning (RHW). This convincing presence of ‘child clowns’ in the data 
reinforces the argument for viewing children’s humour, in this ECEC context, as 
‘carnivality’.  
 
6.2.2 The pull of feasting and an egalitarian carnival space 
 
The free and familiar contact between people during carnival (RHW), as seen through the 
children’s carnival ‘misalliances’ in the data, is also a significant theme running through the 
findings. It appears that the enticing, liberating, rousing atmosphere created by the children’s 
engagement with a carnivalesque sense of the world, succeeds in bringing together children 
who would not usually mix outside of a carnivalesque space.  Further, due to the removal of 
hierarchical boundaries within carnival spaces, the data shows children and adults coming 
together in a mood of celebration and equality. This is significant as it provides the children 
with an opportunity to explore their place in the social hierarchy and experience a sense of 
equality in carnival that can only be imagined in ‘real life’. Whilst inhabiting this egalitarian 
carnival space (RHW) children can subvert the rules they are bound to in the outside world 
and challenge pervasive cultural norms by, in the words of the PRs, ‘testing boundaries’. In 
this scenario, as suggested in the analysis, it is almost like the children engage in a form of 
transactional analysis (Solomon, 2003 - see Chapter 5:138) in their communication with 
adults and each other, to aid their exploration of PR Elsa’s temperament (Lensmire, 2011). 
Also linked to their desire to ‘analyse’ the social conditions surrounding them, test 
boundaries and subvert rules, is the children’s inclination to engage with carnivality during 
mealtimes. In line with Oksnes (2008), Odergaard (2013) and White (2013), the children 
seem drawn towards carnivality when in groups, eating around a table. For Bakhtin this 
reflects the significance of feasts and feasting in medieval carnivals (RHW). In this space, 
characterised by the right to emerge from the routine of life, and the right to be free from all 
that is official and consecrated, the children are able to experience the right to inhabit a space 
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where there is no risk of them being conceptualised as human becomings (Qvortrup, 2009); 
instead they can rejoice in being who they are in that moment. This point is significant if we 
consider the pressures that inhabit ECEC settings, driven by the need for practitioners to 
document children’s ‘progress’ to meet the requirements of the Early Years Foundation Stage 
(EYFS). Nutbrown, (2012) argues it is likely that children in English ECEC, today, can sense 
the pressure practitioners are under to meet targets, however hazily. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, that children might seek opportunities to escape the pressure they encounter, and 
that the welcoming and positive atmosphere of a carnival space would be a significant draw. 
Further, the inviting carnivality inherent within mealtimes seems to provide an opportunity 
for the children to play with the power differential they experience because of the pressure 
that practitioners are under. The carnival space of mealtimes embodies a chronotope riddled 
with potential and anticipation of what is possible. It presents an inviting and potentially 
irresistible occasion in which children can engage in carnivality that personifies subversion 
and topsy turvies; playful carnivalesque performances; the parodying of one another and of 
the social order that presides outside of this space. Their enjoyment of this suggests strongly 
that the children understand the pressure they are under and reject it, perhaps subconsciously 
or not; challenging and/or ignoring the power hierarchy that the curriculum dictates, 
constructing a different, resistant space where these pressures cease to have any authority. 
 
6.2.3 Grotesque realism, subversion and carnival jouissance 
Two examples within the data highlight the children’s engagement with what Bakhtin terms 
‘carnival abuses’ (RHW) which, far from having the negative associations that abuses have 
today, are positive additions to a carnival environment signifying a means of mocking fear 
and generating renewal and rebirth (Cohen, 2011). The examples that illustrate this positive 
abuse show the use of grotesque imagery in ‘name-calling’ and children Marcus’, Sebastian’s 
and Megan’s blowing raspberries and continuing to do so, despite Emily clearly signalling 
her disapproval; and, beyond this, seemingly experiencing a heightened sense of enjoyment 
because someone was opposing their behaviour. When we see this behaviour as carnivality 
and representative of the regenerating and affirmative imagery Bakhtin argues is inherent 
within the carnivalesque, we can flip our thinking from seeing mildly abusive and derisive 
behaviour directed at or around an individual, to seeing children engaging in positive 
behaviour that elicits a sense of jouissance (Barthes, 1975) or unbridled joy in them. Adults 
were not present in either scenario and the events were recorded by the children’s head 
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cameras whilst they were either in the midst of snack time or sitting around a table post-snack 
time. Adults adopting a view that children are engaging in positive carnivality in situations 
like this could be of benefit to children. However, this does not address the potential issue in 
KM ‘Thomas the Tank and Raspberries’ in which Emily  appears mildly distressed when the 
other children seem not to listen to or respond to her. As noted in the analysis, a natural 
response from ECEC practitioners might be to try and help Emily resolve her issue and 
highlight to the other children the negative effect that their words and actions are having on 
her (Holmes, 2000). This raises questions over whether practitioner intervention would be 
necessary so that the children gleaned important messages about empathy, kindness, and the 
impact our words and actions can have on others; and whether Emily requires adult 
assistance to resolve the dispute. I argue that if we frame this encounter, and similar 
encounters more generally, as carnivality practitioners may not need to intervene as the 
lessons for children about socialisation that we might think need addressing for the children’s 
sake, the children may be negotiating and learning about from the carnivality of the 
encounter. Further, the lack of adult presence in these types of situations, and the ensuing 
enjoyment and inherent positivity that most of the children experience as a result, may be lost 
and quashed with adult intervention.  That there will often be a child or small number of 
children who seem not to experience joy or jouissance in these types of encounters may seem 
an apt reason for adults to curb them. Rather, if necessary, perhaps practitioners and children 
could address the issues involved together, away from this carnival experience, whilst 
helping all of the children to recognise the inherent positivity in carnivality. This is an 
important lesson for all - that at times human beings experience and/or are presented with 
resistance to their way of thinking and it is important that we learn how to cope. This could 
be communicated, and support provided to develop the resilience necessary to understand 
that it is not helpful to take these encounters personally. Arguably, this could send children 
important messages about the positivity of taking responsibility for our own happiness. That 
is not to say that practitioners should never intervene in situations that herald base 
vindictiveness or cruelty towards others; only that perhaps it is not necessary or, ultimately, 
helpful to intervene if adults can establish the presence of carnivality in the scene.  
 
6.2.4 The possibilities in carnival jouissance 
Barthes’ (1975) concept of jouissance is raised a number of times throughout the analysis 
chapter because I argue it has close links to the ambivalent positivity and ‘anti-reality’ 
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integral to carnivality. In particular, the potential for carnival behaviours to be viewed as 
negative in today’s climate, where laughter no longer enjoys the positive understandings it 
was afforded in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, resonates with the similar situation that 
jouissance potentially finds itself in. I argue, both Rabelaisian carnival and Barthesian 
jouissance involve ideas that adults can find difficult to reconcile when placed in the context 
of young children (Holmes and Marra, 2006). There are links between carnivality and 
jouissance that need highlighting here in order to better understand possible reasons for 
children’s capacity for both within for ECEC settings. Firstly, carnivality has a thirst for 
‘degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to 
the material level’ (RHW) and is a space where children can engage with grotesque imagery, 
thereby lowering adult authority through engaging with ideas that dominant social discourses 
view as distasteful; and appreciating the empowerment generated by the control they have 
over their own bodies. This resonates with jouissance, Barthes conception of which not only 
involves experiencing intense and powerful pleasure and joy, but also has a connection with 
corporeal sensuality and sexuality. I argue that aspects of the data show children engaging 
with these concepts, as well as suggestions that sensuality, sexuality, degradation and 
grotesque imagery do not consistently sit well with PRs, perhaps in the face of held 
perceptions of childhood innocence. This idea is explored in more depth later in the chapter, 
when we look at the role of the practitioners’ perspectives in this discussion. From the 
children’s perspective, however, the opportunity to be part of a carnival space that holds the 
potential to experience feelings of jouissance, seems to afford them an opportunity to revel in 
the few examples of power and control they have experienced and to harness them, celebrate 
them and feel more empowered by them. Loizou’s argument, that power is a feature of 
humour that children use to move around within their social surroundings (Loizou, 2007) 
resonates deeply with this.  
 
6.2.5 Carnivality and its expression via each, unique child: Annabelle’s story 
 
Of the eighteen children who took part in this study, each was unique, because all children 
are: an important idea to remember when exploring children’s relationship with carnivality. 
Children are in the world as individuals who engage with it and respond to it, discretely and 
collectively. This can be seen within the findings of this study as, although it can be argued 
that some children follow a pattern and share many experiences of carnivality, no two 
 160 
children can be seen as engaging with and responding to it in an identical manner. So, 
personality comes to the fore, as does the notion that people experience life, and the pressures 
it wields, differently (Morisseau et al, 2017). It follows then that if we accept part of adults’ 
role is to help children in their journey to become adults, these children may feel under 
pressure to get the process of becoming an adult ‘right’. It can be argued children often sense 
that there is a ‘correct’ way of doing things according to others and these children may be 
less inclined to jump into a carnival space head-first; whereas others may be much more 
likely to join a carnival space and resist adult pressure.  I argue carnivality presents all 
children with an outlet; a chance to escape their lived experience of pressure, momentarily. 
Consequently, it may be even more important for adults to be mindful, in particular, of 
children who may not be able to join in with the spirit of carnivalesque as readily, to ensure 
that we are sensitive to their perception of and sensitivity to pressure. The scenario above is 
one that could apply to children of a similar temperament to Annabelle who, in the data, 
hardly featured at all. Informal discussions with the PRs, recorded in my field diary, 
however, show her to have an extremely complex character. The practitioners reported that at 
times Annabelle was openly defiant but at others, she was reticent, shy, and stood apart from 
the group watching scenes unfold. The instances where she engaged in defiance appeared 
premeditated and did not involve anybody else, and are therefore not classifiable as 
carnivalesque defiance, which involves the collective (RHW). Everyday (i.e. non 
carnivalesque) defiance can be about all manner of things, and when not enshrined in a 
carnivalesque sense of the world, can be received as negative (Brazelton and Sparrow, 2002). 
Carnivalesque defiance is far from negative and is an occurrence that as practitioners we need 
to nurture, and ensure children have the opportunity to experience and engage in for them to 
experience empowerment and the act of negotiating and attempting to understand social 
conventions (Albon and Rosen, 2015). Later in the chapter, in relation to practitioners 
nurturing carnivalesque defiance, I argue the case for their engagement with positive 
disregard (Tallant, 2015) as a means of facilitating children’s carnivalesque experiences. 
 
6.2.6 ‘Underground, over ground, wandering free’: the dualistic culture of the children’s 
carnivality 
The findings suggest that the children can engage in carnivality in an underground culture, 
away from adults, but that they can also experience carnivality with adults. A number of the 
KMs involve only children. As such, it appears that they are inhabiting an underworld, away 
 161 
from the watchful eye of adults, who we could argue represent the authoritative ‘ruling 
classes’ (RHW). They exert power over the children and drive comic behaviour 
‘underground’, establishing a divide between official and ‘folk’ culture (RHW).  White 
(2013) also notes that children have the capability to choose to inhabit this underground 
space that, necessarily, is positioned outside the official sphere. Entering this space allows the 
children to experience a sense of liberation from the power that adults hold over them in their 
everyday experiences in the setting. Further, she suggests that in addition to the power adults 
have over children, children are also afforded very little power in such circumstances (ibid). I 
argue that entering a carnivalesque space is something that children need to experience to 
enjoy a feeling of empowerment. They can play around with their understanding of power 
relations and where they sit within the ECEC setting and wider social hierarchy.  This 
suggestion is in line with several other theorists who argue that children inhabit carnivalesque 
spaces in all manner of different educational settings, providing an opportunity for them to 
experience power differently (Cohen, 2009, 2015; Lensmire, 2011; White; 2009, Da Silva 
Iddings and McAfferty, 2007; Odergaard and Kellestad, 2013; Oksnes, 2012). Further, 
engaging in the form of free and equal interaction that the openness of carnival spaces 
engenders (RHW) this underground culture means that children can form alliances with other 
children: those with whom they may not usually socialise outside of this space. The main 
benefit of this is that it facilitates a wider range of social experiences for children, enabling 
them to gain more experience of socialising and the rules and potential pitfalls that can arise, 
depending on the individuals with whom one is socialising and the nature of interaction that 
is taking place. 
 
In the latter scenario - mentioned at the beginning of this section - adults join children in their 
carnival and, as hierarchies are banished during the process of adults and children coming 
together. Here, equality reigns and the power relations that exist outside the carnival space 
are suspended, temporarily (RHW). I argue that this occurrence highlights an issue in framing 
children’s humour as ‘Bakhtinian’ carnivalesque and supports why it might be more 
profitable, instead, to think of young children’s humour as carnivality: a completely new idea 
inspired by and almost identical to (but not quite) Bakhtinian carnivalesque. The ‘not quite’ is 
key. The difference between carnivalesque and the notion of carnivality has to do with 
context. In the context of ECEC the findings of this study show that children and adults do 
come together within carnival spaces. However, also seen is the speed with which children 
can flit between a carnival world and the ‘real’ world when engaging in carnivality with 
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adults. This is something not seen in Bakhtin’s sense of the carnival. It seems the carnival 
experience involving adults and children is not sustained in the same way it is in some of the 
examples when only children are involved. This suggests that either it is not profitable to 
consider the children humour here as carnivality, or that this carnival space differs from the 
one Bakhtin describes, even if only subtly. For argument’s sake, let us think of this scenario 
as Bakhtinian carnivalesque, and therefore that the whole encounter is classed as a carnival 
experience, even when a child stops laughing because, for example, they disagree with a 
practitioner’s words or actions. I argue that this would be inaccurate, because when an 
encounter appears interrupted, such as when Emily challenges Elsa over who is on the phone 
in their imaginary play scene (see analysis chapter), it appears that at these moments the 
carnival has ceased to be. Moreover, as Garvey suggests, in these situations, as children are 
stepping out of the play frame (Garvey, 1977) to negotiate and ‘direct’ the play through 
metacommunication (Trawick-Smith, 2013), I argue that they are stepping out of the 
‘carnival frame’ – momentarily remembering the hierarchical gap between themselves and 
practitioners, until the issue has been resolved. They then step back into the carnival once 
they are content that the adult understands the situation, as the child sees it; reflecting 
Bakhtin’s focus on the temporality and physicality of carnival spaces (RHW) and extending 
his theory, remaining faithful to its central and irrevocable tenets. This line of reasoning 
illustrates how it is profitable for us to adopt this view and frame young children’s humour as 
Bakhtinian inspired ‘carnivality’. Another potentially profitable contemplation is that the act 
of stepping in and out of a carnival space when with adults affords children the opportunity to 
explore the hidden dialogicality (DI) within all utterances, potentially assisting them in 
negotiating the complexity of the social world. Further, I argue that this has potential 
implications for the way adults view and support the children’s emotions. Children can 
apparently dip in and out of carnival, experiencing a sudden dispositional transformation but 
rapidly returning to their previous emotional state of carnival jouissance. The children’s 
emotional oscillation illustrates a possible reason why adults’ perception of children’s 
emotions might be as “lesser than” adults’ emotions. Importantly, I refer here to children’s 
experienced emotions not to their ability to regulate emotion, as it is well-documented within 
the literature that young children need support with the development of self-regulation 
(Whitebread, 2012). Children’s capacity to shift from one emotion to another at such speed 
may contribute to practitioners’ misconceiving children’s emotions as less ‘real’ or less 
complex than those of adults; and that a simple ‘shivvying up’ (a phrase appropriated by PR, 
Bulda, in the data) from adults can help restore equilibrium for children. In addition, this 
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‘flitting’ behaviour may also contribute to practitioner’s difficulty in recognising 
carnivalesque spaces due to the lack of fluidity therein resulting in some of children’s 
carnivalesque experiences presenting as fragmented and messy. The idea that practitioners 
could be misled by children’s capacity to shift in this way resonates with research into 
children’s schemas (Athey, 1976) as Athey suggests much of children’s schematic behaviour 
can be misinterpreted as ‘flitting’ and therefore perceived as inconsequential, in line with the 
suggestion that a similar fate could befall some examples of children’s carnivality.  
 
Given the ideas presented here, I argue it could be useful for practitioners to consider 
children’s humour as carnivality and therefore to consider and attempt to empathise with 
children’s lived experiences or ‘pravda’. Bakhtin argues that this is an essential element of 
the carnivalesque experience (RHW) and is opposed to ‘istina’, or ‘abstract truth’. I argue 
that children encounter this every day, outside of carnival spaces, via adults’ accounts and 
explanations of aspects of a world that children have yet to experience. These ideas have 
significant implications for the way adults interpret play scenes that involve the carnivality of 
practitioners and children, and I will return to this idea in the next section, as well as in the 
concluding thoughts in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Practitioners as ‘child experts’, carnival pleasures, and the trouble with ‘jouissance’ 
As identified at the beginning of the chapter, this section places the PRs as the focus and 
discusses findings that present practitioner perspectives alongside potential barriers to ECEC 
embracing children’s carnivalesque humour. This section, therefore, addresses the study’s 
second research question: RQ2. What is a Bakhtinian interpretation of adults’ experiences 
and perceptions of humour inside and outside of an early years' setting, and how do these 
relate to those of young children? In addition, highlighted here is the potential struggle 
depicted in the data, sparked by the PRs and children’s fundamental differences, and 
accentuated by the notion of children’s carnivality as a facilitative language communicating 
their shared lived experiences of ‘carnival jouissance’. 
 
6.3.1 Adults’ relationship with children’s ‘carnival jouissance’ 
Having discussed the concept of jouissance in relation to the children’s experiences, I will 
explore it here in relation to practitioner responses and thoughts, as found and analysed in the 
data. The range of examples of children enjoying playing with carnivality through grotesque 
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imagery, topsy-turvy ideas and a sense of humour shared by the children as a collective, is 
present in the findings. I argue that an apt term to capture the spirit of this carnivalesque 
enjoyment is ‘carnival jouissance’ inspired by Barthes’, 1975 concept. The complex concept 
of jouissance combines ideas which usually sit at the opposite end of the spectrum from one 
another and this idea is one I argue is particularly pertinent when considering practitioners 
capacity to understand and support children’s carnivality. For Barthes, jouissance is pleasure 
of the highest order and is often associated with the form of pleasure associated with 
sensuality (ibid). Further, as highlighted within the analysis chapter, Grace and Tobin add to 
this, suggesting that this ‘...intense, heightened form of pleasure, [involves] a momentary loss 
of subjectivity. It knows no bounds’ (Grace and Tobin 1997: 177). Another way to think of 
jouissance might be as unbridled joy: a concept which conjures images of the highest form of 
happiness possible for human beings but that is encapsulated in a shroud of innocence. This 
definition seems to work perfectly well when wishing to characterise children’s ultimate 
experiences of joy, as well as remaining within the bounds of our British sensibilities and 
sitting well with dominant constructions of children as innocent (Taylor, 2015). However, 
when we consider children’s interest in and engagement with the contentious and perhaps 
less mainstream carnivalesque themes presented in this study, this definition seems to fall 
short.  Returning to Barthes’ conception of jouissance, if we accept that sensuality and even 
sexuality (Barthes, 1975) have a role to play in this reading of ultimate pleasure, suddenly 
this does not sit so comfortably with practitioners (Howard in Barthes, 1975), particularly 
when contemplating ‘innocent’ children in the scenario. This discomfort, Jones (2003) 
suggests, may relate to the presence of a ‘…spectral monster…[who] shapes the possible 
pleasures (and dangers) in the early childhood centre’ (2003: 247). She argues that, akin to 
Tobin’s (1997) argument, ECEC is considered to be hostile to desire and pleasure due to 
‘…the historical shift from the identification and removal of the very rare individual 
paedophile to the fear of the spectral pervert (and therefore the fear of accusation), [which] 
has had a broad and problematic impact on what counts as professionalism and what counts 
as early childhood care and education’ (Jones, 2003: 248). The shift in mood within English 
ECEC from one of professional trust to one of professional suspicion, generated by mass 
anxiety over the potential sexual abuse of young children, is reflected in Jones’ argument. 
The idea of sexuality and sensuality as taboo within ECEC may seem worlds apart from 
children’s engagement with carnivalesque humour. However, in this study the children’s 
interest in carnivalesque humour involved them being amused by (and, therefore receiving 
pleasure from) grotesque imagery and the lower bodily stratum (RHW) (as illustrated in the 
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data by Sebastian’s suggestion that sticky playdough could go ‘on your knickers’; Sian, 
Simon, and Oscar’s interest in poo; Oliver 1’s  attention to toilets; and Oliver 2’s amusement 
at falling on his bottom) a connection between sensuality, sexuality and the lower body can 
be seen. These references to the children’s interest in grotesque imagery warrant further 
investigation into the idea that this poses a challenge for practitioners as a result of held 
dominant constructions of childhood jarring with their enjoyment of humour with such 
bawdy themes (McKenzie, 2005). Worthy of note is that focusing on genre, then utilizing a 
variety of dialogic concepts from the analytic framework, worked well; specifically, when 
analysing the children’s (as opposed to the PRs) voices and humour. This may have been 
because the dominant genre of the children’s humour was carnivalesque (and, as seen above, 
much of it ‘grotesque’ carnivalesque): a consistent theme throughout. This approach was less 
successful when analysing the practitioner’s voices, however, and on reflection this 
highlights the significance of some fundamental differences between the PRs and children’s 
perspectives. When focusing on the practitioner voices it transpired that the different natures 
of the children and PRs KMs meant the time-space (chronotope) of each PR utterance (in 
which only PRs appeared) resonated with the research questions much more. Therefore, 
whilst still utilizing a dialogic approach to analysis, the focus for the practitioner utterances 
became chronotope and this helped to identify the idea that adults may not be comfortable 
with children’s engagement with particular themes: an idea explored in more detail in the 
next section. 
 
6.4 Young children’s carnivality: a language foreign to ECEC practitioners? 
Given the long periods of time practitioners spend with children during which they witness 
their forays into the world of jouissance on a regular basis, coupled with the pressure they are 
under from a policy and cultural perspective to guide children successfully into school, it may 
be challenging for them to see and acknowledge the ease with which children can slip into this 
jubilant state. Every working day, early childhood practitioners are bystanders who witness 
children’s adventures in an alternative world of carnivality. Practitioners may even have 
opportunities to join children in their carnival jouissance, but only on the periphery, due to the 
responsibility and accountability they acquire on entering adulthood. These acquisitions may 
mean practitioners are unable to immerse themselves in carnivality. Children can do so because 
they have not yet acquired a sense of what ultimate responsibility and accountability look and 
feel like. They are therefore unable to understand or empathise with the curbing effect they can 
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have on adults’ capability to let go of inhibitions and freefall into blissful oblivion. They do not 
understand that, as adults’, our responsibilities are ever present, tucked behind any attempts we 
make to escape them.  
 
In the context of this study the data suggest that children may be perceived as ‘that’ 
individual - in a troubling sense - and this may be difficult to understand and easy to 
miscomprehend if being fluent in children’s language is a prerequisite for this. The data 
suggest that, despite an ardent and visceral desire to embrace and appreciate children’s 
humour, the practitioners may not be fluent in children’s carnival vernacular. This suggests 
that there may be aspects of children’s experiences in the ECEC setting that the practitioners 
cannot understand, yet. For example, as Ana and Bulda highlight in the data, there are 
occasions when children seem to want to engage in laughter and humour and fun, regardless 
of its content, and it is not always possible to understand the roots of and empathise with 
children’s laughter. If, as suggested earlier, this carnival jouissance is not fully accessible to 
adults, it is possible that empathy with children’ experience, in this regard, is also 
unavailable. I argue that the findings from this study, as highlighted throughout this chapter, 
provide an opportunity for ECEC practitioners to learn to speak children’ carnival vernacular, 
and this this would be of significant benefit to children, and practitioners. I will return to this 
point in the concluding section of this thesis. 
 
6.5 ECEC practitioners, core values and children’ carnivality 
 
The following section address the third of this study’s research questions that asks: 
 
RQ3. How do these experiences and perceptions, interpreted in this way, relate to the 
pedagogical significance of humour within an early years setting? Initially, a discussion of 
values is presented, drawing on the evidence located within the Literature Review. Themes 
presented in this initial discussion are then woven through the argument in this section, 
highlighting potential discord between the values that underpin policy and curriculum, and 
the PRs own values, attitudes and beliefs.  The section finishes by considering the place of 
humour within English early childhood pedagogy in light of the impact that these values have 
and initiates a discussion of how this can be addressed, that is followed up in the final 
section.    
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The data suggest that central to possibility of children’ carnivality being embraced and 
facilitated is the way that practitioner’s values influence their practice. Before looking at 
evidence in the findings from the PRs, let us think more broadly about the values 
underpinning ECEC in this country, given Bakhtin’s thoughts about the relationship between 
internally persuasive and authoritative discourses (DI). Following Bakhtin’s line of argument, 
we could say that internally persuasive discourses, that house personal values, are often 
influenced by the authoritative discourses that drive policy and curriculum; so, we begin by 
revisiting ideas about values that are highlighted within the Literature Review. According to 
Faulkner and Coates (2013) values that underpin current practice in ECEC in England from a 
curricular perspective, centre around notions of children’ uniqueness; the importance of 
developing positive relationships; the significance of a nurturing and enabling environment; 
and the importance of learning and development. Humour can play a central role in all of 
those values. However, a review of the literature revealed that the attention to humour given 
by the EYFS (DfE, 2017) is limited to a small section in the non-statutory Development 
Matters guidance focusing on children’ development of a capacity to understand jokes. This 
does not indicate that humour is high on the government’s list of priorities. Further, as the 
literature illustrates an evaluation of early education policies revealed that ‘soft skills’ that are 
less easily quantifiable are often neglected. This is despite evidence to suggest that these 
skills are valued by practitioners and education settings (Heckman and Kautz, 2012). Further, 
they suggest that this is potentially negative for young children, given the significance of 
these skills for learning and development. Heckman and Kautz (2012) suggest programmes 
that do nurture soft skills should play a major part in the formation of policy throughout the 
sector.  I would argue that the idea that soft skills are not considered of value, policy and 
curricula-wise, and accepting the argument that humour may not even be seen as worthy of 
the label ‘soft skill’, suggests a comprehensive lack of pedagogical value placed on humour 
within a wide range of early years curricula, globally (Tallant, 2015). 
 
Belsky et al. (2007) and Schweinhart et al. (2005) suggest investing in sufficiently qualified 
staff to look after and meet the learning needs of young children is becoming fundamental in 
the English ECEC field: an idea echoed in the influential Effective Provision of Preschool 
Education (EPPE) study (Sylva et al. 2010). However, does being ‘sufficiently qualified’ 
relate to practitioner’s engagement with children’ humour? The literature informs us that the 
Early years educator (Level 3) qualifications criteria (DfE, 2013) appear to cover all elements 
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of ECEC that will enable a practitioner to: understand the relevant theory relating to children’ 
(birth to five years old) learning and development; support and assess children’ learning and 
development and prepare them for school; keep children safe from harm; engage and work 
with parents/carers for the benefit of children (DfE, 2013). Underpinned by a discourse that 
reflects ideas of progress, development, monitoring, assessment and preparation, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the document skirts the intrinsic value of supporting children by attending 
to their individual needs; recognising the value of relating to children as human beings rather 
than human becomings; and understanding the importance of and impact that the non-
physical environment can have on children and how practitioners can affect this positively. 
Failure to refer to these ideas, explicitly, results in directing practitioner’s attention away 
from the value of so called ‘soft skills’ (Schweinhart et al, 2015) a label which in this context 
could be applied to humour (ill-advisedly, according to this study’s data) and means that 
these attributes are far from being a focus of ECEC practice. Further, as argued within the 
Literature Review, placing emphasis elsewhere elsewhere may well create a situation where 
practitioners are duty-bound to respond to the criteria that curricula and policy deem as being 
the most significant. Subsequently, as raised in the analysis chapter, it follows that this may 
present a barrier to practitioners valuing and paying meaningful attention to children’s 
carnivality.  
 
Children’s carnivality potentially involves features that do not necessarily sit well with our 
English, cultural sensibilities (Taylor, 2013). For example, the data shows that children’s 
carnivality can involve: a challenge to adult hierarchy and power; disparagement and 
degradation of that hierarchy and power; enjoyment of humour at what are perceived as 
‘inappropriate times’, for example the presence of scatological humour at meal times – 
arguably a threat to the upholding of English etiquette and social conventions due to them 
being a time ‘meant’ only to involve ‘sanitary’ imagery that reflects the need for cleanliness 
due to the presence of food, and the potential for illness if cleanliness does not preside; 
children’s engagement with the potentially taboo concept of ‘jouissance’; and the notion that 
children’s carnivality treads a fine line between pleasure and displeasure and represents 
ambivalence in all manner of ways. Adding to this, significantly, the PRs voices in the 
findings suggest that they may be caught betwixt and between focusing solely on the children 
as they ‘are’ and being prompted by an authoritative discourse-fuelled pressure to focus on 
how their practice influences who children ‘will be’: a situation that potentially sits ECEC 
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practitioners between a rock and a hard place, leaving them unsure about how to reconcile 
any differences between their own and policy-driven values.  
 
6.6 Young children, carnivality and ECEC: implications for practice and further 
research 
 
The discussion in this chapter so far leads us to consider how these ideas relate to current 
ECEC practice in England and what nature of further research relating to these themes, might 
benefit young children and the field. The following section looks into this further and 
addresses the study’s final research question: RQ4. What are the implications of interpreting 
young children’s humour and perceptions of young children’s humour through a Bakhtinian 
lens, for early childhood education? 
 
6.6.1 Repositioning humour: from soft ‘non’ skill to pedagogically valued disposition?  
 
The data from my pilot study provide evidence to suggest that elements of children’s humour, 
as seen in an early childhood setting, can be explained by Bakhtin’s theory of carnivalesque 
and that this illumination is potentially important for young children. Questions are raised, 
however, about practitioners’ conscious and subconscious willingness and ability to accept 
and facilitate children’s engagement with this kind of humour. If young children are to have 
the opportunity to engage in carnivalesque humour and explore their world enveloped by its 
renewing and liberating potential (White, 2013) it seems imperative for early childhood 
practitioners, and the field as a whole, to embrace children’s carnivalesque humour. 
Nevertheless, there appear to be a number of potential barriers to its recognition as 
pedagogically valuable. 
 
Firstly, the perpetuated construct of children as innocent is consolidated by political rhetoric 
presenting children as ‘adults in training’ (Sorin, 2005) which accentuates a deficit model of 
children that ties in with Sorin’s notion of children as ‘powerless and in need of adult 
protection’ (Sorin, 2005: 12). Taylor’s (2013) proposal that, ‘[i]n the western world it just 
feels like ‘second nature’ to maintain a tight grip on natural childhood as a state of innocence 
and purity and to want to preserve it’ (2013: 114) strengthens this observation. These ideas 
highlight the tangible incapacity of the early childhood sector to embrace young children’s 
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need to engage with humour that contradicts images of ‘innocence’ and ‘purity’ (White, 
2009). Tobin supports this, suggesting that, ‘[w]e speak freely of the needs and wants of 
children and their teachers, but we only whisper their desires’ (Tobin 1997: 2) leading us to 
ask whether adults are afraid of children’s desires, and how they experience pleasure, in case 
it contradicts our picture of children as the epitome of innocence (Tobin, 1997). 
 
We could liken practitioners who adopt a romantic view of childhood to Enlightenment 
Romanticists, who exercised ‘idealism…[and] false concept of the role and limitations of 
subjective consciousness’ (Bakhtin, 1984: 125). As a result of this, practitioners could be 
misconceiving children, their intentions and their attempts to communicate, just as the 
Enlightenment writer/philosopher, Voltaire, apparently misread what Rabelais was 
communicating through his carnivalesque writing (Bakhtin, 1984).  
 
Sorin and Galloway’s (2006) extensive study identifies ten constructs of children that they 
argue are prevalent throughout the world. In addition to the previously mentioned child as 
adult in training, the list includes the child as innocent (linking to the Apollonian view of 
childhood) and the child as evil (linking to the Dionysian view of childhood) (Jenks, 2006) 
but also includes: the snowballing child, who is not out of control, but is perceived as having 
more control over adults than adults have over them, and needs to be ‘reigned in’; the out of 
control child, who uses power negatively in order to manipulate people; the child as 
noble/saviour, who is ‘beautiful and beloved’ as the innocent child, but also takes on a saint-
like quality; the child as miniature adult, where childhood is not a distinct phase and children 
are the same as adults; the child as commodity, where children are seen as objects to be 
consumed by adults who are infatuated with childhood; the child as victim ‘of social and 
political forces’; and the agentic child, an optimistic construct where the child is talked of as 
‘being as opposed to ‘becoming’ (Sorin and Galloway, 2006: 13-18).  
 
6.7 Limitations of the study 
 
A number of issues presented throughout the course of this research and it is important to 
recognise their potential effect on the findings. 
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Significantly, PR Bulda left the ECE setting where the research based before the second 
round of data collection. This affected the dynamic of our dialogic research partnership, but 
we rallied and developed a new dynamic in which the four of us worked together to build 
upon the first stages of the data collection and initial analysis process. Secondly, I gained the 
impression that it was extremely difficult for the PRs to find time for this research as a result 
of their busy working lives that reflect the involved nature of ECEC practice, generally. This 
presented some issues, particularly with respect to needing to end Dialogic Encounters before 
they were ready to end. Potentially this meant that not only was potential data missed, but I 
sensed that often the PRs were clock-watching, and this affected their ability to focus. Lastly, 
I encountered technical difficulties with the Transana software and saving of data. This issue 
impacted on the data collection process when Transana failed and I lost data that had taken a 
significant length of time to piece together for us to watch and respond to in the Dialogic 
Encounters. I was able to overcome the issues, eventually, but it took away valuable time 
from the Dialogic Encounters: time that was already in short supply. These are all important 
factors that would need to be borne in mind if looking to engage in a similar research process 
in the future. 
 
6.8 Implications for practice and further research 
 
6.8.1 Children’s carnivality: inspiration for a paradigm shift in ECEC from postmodernism 
to protocarnivalism? 
 
Children’s rights rhetoric and post-modern constructions of childhood that present children as 
having agency mean that the idealised role of the practitioner is as co-constructor and co-
learner (Ødegaard, 2007) and the child is recognised as strong, rich and capable (Edwards, 
Gandini and Foreman, 1998). Epstein’s (1997) challenge over the concept of post-modernism 
resonates here and potentially facilitates the continuance of a faithful approach to the 
Bakhtinian tenets of unfinalisiability and uncertainty. Epstein argues that the post-modern 
construction of childhood, reflected within the Reggio Emilia approach, and admired within 
UK early childhood and on many UK training courses (Abbott and Nutbrown, 2001), has a 
strong temporal emphasis on the past via its conception as a paradigm that comes ‘post’ or 
after modernism. He argues for a reframing of thinking that embraces the ideas of ‘proto-’ 
and ‘trans-’, ‘reject[ing] the radical finitude’ of postmodernism, in favour of, what I argue, is 
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an inherently carnivalesque perspective. Epstein asks us to consider what can be ‘born from 
this feast of [the] death [of post-modernism] and what will be resurrected from that which 
dies?’ and suggests ‘it is these "proto-" and "trans-" phenomena-as signs of birth and 
resurrection-that will mark the long period of postmodernity, which is ahead, and which 
comes after postmodernism’ (1997: np).  
 
With Epstein’s proposition in mind, I turn to the idea of trainee early childhood practitioners’ 
engagement in courses that champion positive and constructive images of children: in other 
words, images that conflict with definitions perpetuating ideas of deficit and innocence. 
Training as a professional within an environment that advocates such positive ideas suggests, 
even if these progressive constructions do not dominate, they should at least present pause for 
thought against prevailing construct of children as naturally developing and innocent (Taylor, 
2015; Dahlberg et al, 2006). Perhaps it is not enough simply to advocate and champion 
certain approaches, however, due to a kind of cultural hegemony, meaning that authoritative 
current and historical discourses will prevail if practitioners are not encouraged to analyse 
how such monologic discourses (Bakhtin, 1984) affect their practice (Sorin, 2005). Instead, 
practitioners are left to lay new discourses on across existing ones, effecting a layer-cake 
approach to early years’ practice. In the role of co-constructor and co-learner, practitioners 
would be perfectly set to understand, accept and embrace children’s relationship with the 
carnivalesque. However, the lowest section of the layer-cake, or the most ingrained of their 
held discourses, can act as a barrier to change, by filtering through and determining their 
approach to practice. If practitioners are guided by prevailing ideas of children as innocent, 
this will affect their expectations of children. Bakhtin suggests that practitioner expectations 
of children are responsive, stating that, ‘all real and integral understanding is actively 
responsive…and the speaker himself is oriented precisely toward such an actively responsive 
understanding’ (Bakhtin 1986: 69). Thus, when early childhood practitioners anticipate 
children’s responses, the authoritative discourse of innocence may be overly influential. This 
leads to the potential for a paradigm shift in English ECEC, and perhaps the field more 
broadly, from postmodernism to protocarnivalism which I will return to this in the final 
paragraph of this chapter. 
 
White suggests that in engaging with children’s carnivalesque humour, ‘[t]he teacher plays an 
important role…since her task is not only to recognize this disposition, but also to respond 
appropriately’ (White, 2013: 905). She suggests that a possible obstacle to this is that the 
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teachers’ accountability may prevent them from recognising and responding to this form of 
humour. Gartrell (2006) suggests that practitioner engagement with humour in a classroom 
context is a ‘high level’ skill: another potential reason for practitioner concern. A 
preoccupation with the ‘serious’ and contained nature of ECE, the skill involved and the 
accountability it presents is reflected in the idea that, ‘[l]aughter and play do not allow 
themselves to be controlled and may therefore not be understood by reason that aims to find 
causes and seek defined goals’ (Øksnes, 2008: 162). Returning to the notion of children 
projecting identities or roles onto adults, to seek out who has the control, practitioners need to 
be aware of and negotiate given roles depending on the context in which the carnival is 
playing out. For example, if children are engaging in humour together away from adult gaze, 
the practitioner’s role may be as authority figure. Consequently, practitioners could 
deliberately employ a concept I call ‘positive disregard’ or make the pedagogical decision to 
‘turn a blind eye’, gifting children the freedom to communicate in their underground world. 
Da Silva Iddings and McAfferty’s (2007) findings suggest it is not necessary for children to 
be unaware of this disregard, and that it could be positive for them to note an adult’s subtle 
communication of compliance (via eye contact or a smile), as this may even enrich their 
carnivalesque experience. I offer the term ‘positive disregard’ as an alternative to ‘skilful 
neglect’ (Labbett, 1988). The distinction is that Labbett’s term describes how 
teachers/practitioners understand and act on the idea they are not always responsible for what 
children should know and therefore, in particular situations ought to resist the urge to 
intervene in children’s learning. Positive disregard requires practitioners to recognise their 
limited responsibility for what children should do, or the way they should act, given the 
multidisciplinary nature of ECE. This resonates particularly with the discourse-generated 
ideal of children engaging in play that reflects their innocence and connection with nature. In 
essence, ‘to join the carnival, or not to join the carnival?’ that is the pedagogical question; I 
argue that practitioners need to embrace children’s carnivality and recognise the its strong 
presence in early childhood practice, generally, in order that children are supported 
meaningfully and effectively in the nursery environment.  
 
 
The influence of gender, relating to the children and the adults in this study, has not been 
addressed significantly. However, Brownhill’s (2016) study into the perceived characteristics 
of male role models in early years in England suggests that there are five male 
teachers/practitioner traits that are associated with being a good role model, of which one is a 
 174 
good sense of humour. This was not a central theme within the study and resultantly 
Brownhill does not discuss how this finding in any detail, including how it may relate to 
female teachers/practitioners. He does, however, suggest that male practitioners may wish to 
consider the authenticity of their approach to practice rather than focusing too heavily on 
characteristic traits of role models which raises a question about the link between humour and 
authenticity. Any further discussion of this would be pure speculation but the idea is one that 
I would argue warrants further exploration and is a worthy topic for further research. 
 
 
The ideas from the analysis in this study of: the need for practitioners to engage in positive 
disregard in order that children can enjoy the benefits of their innate carnivality; the benefits 
of adopting a dialogic lens to better understand young children’s humour; the potential for 
children, through their carnivality, to teach practitioners about their capacity to oscillate 
between chronotopes and the benefits this may hold; and the suggestion that it would be 
positive for ECEC to adopt a new paradigm, moving away from the (ironically) backwards-
facing idea of postmodernism, to the future-bound potential of protocarnivalism; are, I argue, 
important contributions to the field of ECEC Lensmire’s aide memoire, that we need to 
recognise how, ‘[s]eriousness of purpose can lead to…fear of failing in an important 
endeavour…’ and if we continue to ignore children’s carnivalesque humour ‘…we risk 
undermining the sort of joyful, playful relation to the world and each other that would 
actually allow us to look fearlessly at the world and tell the truth about it’ (Lensmire, 2011) 
may assist us in further, meaningful exploration of these concepts. 
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Definitions and abbreviations 
 
Terms of reference: 
 
Practitioner Researchers   PRs 
Child Researchers    Children 
Early Childhood Education and Care  ECEC 
Early Years’ Settings    EYS’s 
 
 
Abbreviated Bakhtinian works: 
 
Rabelais and His World  RHW 
The Dialogic Imagination  DI 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics PDP 
Discourse in the Novel  DiN 
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Glossary 
 
Carnivality 
A term created to define young children’s carnivalesque humour in an Early Childhood Education and 
Care context, due to the distinctions between Bakhtinian carnivalesque and children’s humorous 
carnival behaviours within this context. 
 
Carnival jouissance 
A concept that combines Bakhtinian ‘carnivalesque’ (RHW) and Barthesian ‘jouissance’ (1975) to 
describe a type of joy that children can experience when engaging in carnivality. The concept 
encapsulates forms of expression and enjoyment experienced by children within a carnival context 
that are not necessarily consistent with dominant discourses of childhood innocence (Taylor, 2015).  
 
Chronotopes 
Socially constructed time-space configurations with a specific narrative character that represent 
cultural practices and values, and that operationalize the framing of the interactional situation and its 
actors’ (Kumpulainen and Rajala, 2015: 90) 
 
Positive disregard 
I offer the term ‘positive disregard’ as an alternative to ‘skilful neglect’ (Labbett, 1988). The 
distinction is that Labbett’s term describes how teachers/practitioners understand and act on the idea 
they are not always responsible for what children should know and therefore, in particular situations 
ought to resist the urge to intervene in children’s learning. 
 
Protocarnivalism 
A term to describe the paradigmatic nature of carnivality in early childhood settings and offered, in 
this thesis, as an alternative ECEC paradigm to postmodernism. 
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Statement of use of work which has formed part of solely authored publications 
 
Full details of the relevant, solely-authored publications: 
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Chapter 2: The Literature Review 
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Chapter 4: The theory chapter (!) 
Chapter 5: Analysis of an underworld 
Chapter 6: (Non) Final (isable) Thoughts 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Example of a Practitioner Researcher Analysis Journal: 
(begins on the next page) 
 
 199 
D I A L O G I C A L  A N A L Y S I S  J O U R N A L  
ELSA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200 
About the journal… 
 
T h i s  j o u r n a l  i s  a  c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  d a t a  f o r  y o u  t o  r e a d ,  
c o n s i d e r  a n d  r e s p o n d  t o .  T h e r e  a r e  s p a c e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
j o u r n a l  f o r  y o u  t o  r e c o r d  y o u r  t h o u g h t s ,  f e e l i n g s  a n d  
r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e  d a t a ,  a n d  m y  t h o u g h t s  a b o u t  t h e  d a t a .  I t  
w i l l  b e  e x t r e m e l y  h e l p f u l  i f  y o u  c a n  f i n d  a  f e w  m i n u t e s  t o  
w r i t e  s o m e t h i n g  a n d  y o u  d o  n o t  h a v e  t o  s h o w  y o u r  w r i t i n g  
t o  a n y o n e  ( i n c l u d i n g  m e ! ) .  I n  a  f e w  w e e k s ’  t i m e ,  I  w i l l  
r e t u r n  f o r  o u r  l a s t  d i a l o g i c  e n c o u n t e r .  A n y t h i n g  y o u  h a v e  
r e c o r d e d  i n  t h i s  j o u r n a l  m a y  b e  a  h e l p f u l  p r o m p t  f o r  w h e n  
w e  e n g a g e  i n  a  d i a l o g u e  a b o u t  t h e  d a t a .  T h e  j o u r n a l  
c o n t a i n s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e l e m e n t s  o f  d a t a :  
 
 
 
 
 
K e y  M o m e n t s  a n d  S t a n d  A l o n e  S n a p  S h o t s  
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
Moments 
and Stand 
Alone Snap 
Shots
Created
Dialogues
Dialogic 
Concepts 
Applied to the 
Data
'Humour' Key 
Moments 
conceptualised 
as 
carnivalesque 
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Appendix 2 
Ethics Application 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION AND LIFELONG LEARNING RESEARCH ETHICS 
COMMITTEE 
 
Guidance for Staff and Students 
 
This document is intended to provide outline guidance for UEA staff and students proposing to 
undertake a piece of research through the School of Education and Lifelong Learning (EDU). It is in line 
with the Research Ethics Policy of the University, as set out in the revised University Policy and 
Procedures Document which was accepted by Senate in 2013. Thus, this document and accompanying 
form supersedes any existing forms and protocols in use. The document should be read in conjunction 
with the “University Research Ethics Policy, Principle and Procedures” available at:  
 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/rbs/rso/research_ethics/index.htm 
 
All research carried out through EDU must be recorded with the EDU Research Ethics Committee 
(EDU-REC) using this form.  In particular, it should be noted that: 
 
All University members of staff and University-registered students (i.e. postgraduate 
research, postgraduate taught and undergraduate students) who plan to undertake 
research that falls under the scope of the Ethics Principles in the Policy must obtain 
ethics approval for the planned research prior to the involvement of the participants 
via the appropriate ethics review procedure. The Procedures also apply to all 
individuals who are performing research which is funded or managed by the 
University, be this on or off University premises. 
 
And: 
 
Research involving human participants (“participants”) is defined broadly to include 
research that:    
 • directly involves people in the research activities, through their physical 
participation. This may be invasive (e.g. surgery) or non-invasive research (e.g. 
interviews, questionnaires, surveys, observational research) and may require the 
active or passive involvement of a person;    
•  indirectly involves people in the research activities, through their provision of or 
access to personal data and/or tissue; 
•  involves people on behalf of others (e.g. legal guardians of children and the 
psychologically or physically impaired and supervisors of people under controlled 
environments (e.g. prisoners, school pupils)). 
 
All staff and students must complete and submit the form “Application for Ethical Approval of a Research 
Project” (attached below). All research must be documented using this form. Any research involving 
human participants requires full ethical review and approval by the appropriate committee. Section 5 of 
the form must be completed if the research involves human participants. Certain proposals will also 
require approval by other committees inside or outside of UEA. 
 
Although this document speaks to the procedural requirements of the University, it is important that 
people also consider the broader ethical implications of their work and, if helpful, discuss these with the 
Chair of the Research Ethics Committee.  Ethical implications should be reviewed as the research 
progresses and the committee must be updated about any significant changes. PGR students must 
discuss their application with their supervisor.   
 
The Chair of the Committee will determine the procedure through which ethical approval will be granted. 
In many cases, where the project is determined to be of minimal risk, the proposal will not be seen by 
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the full committee but will be approved by the Chair or Deputy Chair in an expedited manner. Research 
must not begin on any project until ethical approval has been granted. 
 
Chair of EDU Research Ethics Committee, 2013/14 
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UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA 
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION AND LIFELONG LEARNING RESEARCH ETHICS 
COMMITTEE 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL OF A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
This form is for all staff and students in the School of Education who are planning research. 
Applicants are advised to consult the school and university guidelines before preparing their 
application by visiting http://www.uea.ac.uk/rbs/rso/research_ethics/index.htm and reading 
the EDU Research Ethics Handbook.  Staff and Postgraduate (PGR) student applications 
(including the required attachments) must be submitted electronically to Dawn Corby 
d.corby@uea.ac.uk, two weeks before a scheduled committee meeting.  Undergraduate 
students and other students must follow the procedures determined by their course of study. 
 
The Research Ethics page of the EDU website provides links to the University Research Ethics 
Committee, the UEA ethics policy guidelines, ethics guidelines from BERA and the ESRC, 
and resources from the academic literature, as well as relevant policy updates: 
www.uea.ac.uk/edu/research/researchethics.  If you are involved in counselling research you 
should consult the BACP Guidelines for Research Ethics: 
www.bacp.co.uk/research/ethical_guidelines.php. 
 
Applications must be approved by the Research Ethics Committee before beginning 
data generation or approaching potential research participants. 
 
1. APPLICANT DETAILS  
Name: Laura Tallant 
School: School of Education and Lifelong Learning 
Current Status: PGR Student  
If PGR Student, name of primary supervisor and programme of study: 
Victoria Carrington: PhD Education 
If UG student or other student, name of Course and Module: 
UEA Email address: l.tallant@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
2. PROPOSED RESEARCH PROJECT DETAILS: 
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Title: Laughing in the Underworld: A Bakhtinian Analysis of Young Children’s 
Humour and Practitioner Responses to and Perceptions of it, in a Nursery 
Setting 
Start/End Dates: November 2014 January 2014 
 
 
3. FUNDER DETAILS (IF APPLICABLE): 
Funder:  N/A 
 Has funding been applied for?  YES    NO    Application Date:  
 Has funding been awarded?  YES     NO 
Will ethical approval also be sought for this project from another source? NO 
 If “yes” what is this source?     
 
 
 
4. APPLICATION FORM FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS:                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
1.1. Briefly outline your research focus and questions or aims (no more than 300 words). 
 
1. Methodological Approach 
I intend to conduct fieldwork for my doctoral research using a number of established dialogic 
research methods, many of which were operationalised by White in her 2009 doctoral 
research, are detailed by Sullivan (2012) and discussed by Helin (2013). ‘Dialogic 
inquiry…involves the use of methods that ‘examine’ the active and responsive nature of language 
among participants in appropriating, constructing, and reconstructing knowledge for self and 
other’ and is based upon the Bakhtinian notion of dialogue (Kotsopoulos, 2010). The 
methodological approach adopted in the research reflects this stance. The focus of the 
study is to explore the nature of children’s humour in a nursery setting and early childhood 
practitioners’ perceptions of, responses to and thoughts about the children’s humour.  
 
 
1.2. Briefly outline your proposed research methods, including who will be your 
research participants and where you will be working (no more than 300 words). 
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2. Research and Data Collection Methods that Reflect a Dialogic Stance 
2.1 Observations 
I will conduct video observations of child participants who are based in one room in a 
nursery, and are between the ages of 3 and 5 years old; and four practitioner participants 
who work with those children.  
2.2 Cameras 
Three static cameras will be set up within the nursery to film the participants as seen in 
research conducted by Keyes (2006), Loizou (2007) and Riordan and Marshall (2008).  
 
In addition, all adult and child participants and I will wear a head-mounted camera. 
Everyone will have his/her own head-mounted camera for the duration of the research. The 
use of head-mounted cameras by adults is well established in research with young children 
(Pereira et al, no date; Darbyshire et al, 2005; Yoshida and Smith, 2008; Aslin, 2009). It 
provides a non-disruptive and accurate practitioner-eye view of children. Children wearing 
head-mounted cameras for research purposes is also well-documented in published 
research by Aslin (2008, 2009, 2012), Murray et al (2007) Adolf et al (2008), Clearfield 
(2011) and Frank (2012) due to them aiding access to a child’s point of view (White, 2009).  
1.3. Location Considerations 
The door to the outside space will remain closed for the duration of the observation to 
prevent children from inadvertently filming anyone who has not given consent. A temporary 
ribbon curtain will be placed at the doors to the bathrooms, along with a large photo of a 
head-camera and an arrow from the picture to a box, in which the children will be asked to 
place their head cameras before going into the bathroom. An adult will also monitor the 
bathroom door at all times throughout the observation to ensure children do not forget to 
take off the camera before going into the bathroom.  
2.4 Dialogic Encounters 
 ‘Loosely structured’ biographic (Sawyer and Norris, 2012) and response interviews 
(dialogic encounters (White, 2009)) will be conducted and video-recorded by a static 
camera (as seen in research by King and Horrocks, 2010) with all participants (the 
biographic encounters will take place with practitioner participants only) to provide footage 
to be analysed by the participants and me in the secondary dialogic encounters.  
2.4.1 Primary Response Encounters 
Participants will view video clips of the practitioner and child participants spontaneously 
displaying or responding to humour, and express responses. This approach can aid recall 
for both adults and children (Dockett and Perry, 2005). In line with a dialogic approach, the 
participants will also develop categories or ‘genres’ (Bakhtin, 1984) (as seen in White’s 
2009 doctoral research – see p73 for an explanation of how participants were asked to 
attempt to recognize genres) for the displays of and responses to humour, which will be 
compared with previously, prepared carnivalesque codes.  
2.4.2 Secondary Response Encounters 
Secondary response encounters will be conducted (Sullivan, 2012) presenting all 
participants with an opportunity to watch the video of the primary dialogic encounters and 
explain, change and/or expand upon their comments in the initial encounter, helping to keep 
the participants and their views at the centre of the research - once again in keeping with a 
dialogic process (Sullivan, 2012).  
2.5 Research Journals and Research Mediators 
The four practitioner participants may keep research journals: only the practitioner 
participants and I (if the practitioners are in agreement) will have access to these. In 
response to Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the 
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child participants will have open access to a ‘research mediator’ with experience of working with 
very young children who will answer any questions the children may have over the course of the 
research and beyond, and who will advocate on their behalf at all times. The research mediator 
will be the child participants’ key person and therefore someone the children feel 
comfortable with and can speak to about any aspect of their participation in the research, 
should they wish to (Elfer et al, 2005). This information will be presented to the children in 
an appropriate and accessible manner as judged appropriate by their key person.  
3. Data 
All data will be kept secure and safe at all times – the digital data will be kept on a 
password protected computer within my home and all paper documents will be kept in an 
anonymous, secure location, also in my home. 
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1.3. Briefly explain how you plan to gain access to prospective research participants. 
(no more than 300 words). 
 
• If children/young people (or other vulnerable people, such as people with mental 
illness) are to be involved, give details of how gatekeeper permission will be 
obtained. 
• Is there any sense in which participants might be ‘obliged’ to participate – as in 
the case of students, prisoners or patients – or are volunteers being recruited? 
Entitlement to withdraw consent must be indicated and when that entitlement 
lapses.  
 
1. Research Location 
I intend to approach a local nursery setting, the manager of which is known to me in a 
professional context. As gatekeeper, she will provide written agreement for the study to 
take place at the nursery. 
2. Consent  
2.1 Child participants 
I will provide opt-in consent forms and a project information sheet (attached) for the parents 
of all child participants to sign (Wiles et al, 2004). I (along with the child participants’ 
research mediator) will consult the child participants and make clear to them that if they do 
not wish to take part in the research at any point all they need do is express their wishes. I 
will remain sensitive to the children’s efforts to communicate their ongoing consent to take 
part and will fully respect the children’s wishes should they demonstrate that they are not 
content at any stage of the process. I will remain sensitive to my ‘ethical radar’ (Skånfors, 
2009) which may alert me to the various which ‘children can and do express their 
resistance’ (Skånfors, 2009:15) 
 
           2.2 Practitioner participants 
I will provide opt-in consent forms for the four practitioner participants (attached). I will 
provide opt-in consent forms for all parents of the children who may be captured on video 
during the process of the pilot study, and opt-out consent forms for all early childhood 
practitioners in the same situation (Wiles et al, 2004). If any parents, children or 
practitioners do not wish to be recorded I will arrange that the recording take place when 
they are not present.  
3. Access to Video Footage 
I will make clear to all children, parents of children and early years practitioners who may 
be captured on video that selected sections of the video will only be used for the purpose 
of my research and will not be viewed by anyone other than myself, my examiners, all 
research participants, the child participants’ parents and my doctoral supervisors (Victoria 
Carrington and Nigel Norris). The videos will be kept safe and secure at all times (on a 
password protected computer in my home). It will be made clear to all participants that they 
have the right to withdraw at any stage of the research process.  
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1.4. Please state who will have access to the data and what measures will be adopted 
to maintain the confidentiality of the research subject and to comply with data 
protection requirements e.g. will the data be anonymised? (No more than 300 
words.) 
 
The only parties who will have access to the unpublished raw data are the participants, the 
child participants’ parents, my doctoral supervisors, Victoria Carrington and Nigel Norris 
and myself. Any written names will be anonymised.  
 
 
1.5. Will you require access to data on participants held by a third party?  In cases where 
participants will be identified from information held by another party (for example, 
a doctor or school) describe the arrangements you intend to make to gain access 
to this information (no more than 300 words). 
 
No information on participants will be required from a third party. Any information gained 
about the participants will come from the participants only. Should, for any reason, written 
information be passed on from nursery staff to me concerning the participants, all names 
and/or information that might make them identifiable will be anonymised, and the 
documents will be kept secure and safe at all times, in an anonymous, secure location in 
my home. 
 
 
1.6. Please give details of how consent is to be obtained (no more than 300 words).  
 
Copies of proposed information sheets and consent forms, written in simple, non-
technical language, MUST accompany this proposal form. You may need more than 
one information sheet and consent form for different types of participants. (Do not 
include the text of these documents in this space). 
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I will provide opt-in consent forms (attached) for the parents of the child participants to sign 
(Wiles et al, 2004). I will consult the children and make clear to them that if, at any point, 
they do not wish to take part in the research all they need do is express their wishes, as 
recognised by me, the child’s research mediator or any other person involved. I will to 
remain sensitive to the children’s efforts to communicate their ongoing consent to take part 
and fully respect their wishes should they demonstrate they are not content with any stage 
of the process. I will also remain sensitive to my ‘ethical radar’ (Skånfors, 2009) which may 
alert me to the various which ‘children can and do express their resistance’ (Skånfors, 
2009:15) 
 
I will provide opt-in consent forms for the practitioner researchers (attached). I will provide 
opt-in consent forms for all parents of children who may be captured on video during the 
pilot process and opt-out consent forms for all early childhood practitioners in the same 
situation (attached) (Wiles et al, 2004). If any practitioners, children or parents of children 
who may be captured on camera are not content with the situation, I will try to arrange for 
recording to take place when they are not present. If this is not possible, no video recording 
will take place and any observations conducted will be handwritten, not video recorded. 
 
 
1.7. If any payment or incentive will be made to any participant, please explain what it is and 
provide the justification (no more than 300 words).  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
1.8. What is the anticipated use of the data, forms of publication and dissemination of 
findings etc.? (No more than 300 words.) 
 
 
Data will be used to inform analysis and will be used in PhD thesis publications and possibly 
academic conference presentations. All participants and parents/carers of child participants 
will be made aware of this.  
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1.9. Will the data or findings of this research/project be made available to participants? If 
so, specify the form and timescale for feedback. What commitments will be made to 
participants regarding feedback? How will these obligations be verified? (No more than 
300 words.) 
 
The participants and the child participants’ parents will have open access to the data 
throughout the life of the project and all participants will be actively encouraged to engage 
with the data throughout. 
 
 
1.10. Please add here any other ethical considerations the ethics committee may need 
to be made aware of (no more than 300 words). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED ONLY IF 
THEY APPLY TO THIS RESEARCH.  THEY MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE.                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
1.11. What risks or costs to the participants are entailed in involvement in the 
research/project? Are there any potential physical, psychological or disclosure 
dangers that can be anticipated? What is the possible benefit or harm to the subject 
or society from their participation or from the project as a whole? What procedures 
have been established for the care and protection of participants (e.g. insurance, 
medical cover) and the control of any information gained from them or about them?  
 
N/A 
 
 
 
1.12. Comment on any cultural, social or gender-based characteristics of the 
participants which have affected the design of the project or which may affect its 
conduct.  
 
N/A 
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1.13. Identify any significant environmental impacts arising from your research/project 
and the measures you will take to minimise risk of impact. 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
1.14. Please state any precautions being taken to protect your health and safety.  Have 
you taken out travel and health insurance for the full period of the research?  If not, 
why not.  Have you read and acted upon FCO travel advice (website)?  If acted upon, 
how?  
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
1.15. Please state any precautions being taken to protect the health and safety of 
other researchers and others associated with the project (as distinct from the 
participants or the applicant).  
 
N/A 
 
 
 
1.16. The UEA’s staff and students will seek to comply with travel and research guidance 
provided by the British Government and the Governments (and Embassies) of host 
countries.  This pertains to research permission, in-country ethical clearance, visas, 
health and safety information, and other travel advisory notices where applicable.   If 
this research project is being undertaken outside the UK, has formal permission/a 
research permit been sought to conduct this research?  Please describe the action you 
have taken and if a formal permit has not been sought please explain why this is not 
necessary/appropriate (for very short studies it is not always appropriate to apply for 
formal clearance, for example).  
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
1.17. Are there any procedures in place for external monitoring of the research, for 
instance by a funding agency? 
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N/A 
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5. DECLARATION: 
 
Please complete the following boxes with YES, NO, or NOT APPLICABLE: 
 
I have read (and discussed with my supervisor if student) the University’s Research Ethics Policy, 
Principle and Procedures, and consulted the British Educational Research Association’s Revised 
Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research and other  available documentation on the EDU 
Research Ethics webpage and, when appropriate, the BACP Guidelines for Research Ethics. 
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I am aware of the relevant sections of the Data Protection Act (1998): 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm and Freedom of Information Act (2005). 
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Data gathering activities involving schools and other organizations will be carried out only with the 
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Prospective participants will be informed that data collected will be treated in the strictest confidence 
and will only be reported in anonymised form  
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All potential participants will be asked to give their explicit, written consent to participating in the 
research, and, where consent is given, separate copies of this will be retained by both researcher 
and participant. 
YES 
In addition to the consent of the individuals concerned, the signed consent of a parent/carer will be 
required to sanction the participation of minors (i.e. persons under 16 years of age).  
YES 
Undue pressure will not be placed on individuals or institutions to participate in research activities. YES 
The treatment of potential research participants will in no way be prejudiced if they choose not to 
participate in the project. 
YES 
I will provide participants with my UEA contact details (not my personal contact details) and those 
of my supervisor, in order that they are able to make contact in relation to any aspect of the research, 
should they wish to do so.  I will notify participants that complaints can be made to the Head of 
School. 
YES 
Participants will be made aware that they may freely withdraw from the project at any time without 
risk or prejudice.   
YES 
Research will be carried out with regard for mutually convenient times and negotiated in a way that 
seeks to minimise disruption to schedules and burdens on participants  
YES 
At all times during the conduct of the research I will behave in an appropriate, professional manner 
and take steps to ensure that neither myself nor research participants are placed at risk. 
YES 
The dignity and interests of research participants will be respected at all times, and steps will be 
taken to ensure that no harm will result from participating in the research 
YES 
The views of all participants in the research will be respected. YES 
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Special efforts will be made to be sensitive to differences relating to age, culture, disability, race, 
sex, religion and sexual orientation, amongst research participants, when planning, conducting and 
reporting on the research. 
YES 
Data generated by the research (e.g. transcripts of research interviews) will be kept in a safe and 
secure location and will be used purely for the purposes of the research project (including 
dissemination of findings).  No-one other than research colleagues, professional transcribers and 
supervisors will have access to any identifiable raw data collected, unless written permission has 
been explicitly given by the identified research participant. 
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Research participants will have the right of access to any data pertaining to them. YES 
All necessary steps will be taken to protect the privacy and ensure the anonymity and non-
traceability of participants – e.g. by the use of pseudonyms, for both individual and institutional 
participants, in any written reports of the research and other forms of dissemination. 
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I am satisfied that all ethical issues have been identified and that satisfactory 
procedures are in place to deal with those issues in this research project. I will abide 
by the procedures described in this form. 
 
 
Name of Applicant: Laura Tallant 
  
Date: 22.01.2014 
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I have discussed the ethics of the proposed research with the student and am satisfied 
that all ethical issues have been identified and that satisfactory procedures are in place 
to deal with those issues in this research project. 
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Date: 08.01.2014 
 
 
6. ATTACHMENTS: 
 
The following should be attached to your application as necessary – please indicate if 
attached and list any additional materials: 
 
* Project Information Sheet (for participants) 
* Participant Consent Form(s)     
* Other Supporting Documents 
 
 
EDU ETHICS COMMITTEE 2013/1 
 220 
 
Appendix 3 
Example of Key Moment selection process: 
Head Cam Clip Database 
 
Head Cam Time 
(With lead up 
and lead down 
(restoration?)) 
People 
involved 
Event Indication 
of humour 
Cross 
Reference 
1. Elsa (Obs 
1a) 
1.50ish Ed Sand tray, 
laughing 
Laughter  
2. Elsa (Obs 
1a) 
3.28ish Harry, 
Pedro, Leo, 
Sam 
Computer, 
dancing, 
laughing 
Laughter  
3. Elsa (Obs 
1a)  
6.20ish Sabina ‘I’ve been 
looking in the 
mirror’ 
smiling 
Smiling  
3. Elsa (Obs 
1a) 
8.30ish Harry, Leo, 
Pedro 
‘Scary baby’ 
laughing 
Laughter  
4. Elsa (Obs 
1b) 
3.00ish Chloe, Zoe Egg, beans and 
sausages 
Laughter  
5. Elsa (Obs 
1b) 
4.50ish Zoe, Chloe 
(then James) 
Maman Laughter  
6. Elsa (Obs 
1b) 
5.28ish Zoe, Chloe 
and James 
‘It’s working 
again’ and 
‘how did she 
get up there?’ 
Laughter  
7. Elsa (Obs 
1b) 
6.18ish James, Zoe 
and Chloe, 
Madi, Sam 
Juicy James Laughter  
8. Elsa (Obs 
1b) 
8.50ish James Rapunzel let 
down your 
hair 
Smiling and 
laughter 
 
9. Elsa (Obs 
1b carried 
over into 1c) 
10.03ish James, 
Chloe 
My headband 
went on my 
nose 
Smiling and 
laughter 
 
10. Elsa 
(Obs 1c) 
2.10ish James Because he 
poos 
Laughter  
11. Pedro 
(Obs 1a) 
7.00ish Leo, Dhruva Sandcastles 
and Bears 
Smiling, 
some quiet 
laughter 
 
`12. 
Nathanial 
(Obs 1a) 
1.00ish Gerda I’ve got two? Laughter  
 
13. 
Nathanial 
(Obs 1a) 
3.00 ish Pedro Round and 
round 
Laughter  
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14. 
Nathanial 
(Obs 1a) 
5.50ish Pedro, Elsa 
(look up 
4.50ish) 
Man on the 
moon nah nah 
nah 
Laughter  
15. Aled 
(Obs 1b) 
3.20ish Ana Oh no, it’s 
going 
backwards! 
Laughter  
16. Aled 
(Obs 1b) 
6.10ish Ethan, Leo, 
Pedro 
Sandcastles 
and Bears (I 
don’t want any 
bears to come 
out…) 
 11 
 
17. Aled 
(Obs 1b) 
8.50ish Ethan, 
Pedro, Leo 
A lovely 
pattern…he’s 
making into 
blocks 
Laughter  
18. 
Nathanial 
(Obs 1a) 
9.05ish Pedro 
(Pedro’s 
comment 
but did not 
catch it on 
his head 
camera), 
Elsa, Madi,  
Madi chair, 
Ethan chair! 
  
 
Nathanial 
(Obs 1a) 
9.20ish Pedro, Laura O, oh! Smiling and 
quiet 
laughter 
 
Sebastian 
(Obs 1a) 
0.20 Gerda Look, look! Smiling, 
quiet 
laughter 
 
Sebastian 
(Obs 1a) 
8.10ish Elsa It’s working 
again and How 
did she get up 
there? 
Smiling 6 
Sebastian 
(Obs 1a 
going into 
1b) 
9.10ish Elsa, Sabina, 
Sam, Madi, 
Zoe 
Juicy James, 
Sammy Snake, 
Marvellous 
Madi and 
Zippy Zoe 
Laughing 7 
Sebastian 
Obs 1b 
2.16ish Elsa, Laura Your sponge 
has popped 
out! 
Laughing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
Appendix 4 
Example of the head camera band and head camera used in the study: 
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Appendix 5 
Example of the polyphonic video screen with 2 different perspectives of the 
same event (taken from individual head cameras). 
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Appendix 6 
Fieldwork timetables 
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